Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

117. Memorandum From Edward Ifft of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs (Holmes)¹

Geneva, November 7, 1985

SUBJECT

• Round III Assessment

It is rather difficult to produce my usual end-of-round assessment this time, given the fluidity of the current situation. The fast-moving preparations for the November Meeting,² to which the Delegation has not been a party, may make such a report OBE before it is written. Nevertheless, a Geneva perspective, particularly on the Soviet approach and where it seems to be heading, may be helpful. You are, of course, in a better position than I to judge how best to bring these observations to bear on the U.S. position for the November Meeting and beyond. Clearly we will want to revisit many of these issues after the November Meeting is over.

I am also attaching a short paper on the status of the negotiations which I prepared for the Delegation. I would be happy to discuss these and any other matters with you in greater detail at your convenience.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State³

Geneva, November 7, 1985

NEGOTIATING GROUP ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

ROUND III

Overview

Round III was the best and most productive round thus far. The dominant early event was, of course, the tabling of the Soviet proposals on September 30 and October 1. For most of the Round, our efforts were devoted to seeking clarification of the Soviet proposals, criticizing their unacceptable aspects and attempting to pocket desirable features. Soviet efforts seemed much more focused on the November Meeting, and the need for some sort of agreement in principle, than were ours. The last few days were devoted to presenting the new U.S. proposal. Overall relations between the U.S. and Soviet components of the Negotiating Group continued to be good.

Where Are the Soviets Going?

The Soviet proposal of September 30 contained deeper reductions in almost every category than had been expected. If one looks only at the constraints and reductions offered on Soviet forces, it is truly remarkable:

—reductions to something close to the U.S.-proposed ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile RVs (6000 total weapons minus weapons on heavy bombers),

—1250 SNDVs (the 1982 U.S. proposal was 850 ICBMs and SLBMs plus 400 heavy bombers),

—a ceiling of 3600 ICBM RVs,

—a 50 percent reduction in throw-weight (close to the original internal U.S. goal),

—a halt in construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar (until fairly recently the U.S. position in the SCC).

Anyone willing to bet even three months ago that the Soviets would make such an offer at any price could have made a great deal of money. The problem, of course, lies in the unacceptable constraints on U.S. forces—not only the continuing condition of a ban on space weapons, but in the INF area—which are tied to the offer. The important question is, what is their strategy and where is their bottom line?

It may be useful to consider this proposal as the Soviet equivalent of the U.S. March, 1977 proposal.⁴ The parallels are interesting—a new team (Gorbachev and Shevardnadze) arrives on the scene, finds a deadlocked negotiation, wishes to put its stamp on the situation and makes a flashy proposal, elements of which it knows are non-negotiable, but which contains deep reductions which it believes will put it in a favorable position, both with respect to public diplomacy and with respect to subsequent moves in the negotiations. The Soviets had to live for three years with the disadvantage of a specific U.S. START proposal on the table containing deep reductions, while they had essentially nothing specific of their own. Their new proposal corrected this tactical disadvantage, at least temporarily. In the larger sense, they have finally done what we have been predicting for all of 1985—that is, offer very deep reductions in their offensive forces, in exchange for constraints on U.S. defensive programs.

What many did not anticipate is the half-merger of START and INF contained in their proposal, and this now becomes a new obstacle to progress. The Soviets clearly recognize that their proposal in its present form is not negotiable. With respect to INF systems, they must go in one of two directions:

1. Begin to remove U.S. INF systems from the strategic equation, or

2. Begin to add Soviet INF systems to the strategic equation.

The first course seems definitely the more likely in the near term, although a complete separation of what we consider intercontinental- and intermediate-range systems may now be more difficult. The Soviets probably assign the following priorities to INF systems in terms of their “strategic” potential:

—P IIs

—GLCMs

—land-based aircraft

—carrier-based aircraft

Based upon numerous hints they have provided us, the Soviets see clear qualitative differences between INF missiles and INF aircraft. If this is an accurate reflection of their priorities, they will soon agree to drop carrier-based aircraft and perhaps all medium-range aircraft from START, but will fight hard for banning PIIs or, failing that, counting them in START. A separate INF agreement which took care of all these systems would undoubtedly simplify things greatly and might well take the INF systems off the table entirely in START. One hopes that such an agreement would also remove the issue of UK/French systems from the negotiations.

It seems clear that a number of other aspects of the current Soviet position are soft. As negotiations progress, they will probably be prepared to:

—Drop their ban on ALCMs and return to some method of counting ALCMs and ALCM carriers.

—Move their 6000 ceiling upward and their 60 percent sublimit downward.

—Drop SRAMs and gravity bombs from their weapons aggregate.

—Ease their proposed restrictions on modernization.

—Accept a ceiling on heavy ICBMs substantially below the current level.

On the other hand, there are at least three other difficult areas in which they will probably hold firm for some solution which requires changes in the current U.S. position:

—Some compromise on space weapons/ASAT—perhaps partial and interim—but one which assures them that a U.S. breakout from the ABM Treaty is not imminent.

—Some solution to the SLCM problem.

—A solution to the Backfire problem which does not classify it as a heavy bomber.

One plausible theory regarding how the Soviets expect things to unfold is that they are not particularly enthusiastic about the low SNDV and weapons numbers they have proposed and expect them to rise in the course of the negotiations. They may have anticipated that such a rise would come about as a result of several factors:

—When the United States drives FBS off the table, they could say that such deep reductions in central systems are no longer possible.

—When the United States refuses to halt SDI, they could say that deep reductions are no longer possible.

—When the United States insists that large numbers of ALCMs be allowed, this would drive the SNDV and weapons numbers up.

—When the United States refuses to ban SLCMs, or to include direct limits on SRAMs and gravity bombs, they could say that the numbers of those other weapons which are limited must go up.

Our counterproposal does in fact drive the SNDV number up from 1250 to 1600–1800. However, in the areas of ALCMs and overall weapons, we have called the Soviet bluff, if that is what it was, although the fact that gravity bombs and SRAMs are in the Soviet 6000 ceiling and not in ours does confuse this aspect of the problem. This leaves the issue of how the resolution of the issue of INF systems will affect the ultimate intercontinental numbers, and this remains an open question.

The new U.S. proposal is an effective counter to the Soviet approach and puts pressure on them to make further concessions. What some of these might be has been noted above. The next section considers what additional moves on our part might be necessary or desirable at the November Meeting and beyond. How best to bring these to bear upon our pre- and post-November Meeting work is beyond the scope of this paper.

Where Should We Be Going?

Any attempt at a comprehensive look at this question would probably be OBE before this paper reaches Washington. Nevertheless, a few observations on what I see as major problem areas, most of which will probably still exist regardless of the outcome of the November Meeting, might be useful:

—In the September 30 Plenary, we used earlier guidance and told the Soviets we could consider “associated limits” on ballistic missiles and heavy bombers and also on ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs. Thus we were somewhat surprised to receive the next morning the new U.S. proposal which continued to propose separate limits on these elements. However, if my understanding is correct, the new proposal does inch us closer to two major aggregates with appropriate sublimits—a structural compromise State has advocated for a long time. What does not seem logical in the new U.S. position is the presence of separate limits (or sublimits) on heavy bombers and ALCMs. The effect of these two sublimits is to erect an unnecessary negotiating obstacle and to limit our own options to have more than 350 heavy bombers/1500 ALCMs in the future. One could view our current SNDV position as an aggregate of 1600–1800 with sublimits of 1250–1450 ballistic missiles and 350 heavy bombers. What is the rationale for the latter sublimit, which is on a system we have consistently described as stabilizing, in an overall aggregate we have said is of secondary importance? In fact, what we should do is move to an SNDV aggregate with a sublimit only on heavy ICBMs at as low a level as we can achieve. This would not only be more consonant with our own rhetoric and possible future needs, but would also ease a serious negotiating problem—the Soviets do not want 350 heavy bombers. The second pillar of the aggreement should be an aggregate of 6000 ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs, with sublimits only on ballistic missile warheads and ICBM warheads. This is essentially the current U.S. position with the sublimit which unnecessarily limits our flexibility to have more than 1500 ALCMs in the future removed.

—The ban on all mobile ICBMs came as a complete surprise to both the U.S. and Soviet Delegations, and looks like a non-starter with both the Soviets and with Congress. If verification problems are the primary rationale for the ban, it will be difficult to explain why we can count SS–20s, which our INF position allows, but cannot count SS–25s, which seem to employ essentially the same basing scheme. If this is a tactical ploy which succeeds in causing the Soviets to be more forthcoming on verification, perhaps it will turn out to have been useful, but it strikes me as a dangerous gambit. It could not only weaken Congressional support for our negotiating position, for MX and Midgetman, but also provides the Soviets with arguments they can turn against us in several areas (INF, SLCMs, our stated desire to move toward more survivable forces, etc.).

—We have made remarkable progress with the Soviets on the issue of reductions in throw-weight. We should strongly resist any attempt within the USG to insist that an aggregate throw-weight number must appear in the Treaty. The Soviets have offered 50 percent reductions, but have consistently refused to accept throw-weight as a unit of account—a subtle distinction of considerable importance to them and of little significance to us. We can transform this offer into a quite acceptable legal obligation without rubbing their noses in the unit of account issue in at least two ways:

1. There could be a sublimit on heavy ICBMS, plus appropriate additional restrictions to control “throw-weight creep” in other missiles, or

2. There could be a treaty obligation that they will reduce throw-weight by 50 percent, plus a data exchange which establishes agreed throw-weight values for all current missiles. This would give us the aggregate throw-weight at entry into force, as well as at every stage of reductions, without any need for such a number in the Treaty itself. The throw-weight of future missiles would be declared in the usual way, along with other data, in the SCC.

—Our position that intercontinental-range and intermediate-range systems should be kept completely separate is certainly a correct and sensible one. At the same time, assuming the issue is not resolved at the November Meeting, we should not close the door completely to an eventual merger of some sort. We should also probably not rule out the possibility of some sort of facesaving (for the Soviets) solution involving some allowance for some INF systems in START. One possibility, which might allow us to move ahead in START even if a separate INF agreement cannot be achieved, would be to count only the U.S. INF missiles in the SNDV and weapons aggregates (perhaps on a discounted basis), but allow the United States a numerical advantage in these aggregates to compensate for the asymmetrical composition. Although the latter solution would have sounded highly improbable prior to Round III, the Soviets themselves have opened the door to such a possibility by proposing unequal SNDV numbers which favor us. The basic point is that there do exist possible outcomes which allow us to achieve “equality” in “strategic” systems, but also allow the Soviets to say U.S. FBS has been “taken into account” in the strategic equation. Naturally, if a separate INF solution could be achieved soon, the problem would probably disappear from START and this would clearly be the best solution.

—For both public diplomacy purposes and substantive reasons, we should have a counter to the Soviet proposal for a limit on new types. We should not be in the position of allowing the Soviets to pose as the only side interested in stopping the “arms race,” while we appear to oppose almost all constraints on modernization. An annual quota on ballistic missile flight tests would be ideally suited to serve our interests in this area and should be studied.

—As noted above, the SLCM problem has not gone away—quite the opposite. The SLCM loophole looks even larger in light of the deep reductions now proposed by both sides and we need to redouble our efforts to solve this problem, which could soon become a major obstacle to progress.

—We should aim for a document to be agreed at the November Meeting which establishes an agreed framework and clarifies the problem of “interrelationships” which has made implementation of the January 8 Joint Statement⁵ difficult. The Vladivostok aide-memoire remains a good model, but we should probably be thinking in terms of something less ambitious.

—The ACDA lawyers have already prepared a draft Treaty incorporating our new position, which has been circulated within the U.S. Delegation, but not tabled with the Soviets. This draft represents minimum changes to our 1983 draft Treaty, which is widely acknowledged to contain serious deficiencies. After the November Meeting, we should prepare an entirely new draft Treaty, based upon whatever the state of play is at that point, for possible tabling in Round IV. We have a golden opportunity to correct a number of problems with our 1982–83 position which should not be wasted.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁶

Geneva, November 5, 1985

STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Modalities

—Round I ran from March 12 to April 23.

—Round II ran from May 30 to July 16.

—Round III began September 18 and ends November 7.

—Pursuant to the January 8 Joint Statement worked out by Shultz and Gromyko, each side has one Delegation divided into three Negotiating Groups:

—Strategic Nuclear Arms

—Intermediate-Range Nuclear Arms

—Defense and Space Arms

We call the overall negotiations the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST).

Overview

—Atmosphere thus far has been businesslike—relations with our Soviet counterparts are generally good.

—We typically have one formal plenary session per week, as do the other two Negotiating Groups. The opening and closing sessions of each round generally include the overall Delegations and a few additional overall plenaries are sometimes held as needed. In addition, there are occasional meetings of Heads of Negotiating Groups, as well as a number of informal contacts at other levels.

—After two rounds of evading specifics, Soviets tabled major new counterproposals September 30/October 1. Several weeks were devoted to understanding the implications of these new proposals and gathering information which could be a helpful input for the November Meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. On November 1, the major new U.S. proposals were tabled.

—Both the substance and the timing of future rounds will obviously be influenced by the results of the November Meeting. As things stand now, we expect Round IV to begin in mid-January.

Soviet Position

—While never formally withdrawing their 1983 draft Treaty, the Soviets made clear it does not apply to these new negotiations.

—In Round II the Soviets began to reveal elements of their position, while continuing to insist that an agreement on strategic offensive arms is contingent upon a ban on space weapons. They also consistently maintained that such an agreement must take into account the situation regarding INF systems, implying that the levels to which they will be willing to reduce intercontinental systems will be influenced by the level of U.S. INF deployments.

—The September 30 proposal establishes a framework similar to that put forward in 1982–83. There would be two aggregates—one on SNDVs and another on all the nuclear weapons on these SNDVs. However, a major new and unacceptable feature of the new proposal is that these aggregates would include all systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the territory of the other side. The current SNDV totals were said to be:

U.S.

2215	ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers
209	Medium-range missiles in Europe (PII and GLCM)
560	Carrier-based aircraft (evidently 14 carriers with 40 nuclear-capable aircraft each)
380	Medium-range aircraft in Europe and Asia
3360	TOTAL

USSR

2504	ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.

—These alleged current totals, which exclude Soviet IRBMs and medium-range aircraft, would be reduced by 50 percent, so that the United States would be allowed 1680 SNDVs and the USSR 1250 SNDVs.

—Nuclear weapons on these delivery vehicles would be reduced to no more than 6000 for each side.

—No one component of delivery vehicles could have more than 60 percent of the allowed weapons total (i.e., no more than 3600 weapons on ICBMs, SLBMs or aircraft).

—Cruise missiles of all basing modes over 600 km range would be banned.

—New types of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers would be banned or limited to maximum extent. New types would be those flight tested after an agreed date.

—Soviets said their throw-weight “would be” (informal)/“could be” (formal) reduced by roughly 50 percent.

—Verification is important and cooperative measures to supplement NTM, where justified, could be considered.

—Soviets also proposed October 1 a list of other measures they suggested could be agreed in connection with November Meeting:

A. Halt all work on development, testing and deployment of space weapons; terminate development, testing and deployment of new kinds/types of nuclear arms; freeze existing nuclear arms at current levels with maximum limitation on their modernization.

B. In framework of freeze in (A), stop deployment of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe.

C. Each side could agree to remove from “combat alert status,” and dismantle by an agreed date, certain percentage or number of nuclear arms—for example, 200–300 ICBMs.

D. Refrain from deploying nuclear arms in states where none now exist; refrain from building up stockpiles, or replace with new weapons, nuclear arms in countries where such weapons are already deployed.

E. Establish mutual moratorium on nuclear explosions; subsequent actions of the two sides would take into account actions of other nuclear states.

(C) was originally described as requiring agreement to a ban on space weapons. Later informal statements by Karpov indicated that it could be agreed independently of such a ban.

U.S. Position

—1983 draft Treaty remains on the table.

—Major new U.S. proposal tabled November 1. It builds upon positive aspects of the Soviet proposal, adopts an overall theme of 50 percent reductions and contains the following major provisions:

—Ceiling of 4500 on ICBM and SLBM warheads,

—Ceiling of 3000 on ICBM warheads,

—Reduction of 50 percent in Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight,

—Ceiling of 1500 on long-range ALCMs carried by heavy bombers (contingent upon the ballistic missile warhead and throw-weight reductions above),

—Ceiling of 350 heavy bombers,

—Ceiling of 1250–1450 ICBMs and SLBMs,

—Ban on all new heavy strategic ballistic missiles, including a ban on modernization of Soviet SS–18s,

—Ban on mobile ICBMs,

—Reductions to be carried out in accordance with the “build-down” concept,

—No direct limits on SRAMs or gravity bombs,

—No inclusion of intermediate-range systems in strategic offensive arms negotiations.

—United States cannot agree to abandon its legitimate right to SDI research.

Areas of Divergence

—Soviets continue to link any agreement on strategic offensive arms to a ban on space weapons

—Soviet introduction of over 1100 U.S. intermediate-range missiles and aircraft into U.S. half of the strategic equation, while excluding comparable Soviet systems from their half, is out of the question. Acceptance of such a scheme would be devastating to U.S. forces, probably lead to U.S. inferiority in both intercontinental-range and intermediate-range forces, and reduce security of U.S. Allies.

—Soviets continue to propose a ban on cruise missiles of all basing modes with ranges over 600 km. U.S. proposal allows 1500 ALCMs and contains no constraints on SLCMs or ICCMs.

—Soviets want to aggregate diverse systems and include SRAMs and gravity bombs in the weapons aggregate. U.S. proposal is opposed to this.

—Soviets have not yet offered formally to reduce heavy ICBMs or accept a legal obligation to carry out predictable reductions in throw-weight.

—U.S. proposal bans modernization of SS–18s, while Soviet proposal would allow some modernization.

—Soviets propose stricter overall constraints on modernization than United States is prepared to accept.

—U.S. proposal bans mobile ICBMs; Soviet proposal allows mobile ICBMs.

—U.S. proposal allows 350 heavy bombers. This is probably far more than the Soviet Union wants (excluding Backfire).

—Some other areas—for example, verification—probably contain serious U.S.-Soviet disagreements, but discussions have not advanced to the point at which these can be clearly identified.

Areas of Convergence

—U.S.-proposed ceiling on ballistic missile warheads, plus ceiling on long-range ALCMs, equals 6000. Soviet weapons aggregate ceiling is also 6000 (although, as noted above, it includes additional weapons not included in the U.S. number).

—U.S.-proposed ceiling on ballistic missile warheads (4500) is not too different from the comparable effective ceiling in Soviet proposal.

—U.S.-proposed ceiling on ICBM warheads (3000) is not too different from the effective ceiling on ICBM warheads (3600) in Soviet proposal.

—U.S.-proposed reduction in Soviet throw-weight is 50 percent. Soviets have said that their proposal would result in reductions in Soviet throw-weight of about 50 percent.

—U.S.-proposed ceiling on ALCMs (1500) is not too different from what we estimate Soviets will deploy.

—U.S.-proposed ceiling on ICBMs and SLBMs, plus ceiling on heavy bombers, equals 1600–1800. This is within the range of SNDVs contained in Soviet proposals.

—Soviet proposal calls for aggregates of SNDVs, and weapons on SNDVs, with some sublimits. We have said we are prepared to consider “associated limits” on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, and also on ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs.

—Although the unacceptable linkage to space weapons remains and the INF linkage has been made even more objectionable, Soviets are now willing to make specific proposals and discuss details without a priori U.S. agreement to their goals in the other Negotiating Groups. This is in sharp contrast to their stated position earlier this year.

—Informally, Soviets have indicated that they have flexibility in a number of areas—specifically, the numbers 6000 and 60 percent, ALCMs, throw-weight, modernization constraints, inclusion of intermediate-range systems (especially aircraft), and inclusion of SRAMs and gravity bombs. Whether they are really prepared to move toward us in these areas and, if so, at what price, must await further negotiations.

1. Source: Department of State, Lot 06D436, Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Subject Files, 1983–2005, Box 9, NST/START Round III. Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Ridgway, Hawes, and Dean. Tower reported on Round III, which ran from September 19 to November 7, in telegram 10590 from Geneva, November 7. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850801–0094)
2. Reference is to Reagan and Gorbachev’s meeting, November 19–20. See Documents 119–122.
3. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Ifft.
4. Reference is to Carter’s “deep cuts” proposal and Vance’s trip to Moscow. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 13–23.
5. See footnote 3, Document 100.
6. Secret. Drafted by Ifft.