Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

98. Letter From the Ambassador to Romania (Funderburk) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Carlucci)¹

Bucharest, October 22, 1982

Dear Secretary Carlucci:

In your October 11 meetings with Minister of Defense Lt. Gen. Constantine Olteanu and Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei² they—especially Andrei—asked you about the status of the United States response to Romania’s request for seismic equipment. As you are aware they were referring to the Romanian request, most recently made to USAID in early September, for a variety of seismic and other equipment to be funded by USAID’s Disaster Relief Program.

We understand from other Washington visitors that the Romanian Embassy in Washington has been told already that the United States cannot supply some of the items requested and that the remainder of the list is being scrutinized.

These Romanian requests bring into focus concerns that I and several of my staff have had with the matter of technology transfer to Romania. Upon reading NSDD–54 we noted that Romania is to be treated differently than other Warsaw Pact members with regard to the transfer of sensitive technology. We have serious reservations about such an exception. We realize that the NSDD was a laboriously negotiated document and that the various elements of it are in effect encapsulations that have specific meaning to those who deal with the subject in Washington. We also realize that sensitivity is relative and that there are items and technology governed by COCOM that are not particularly sensitive. We also understand that we have interests to promote by permitting the transfer of less sensitive items. Romania, probably for commercial reasons, would resist Soviet efforts to get less sensitive items more than highly sensitive items.

Our concerns are with truly sensitive items and technology—material that the Soviets would covet and that would bestow on the Soviets military benefits which they do not now possess—and with NSDD–54’s perception of Romania.

Regarding the sensitivity of export items, we would defer to the experts to determine what is truly sensitive and what is not. If an item is truly sensitive, however, we believe that it should not be transferred to Romania.

Briefly, we believe that, were we to transfer to Romania highly sensitive technology which the Soviets coveted, the Soviets could bring sufficient pressure to bear on the Romanians to obtain it. Moreover, we believe that in their present economic straits, in which they are seeking Soviet and CEMA aid, the Romanians’ susceptibility to Soviet pressure is increasing and is greater than it has been for twenty years.³

Thus, we are encouraged by the close scrutiny that Romania’s requests apparently are receiving and urge that it be continued. Copies of this are being sent to Secretary of State Shultz and National Security Adviser Clark. Thank you for your consideration.

Betty and I enjoyed your visit and meeting your wife. Best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

David B. Funderburk

1. Source: Reagan Library, Donald Fortier Files, Subject Files, Technology Transfer: Romania Landsat Case 1981–1982. Confidential. “Dep. Sec. has seen” is stamped at the top of the letter. Another stamped notation reads, “See Mr. Carlucci’s comment.” Carlucci wrote at the top of the letter, “Unusual position for an Amb. to take. Good for him. I agree. Let’s support him. FC.”
2. No records of these meetings were found.
3. Carlucci drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.