Before distribution is made, Paul wanted the Secretary to take note of
paras 13 and 15 regarding the “walk-in-the-woods.”2 These paras are factual in recording
the events; however, if the paras cause any discomfort to the Secretary,
they can be omitted from the final distribution—and recorded only for
posterity. It could be perceived that Nitze is again pushing something
that some believe to be long dead, thus undercutting his credibility in
assisting the Secretary. If Mr. Shultz has no problem, we can let it fly
as written. Please check this out for us.
Attachment
Memorandum of Conversation5
Washington, July 31, 1985
SUBJECT
- Nitze-Kvitsinskiy Dinner Conversation, Helsinki,
Finland, 31 July 1985
1. As Kvitsinskiy’s
guest, Ambassador Nitze had dinner with his former Soviet colleague
at the Restaurant Tapiola Linnunrata, 31 July 1985. Norman Clyne
from Nitze’s staff and Pavel Palazhchenko on the Soviet side also
attended. Below are the highlights of the substantive conversation
during dinner.
2. Nitze noted that three possible types of outcomes for the summit
meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in November had been discussed that
afternoon between Shultz and Shevardnadze.6 These were outcomes dealing (a) merely with the
easy issues; (b) with somewhat more difficult issues; and (c) with
the really substantive issues of security, particularly those
involving the negotiations on nuclear and space arms in Geneva.
Nitze said it was his understanding that the Ministers had agreed
that the third category of issues should receive paramount attention
by both sides prior to the summit. Kvitsinskiy agreed; he
said it was the Soviet view that, while this third category
contained the issues most difficult to resolve, it nevertheless
contained those issues whose resolution could make the summit an
unqualified success. Kvitsinskiy asked Nitze’s opinion as to how we
should prepare for the third category of issues.
3. Nitze said the first thing would be to clarify definitions and
concepts. For example, the Soviet definition of what it calls “space
strike arms” is based on an unacceptable criterion of intent; that
is, according to Gromyko (and Kvitsinskiy) those systems stationed in space
created or developed for the purpose of
attacking objects in space or on land, and those stationed on earth
for the purpose of attacking objects in
space. Kvitsinskiy
pointed out that the President had stated that the purpose of the
U.S. SDI program was to develop
such arms. Nitze emphasized that statements of intent were not
pertinent, whether one was speaking of offensive or of defensive
arms. Rather, systems must be dealt with on the basis of objective
judgment of their capabili
[Page 417]
ties derived from observable characteristics. If one looks at the
Soviet definition on the basis of capabilities, the Galosh system
around Moscow as well as all ICBM
systems would be included in the ban. This is not desired by either
side. Nitze emphasized the need for precise agreement on what is to
be included in the agreements between us and what is to be excluded.
We will find it necessary to stay away from generalities such as the
Soviet demand for a ban on “space strike arms” based on an ambiguous
and misleading definition.
4. Changing the subject, Kvitsinskiy asked if the U.S. would live up to the
ABM Treaty. Nitze replied that
the U.S. would do so and had made that point clear in Geneva; the
real question is whether the Soviet Union will do likewise. We need
first to agree on what it means. For example:
(a) the meaning of “development” with regard to permitted research.
Nitze said the negotiating record is clear on this subject. He cited
the paper Harold Brown had given to Karpov explaining the U.S. view
on the damarcation between research and development. Brown’s paper
was not contested by the Soviet side. Article V was drafted on the
basis of the definition of “development” contained in Harold Brown’s
paper. Kvitsinskiy
responded by citing Gerard Smith’s testimony in which Kvitsinskiy contended
Smith had described the demarcation between research and development
in a different way; Smith had used the term “breadboard model” to
describe the point beyond research which included development. Nitze
contested that, saying that while Gerard Smith’s testimony was not
inconsistent with the Brown paper, Brown’s paper, not Smith’s, was
basic to the negotiating record of the ABM Treaty. This paper pointed out that full scale
development started with observable testing of a prototype model,
that is, a piece of equipment of the type which would ultimately be
deployed. In any event, it is unambiguous that neither side included
unobservable research in banned development. This point was made
clear not only by Brown’s paper but also by Smith’s testimony. In
fact, Nitze pointed out, the Soviet side also confirmed its similar
interpretation that research would be permitted by the ABM Treaty when former Defense
Minister, Marshal Grechko, explained to the Supreme Soviet that the
Treaty imposed no limitations on the performance of research and
experimental work toward defending the “national territory.”
Kvitsinskiy
corrected Nitze, saying that Marshal Grechko made no mention of
“national territory;” rather, he made reference to defending “the
country” against nuclear missile attack. (Kvitsinskiy laughed
heartily when he “corrected” Nitze). Nitze said it seemed ludicrous
in the context of the ABM Treaty to
draw a distinction between “the country” on the one hand and
“national territory” on the other; one could not walk history back
with some simple-minded joking distinction.
[Page 418]
(b) Returning to the Brown/Smith discussion, Kvitsinskiy insisted
there was a distinction between Smith’s definition of “development”
and Brown’s. Smith’s testimony exempted only Department of Defense
research and development line items 6.1 and 6.2, while Brown’s would
have the cut-off point be within 6.4, he referred to 6.4(a) and
6.4(b).
(c) Nitze brought up the Krasnoyarsk radar. He said that everyone on
the U.S. side, in and out of Government, is convinced that this is a
violation of the Treaty. Kvitsinskiy asserted that the U.S. radar at Thule,
Greenland, violated the Treaty. Nitze emphasized that while the U.S.
believes there is nothing here that is contrary to the ABM Treaty, the main point he was
making was that the issues should be talked out frankly and
settled—not limiting the discussion to stereotype assertions such as
those to which the Soviet side has limited itself.
(d) Nitze cited the Soviet laser program being conducted at Sary
Shagan as an example of Soviet “SDI-type” research. Nitze said this is germane to the
ABM Treaty and thus pertinent
to the defense and space negotiations. He asked rhetorically why
can’t the Soviet side discuss its SDI-type programs; the U.S. is willing to do so and, in
fact, has discussed its programs at Geneva in some detail. Kvitsinskiy responded
that it (the Soviet laser) is not pertinent since it cannot damage a
satellite. Nitze noted that in any event, it is permitted because it
is at a test range. Nitze maintained Kvitsinskiy had
apparently missed the point; on any issue where there was not
coincidence of views, it should be discussed frankly and
resolved—not swept under the rug by assertion of one side or the
other. Kvitsinskiy
then noted the testing of a U.S. laser on Maui (in connection with a
recent space shuttle flight). He asked rhetorically if that laser
could substitute for a radar and if Maui was part of the Kwajalein
test range. Nitze replied that the U.S. would be willing to discuss
the issue frankly and constructively.
5. Referring to the Geneva negotiations, Kvitsinskiy asked when
the U.S. side was going to propose something concrete on space.
Nitze replied with a question of his own: “Which should come first,
working on what the Soviets want on space, or on what the U.S. wants
on limiting offense?” Nitze said that the Soviet form of linkage is
unacceptable; this amounts to preconditions. Preconditions need to
be forgotten and replaced with constructive discussions of the
issues.
6. Nitze continued by asking what specifically are the Soviets
suggesting with respect to limitations on the offense. Kvitsinskiy said that
the Soviet side cannot be more specific until and unless it knows
the outcome for space. He added that the Soviet side had made a
specific proposal in the recent round just completed. Nitze replied
that with what the Soviet side had given at Geneva, one could only
speculate on possible methods of
aggregation consistent with what they had said, coupled with various
applicable percentages. For example, as to the
[Page 419]
Soviet form of aggregation, Nitze
asked what was to be included in the Soviet term “nuclear charges.”
This form of aggregation appeared to include gravity bombs and
SRAMs. Nitze said Kvitsinskiy knew the
long-held U.S. view on this issue; namely, that it was improper to
constrain such bomber loadings without corresponding constraint on
air defenses. Nitze went on to explain that the two sides had to
work out specific and equitable counting rules to have an effective
agreement. He emphasized the unacceptability of aggregations which
equated “elephants with flies;” SS–18 RV’s cannot be equated with gravity bombs.
7. By way of example, Nitze said that if one were to assume that
counting rules had, in fact, been worked out, what could be made of
the so-called Soviet “model” surfaced in Geneva? Continuing, Nitze
said that low overall SNDV
limitations could become meaningless or counter-productive at low
levels of RVs, or even of “nuclear
charges”. Continuing his example, Nitze said that if one were to
assume a base level of 10,000 “nuclear charges” with an agreed
reduction of 40%, this would result in a ceiling of 6,000 such
“charges” at the end of a given period. If one were then to combine
this figure with the Soviet suggestion of a percentage limit on the
number of “charges” in any one leg of the deterrent, and assume that
this limit was 50%, then the Soviet side would be able to retain
3,000 highly capable RVs on its
ICBM force. This is more than
a sufficient number to launch a highly successful attack against the
land-based portion of the U.S. retaliatory force. Without other
compensating provisions, such an outcome would be insufficient to
meet the needs of the U.S. side.
8. Nitze suggested that we should abandon all the propaganda play
with numbers and get down to discussing a comprehensive and
substantive end result. Nitze said the U.S. needs protection in an
agreement against the Soviet capability for an effective strike
against its land-based retaliatory forces; if that can be worked
out, all kinds of things become possible.
9. Kvitsinskiy
responded by saying that the U.S. was threatening Soviet land-based
forces with Trident missiles. Nitze replied that the Trident I
offers no such threat and the D–5 will not be along for some years.
The point was, Nitze emphasized, that if the Soviets relieve the
U.S. of the threat to the survival of its land-based assets, the
U.S. could comparably relieve the Soviet side of such a threat to
its forces. The sides should talk constructively about this and
resolve the issues necessary to a mutually acceptable agreement.
10. Continuing on sea-based systems, Kvitsinskiy insisted
that SLCMs be banned. Nitze said
that both sides were fully aware of the difficulties in verifying
the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear SLCMs and in verifying the range
capabilities of given types of SLCMs. Kvitsinskiy said a complete ban would meet many of
these problems. Nitze recalled a discussion with McClain, Director
of the China Lake Naval Weapons Laboratory, who had put together a
cruise missile capable of hitting a ship in the China Sea from
Hainan Island with parts bought from a Montgomery Ward catalogue.
SLCMs had become widely
dispersed. The U.S. Navy was not going to let itself be without
SLCMs when Argentina had them.
Kvitsinskiy
said: “But who gave the Argentines their SLCMs?” Nitze replied: “The French, but Col. Qaddafi
and Castro got theirs from the Soviet Union.”
11. Returning to the space issue, Kvitsinskiy asked: “What
about space strike arms?” Nitze replied that if the ground-based
threat is relieved, then the need for defenses diminishes.
Accordingly, we should first agree to limit offenses to relieve the
ground-based threat; then we can agree to appropriate limitations on
defenses. Kvitsinskiy said that limitations should be made in
the reverse order. Nitze said he would compromise: “Let’s work
toward both concurrently.”
12. Kvitsinskiy
alleged that some people on the U.S. side (otherwise not identified)
in Geneva have said the sides can discuss establishing a ban on
ASAT systems. Nitze replied
that he had not heard of such. In any event, this would involve
banning ABM and ICBM systems; therefore, the better
course would be to discuss how we can make communications and other
such satellites survivable.
13. Kvitsinskiy
then asked about INF. Nitze said
personally he continued to think that the “walk-in-the-woods”
formula had merit, but he emphasized that that was his personal
view. Kvitsinskiy
said the “walk-in-the-woods” formula was not acceptable to Moscow;
it provided no compensation for British and French forces. Kvitsinskiy added that
Nitze had once suggested indirect compensation for the British and
French. (Kvitsinskiy, to support his argument that Nitze had
suggested indirect compensation for the British and French, referred
to a piece of paper Nitze had given him on November 19, 1983. That
paper to which Kvitsinskiy referred consisted of points Nitze had
been instructed by Washington to make. The paper does not make
Kvitsinskiy’s
case but, in any event, the episode is reported fully in the
attached telegram INF–7397 (Geneva 0722). Nitze denied the allegation; he told
Kvitsinskiy
that the “walk-in-the-park” proposal included partial compensation
but that was Kvitsinskiy’s proposal. Nitze reminded Kvitsinskiy that he,
Nitze, had never made an equal reductions proposal. Kvitsinskiy then said
that it was Nitze who had made the computation
[Page 421]
concerning equal reductions of 572,
resulting in 122 to 127 SS–20s for the Soviet side. Nitze accepted
that; it was simple arithmetic after Kvitsinskiy had
suggested he look at equal reductions of 572. Nitze reminded
Kvitsinskiy
that during their “walk-in-the-park” it was he, Kvitsinskiy, who said
that the Soviet Government would accept equal reductions of 572 if
the U.S. Government would propose such. Kvitsinskiy nodded and
did not challenge the point. Continuing, Nitze said that in any
event, the Soviet Union is not entitled to compensation for the
British and French forces. Kvitsinskiy’s only comment was to note the French
had deployed another submarine; hence, the Soviet side was “now
entitled to more than 122.”
14. Kvitsinskiy
said he would have to report to his superiors that Nitze had no
proposal on space strike arms, no proposal on limiting ASATs, on limiting SLCMs or any proposals on offenses,
generally. Nitze replied that his purpose during the evening had not
been to make proposals. Rather, as he had said at the outset, he
wanted to have a serious, frank discussion with Kvitsinskiy on how the
two might work together to prepare for a substantive summit rather
than an easier one. Kvitsinskiy replied, “We should talk further.”
15. The next morning, while Clyne was having breakfast in the dining
room of the Intercontinental Hotel, Kvitsinskiy and Detinov
entered, “nodded” to Clyne, went through the buffet line and took a
table on the opposite side of the dining room. Immediately after
they took their seats, Kvitsinskiy left Detinov and came to Clyne’s table.
After exchanging pleasantries on the previous evening, Kvitsinskiy asked: “Was
your boss serious about the ‘walk-in-the-woods’; would you really
give up your Pershings?” Clyne repeated a Nitze comment of the
previous evening, namely that his view on the “walk-in-the-woods”
was a personal one. Clyne said that Nitze’s view at the time was
that the formula the two had worked out was to be an “end result” of
the negotiations. But to answer Kvitsinskiy’s initial
question as to whether Nitze had been serious during dinner, Clyne
said: “Nitze is always serious.” Kvitsinskiy replied: “We
(he and Nitze) should talk again.”
