Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

151. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, November 19, 1985, 11:27–12:15 p.m.

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA
November, 1985

First Plenary Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

• United States

  • President Ronald Reagan
  • George Shultz, Secretary of State
  • Donald T. Regan, Chief of Staff, White House
  • Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Arthur Hartman, Ambassador to the USSR
  • Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
  • Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Robie M. Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
  • Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

• Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

  • General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
  • Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
  • Aleksandr Yakovlev, Chief, Propaganda Department, Central Committee, CPSU
  • Leonid M. Zamyatin, Chief, International Information Department, Central Committee, CPSU
  • Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to General Secretary Gorbachev
  • Sergey P. Tarasenko, Assistant to Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Yury P. Uspensky,² Interpreter

The President and the General Secretary emerged from their private meeting and greeted each member of the other’s delegation. There was then a photo opportunity. The two delegations were then seated.

The President opened the meeting by stating to the General Secretary that he was pleased that the meeting is finally underway. He noted that the two of them had been talking about how important their meetings are, and then turned the floor over to the General Secretary.

Gorbachev thanked the President. He noted that he and the President had agreed that it was important to have a constructive exchange of views at this meeting. As he had already said during their private meeting, the Soviet Union attaches a lot of importance to this meeting and to the fact that it is taking place after almost seven years since the last summit. A lot of things have changed in the world and in both of our countries. Many problems have come up which are of concern to the American people, to the Soviet people and to their leaders. We regard this meeting as a positive event, he added.

Gorbachev then returned to the question of how to proceed and at what level. He shared the view that we need to bolster confidence in our relationship. We need to think together about a mechanism for implementing this idea. This should include a political dialogue at various levels. It is not good when for extended periods our relationship is reduced to having our entire dialogue take place via the press. He understood that this was the President’s idea about dialogue. The President had said that he was for talking to each other rather than about each other. The task before us is strengthening confidence. We should be looking for opportunities in various areas, for example trade and economic relations can be helpful.

Experience has shown that the Soviet Union and the United States can live without each other in the area of trade and economics. But they cannot hope that a strong peace and understanding will emerge without active links and relationships. Economic and commercial ties are important not only in themselves but also as a political link. There needs to be a material basis for the political process.

Some underestimate this fact, he continued. Sometimes these relations are used in a way which is detrimental to the process we want. This had happened in the past. He would note that the President had seen that, and had lifted the grain embargo. But, unfortunately, this action was not followed by other steps. There is interest among U.S. businessmen and in Soviet economic circles. Commercial ties can be part of the mechanism of trust.

Gorbachev said that he welcomed the President’s idea for a broad based exchange of people in science, culture and other areas. He was pleased that American people are interested in a greater understanding of the Soviet people and noted that American travel to the Soviet Union was going up and had reached some 50,000 annually. He also welcomed a more lively and dynamic set of contacts between foreign ministries and embassies. High level summits should fit in with this and be the centerpiece of our mechanism for building trust.

The General Secretary said that he would build on this subject of dialogue in greater detail. He mentioned it now since he understood that it is a subject of special importance to the President.

He then returned to what he called the central point: that after many years the two leaders are meeting at a time when relations are at the lowest level ever. He did not know whether the President and his Administration find this good. The President’s recent statements seemed to indicate that he wants improved relations. This is definitely the Soviet desire. They feel that despite all the existing differences and without simplifying difficulties, the two sides have to get down to steering their relations into a normal channel. He had said in their private meeting that the Soviet leadership as a whole is for this improvement, that he did not see any opposition to this view. The Soviet leadership is united in a desire to improve relations, if that is the U.S. desire. The Soviet Union is willing to accommodate the United States without preconditions. He stated this because the U.S. has set conditions for an improvement in relations. This has been unacceptable in the past, and continues to be unacceptable.

He mentioned that in Moscow he had said to Secretary Shultz and National Security Advisor McFarlane that he wanted our relations and the process of making policies to be free of delusions.³ There seem to be several delusions on the part of the American ruling class, to judge by some studies put out by U.S. “think tanks.” These include such ideas as the contention that the Soviet economy is in a perilous state and therefore it can be subject to the pressure of an arms race to give more leverage to U.S. foreign policy. Or that the Soviet Union is lagging behind in high technology so that the United States can rush ahead and achieve military superiority. Or that the Soviet Union seeks military superiority.

He would note here what he had said to Shultz and McFarlane. The Soviet Union is often accused of causing problems for the United States in Europe and in the Third World. The two sides may have differences on concrete situations and on specific bilateral and international matters. But the USSR proceeds from a recognition of the role and weight of the United States in international affairs. The Soviets duly appreciate American achievements in technology, service and other spheres—the fruits of labor of the American people. The Soviets greatly respect the Americans. This is most important. Yes, there are differences: political, ideological, and in terms of values. But we have managed to stay alive for many years. And we have never been at war with each other. Let us pray to God that this never happens. The broad and fundamental approach he had described would make an improvement in relations possible.

He continued that it would be bad if instead of policy we have only public reactions and pinpricks. This can happen on occasion, but it is a different matter if this becomes the policy itself. This would make both the United States and the Soviet Union insecure. There needs to be a long-term prospect for the future of our relations. The Soviet Union holds that it is necessary to develop a new policy. Our countries should not be captive to outdated approaches. Life has changed and it is always changing.

He continued that whatever the two sides try to do in setting policies, the peoples of the world attach priority to the issue of war and peace. If the two of them are unable to tackle this issue, it is difficult to see how they can deal with others. This would devalue the whole process. They must deal with the critical, pivotal issue of peace and war. Their meeting must conclude by giving an impulse to the negotiations in Geneva. Of course they can send their negotiators back to Geneva. But if he and the President go home without giving any greater hope or impulse to the process, they will take a scolding in their countries and in the world. Isn’t this precisely the issue which must be at the center of their attention?

Gorbachev continued that there are people linked to military affairs in both countries. He realized that there are people who earn their living from these matters. But studies in both countries have shown, what for example, Japan and the FRG have been able to do with little expenditure on the military. They have experienced an economic upsurge. Soviet and American scholars have shown that one job in the military sector is three times as costly as in the civilian sector. More jobs can be created if money is channeled into civilian areas. The situation is so acute that if they returned without saying anything about arms control, about the first priority issue, people will maintain that this meeting gave birth to a mouse.

The United States has economic problems and the Soviet Union has them. Each knows his own problems better. But both could do better if they could release resources to the civilian economy. He knew what institutions like the Heritage Foundation—which advised the Administration particularly when the President was running for office the first and second time—were saying. Before this meeting, they had been saying that the United States should use the arms race to frustrate Gorbachev’s plans, to weaken the Soviet Union. But history teaches that this was not possible earlier even when the Soviet Union was not so strong. Now that it is even stronger, this is a delusion. The Soviet Union is an enormous country which will take care of its problems.

Gorbachev continued that of course there are many problems which are particularly acute in the developing world. It makes the United States and the Soviet Union selfish to devote so much money to the military when the destiny of millions and billions of people is at stake. It should not be a surprise that there are protests against this in Latin America, Africa and elsewhere. The military is devouring huge resources. The two of them must take a realistic approach to this.

Gorbachev added that he believes there is a basis for movement to meet each other’s concerns. The President had recently said that a nuclear war must never be fought.⁴ He agreed. The President had said that they should proceed on an equal basis. He agreed. The President had said he was for exchange among our peoples. The Soviet side agreed with this as well, so long as it was within a framework of respect for sovereignty and the values each society had developed. There must be a respect for the path each side has chosen.

He then said that they often hear the United States argue that there should be no agreement signed, no document signed that is not consistent with United States national interest. He would not quarrel with this, but how is one to understand national interests if there is no restraint in defining them? Can there be a right to exploit others or to impinge on the security of others in the name of one’s security? He could say for himself that this is not the way to define one’s interests. He recalled a conversation with Prime Minister Thatcher in which she quoted Lord Palmerston that nations have no permanent enemies only permanent interests. He agrees with this and would say that the Soviet Union is implementing its interests in the community of nations. Both of us must take the interests of others into account.

However, what is the Soviet Union to think if the United States asserts a vital interest in areas distant from it, areas which often are very near the Soviet Union? Many zones are declared vital interests of the United States. The Soviet Union fails to understand how the United States cannot take account of other countries’ interests.

Gorbachev stated that he was hopeful that when they came to the afternoon discussion, both sides could express their views about war and peace and disarmament. He would like in conclusion of his overview of the world situation to state that the Soviet Union believes that the central question is how to halt the arms race and to disarm. For its part, the Soviet Union would not put forward proposals which would be detrimental to the United States. They are for equal security. If anything detrimental to the United States was proposed, this would not be acceptable to the Soviet Union because it would not make for stability. The Soviet Union has no ulterior motives. What the President has said about equal security, no superiority and movement toward halting the arms race are the conditions for building a cooperative relationship. The United States is losing a big market in the Soviet Union; the Soviets have good economic cooperation with other countries.

Gorbachev continued that we can live in this world only together, so both must think how to put relations on a new track. If the United States thinks that by saying these things, Gorbachev is showing weakness, that the Soviet Union is more interested than the United States, then this will all come to nothing. The Soviet Union will not permit an unequal approach but if there is on the U.S. side a positive will, the United States will find the Soviets an active participant in the process.

President Reagan then began his presentation. He said that as he had noted earlier, if the two sides are to get down to the business of reducing the mountains of weapons, then both must get at the cause of the distrust which had led to building these weapons. Why does the distrust and suspicion exist? We fought together in two wars. Americans who had been bringing in supplies to help the Soviet Union in the second world war are buried near Murmansk. When that war ended, the Americans were the only ones whose industry had not been bombed and who had not sustained great losses. The Americans were the only ones who had a weapon of great devastation, the nuclear weapon. They were the only ones able to use it if they had wanted to. But they reduced their armed forces from twelve million to a million and a half and allowed their navy to go down from a thousand ships to less than half that number. And the United States began making proposals to the Soviet Union and the world about sharing nuclear technology and doing away with the weapon. Eighteen times before this meeting the United States had proposed meetings to discuss arms reduction and for twelve of those times the United States had nuclear superiority. The United States was willing to give it up. Most of these times the United States did not get cooperation from Gorbachev’s predecessors.

The President stated that this is the first meeting where we have sat down to consider reducing arms. The other meetings dealt only with regulating the increase in these weapons. In 1980 he had said that he could not condone this approach, but that he would stay at the negotiating table as long as it might take to get real reductions. He recalled that the Soviet leaders had talked about a one-world communist state and had been inspiring revolutions around the world. The United States had watched the Soviet military buildup, including in nuclear weapons. This came after dozens of United States proposals. The United States has fewer nuclear weapons than in 1969, but the Soviet buildup since then has been the greatest in history. Yes, he had made a promise to refurbish the American military and this has been done, but the United States is still behind: The Soviet Union has 5.4 million men in their armed forces: The U.S. has 2.4 million men. The United States also sees an expansionist Soviet Union. It has a satellite in Cuba just 90 miles off our shores. We had problems there with nuclear missiles but this was settled. Now we see Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola and Yemen—with for example 35,000 Cubans in Angola.

The President stated that he was setting out all of this to explain the basis for American concern and distrust. With regard to our military industry having a policy effect, he noted that our budget for humanitarian affairs—for the elderly and handicapped and for other social needs—is greater than our total military budget. Two thirds of our military spending pays for manpower; only a small percentage is spent on equipment. The total military budget is a very small percentage of our GNP; of course we would be better off without it. The basic interest of our industry is consumer products, for example the automobile and airplane industry. The United States has no economic interest in continuing a military buildup.

The President said that now the two sides have come to this meeting he had said frankly why the American people had fears. Maybe not fears of war, but that the Soviet Union could acquire such an imbalance of strength that it could deliver an ultimatum. The United States has seen violations of arms control agreements already signed. The United States is ready to try to meet the Soviet Union’s concerns if the Soviet Union is ready to meet ours. But more than words are needed. We need to get on to deeds. If we just get in bargaining over the numbers of particular types of weapons we are likely to go on trying to keep advantages. But deeds can relieve mistrust, if we can go on the basis of trust, then those mountains of weapons will shrink quickly as we will be confident that they are not needed.

The President continued by saying that we are the two superpowers. No other nations in the world can do what the Soviet Union and the United States can. They are the only ones which can bring about a world war. The only ones. That is a measure of their responsibility. The two must remove the causes of distrust. History since World War II has shown that if the United States had any hostile designs it was in a position to impose its will with little danger to itself. Indeed the United States had set out to reduce its superiority.

The President then said that today he wanted to talk about one specific question. Gorbachev had said that the United States was interested in achieving a first strike capability by having an anti-missile shield which would destroy missiles before they hit the target. The United States did not know whether this would be possible. The United States had a research program. The Soviet Union had the same kind of program. The United States has some hope that it might be possible. If both sides continue their research and if one or both come up with such a system then they should sit down and make it available to everyone so no one would have a fear of a nuclear strike. A mad man might come along with a nuclear weapon. If we could come up with a shield and share it, then nobody would worry about the mad man. He didn’t even want to call this a weapon; it was a defensive system.

The President said that he hoped he had made clear that it is the sincerest desire of the United States to eliminate these suspicions. When he thinks of our two great powers, and of how many areas we could cooperate in helping the world, he thinks about how we must do this with deeds. This is the best way for both of us to assure the other that they have no hostile intent.

Gorbachev asked whether there was any more time. Should they stick to their schedule?

The President responded that he thought they should stick to the schedule as it calls next for lunch.

Gorbachev said this was fine and he would respond when they resumed after lunch if the President would give him the floor.

The President said that the floor was Gorbachev’s.

Gorbachev said that he understood they would get into more specific discussion in the afternoon.⁵

The President agreed, and the meeting ended at 12:15 P.M.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Reykjavik Meeting—Geneva Materials 10/12/1986–10/13/1986 (1). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Palmer and Matlock. The meeting took place in the Maison Fleur d’Eau. On November 19, in his personal diary, Reagan summarized the morning meetings: “This was the day. Mr. G & I met. We were scheduled for 15 min. of pvt. one on one—we did an hour which excited the h—-I out of the Press. Then we joined the plenary meeting. I gave him the floor 1st and he did a pitch about us not trusting them etc. We should have no pre-conditions set before any agreement about better relations. ‘Our ruling class (munitions makers) keep our people upset at the Soviets so they can sell more weapons.’ He also took off on the Heretage [Heritage] Foundation & think tanks that do the same. He said we had declared zones of special interest around the world but attacked the U.S.S.R. when they did the same thing. We must recognize right of people to a revolution. Well finally it was my turn and I took them all the way through the history of Soviet aggression etc. We broke for lunch but I assured him he’d have the floor to rebut me after lunch. Our gang told me I’d done good.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, pp. 541–542; brackets are in the original quote)
2. Nikolai Uspensky is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspensky.
3. See Document 138.
4. See “Radio Address to the Nation and the World on the Upcoming Soviet-United States Summit Meeting in Geneva,” November 9, 1985, Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book II, pp. 1362–1364; and Address to the Nation on the Upcoming Soviet-United States Summit Meeting in Geneva,” November 14, 1985, Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book II, pp. 1388–1391. For the second address, see also Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 255.
5. In his memoir, Gorbachev recollected of the first plenary: “The first round of talks showed the extent and sharpness of the existing antagonism, mutual mistrust and ‘political deafness.’” He continued: “We had lunch at our residence, and I shared my impressions of my tête-à-tête with Reagan with my colleagues. Reagan appeared to me not simply a conservative, but a political ‘dinosaur.’ We agreed that we must take a firm stand in the talks but at the same time stick to our principal objective, without missing the slightest opportunity to achieve a breakthrough towards reasonable solutions.” (Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 406)