Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

89. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State¹

638.

Bucharest, January 29, 1982, 0949Z

SUBJECT

• Invitation to Secretary Haig To Visit Romania.

REF

• Bucharest 0488.²

1. (Confidential—Entire text.)

2. Begin summary: President Ceausescu warmly welcomes the possibility of Secretary Haig’s visit to Bucharest during the period February 8–13. A visit would provide a unique opportunity to state our policy on Poland and to underscore our continued policy of differentiation towards Eastern European countries while on Warsaw Pact territory. The Embassy strongly recommends acceptance of the invitation. End summary.

3. The Ambassador, accompanied by visiting Romanian Desk Officer Becker, called on Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei the morning of January 29 at Andrei’s request. Andrei said that President Ceausescu is delighted by the possibility of a visit by the Secretary. Andrei added that any time from February 8 to 13 would be acceptable. The Secretary’s visit was the number one item on Ceausescu’s agenda and had precedence over all other events.

4. Andrei said that Ceausescu would plan to discuss bilateral relations, “matters involving Poland and the Soviet Union and the relationship between those two countries,” disarmament and the Middle East. He would appreciate a briefing from the Secretary on his recent meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.³ The Secretary could, of course, raise any matters he wishes. Ceausescu would be glad to hear his views on any topic.

5. Andrei added that although Ceausescu would not raise with the Secretary Romania’s recent financial and credit requests (which had been the subject of discussions between Andrei and the Ambassador),⁴ he himself would welcome the opportunity to discuss these matters with the Secretary.

6. President Ceausescu’s invitation to the Secretary to visit Romania at the earliest opportunity provides us with a unique and unexpected opportunity to carry the case, and the challenge to the Soviet Union, for national independence and non-interference in internal affairs into Eastern Europe. It would allow the Secretary to make a statement on Eastern European territory of our overall objectives and hopes for Poland and the Polish people. This statement could underscore our continued commitment to the policy of “differentiation” in Eastern Europe and hold open a channel of communications into the Warsaw Pact which can be used to challenge the Soviet Union’s attempted solutions to the crisis in Poland.

7. Alone of Eastern European leaders, President Ceausescu in his December 25 message to President Reagan⁵ attempted to establish a dialogue on Poland which is both candid about Romanian concerns over the concept of sanctions and yet noncontentious about U.S. motives and President Reagan’s actions. Subsequently, Romania has refrained from any critical comment regarding the United States’ attitude toward Poland although offering some criticism of the concept of sanctions in general. The nuanced policy has been in marked contrast to that pursued in the other nations of the Warsaw Pact.

8. We are acutely aware that the Secretary’s visit would come at a crucial time for Romania in terms of its growing economic/financial crisis and the multi-lateral discussions about its external debt renegotiations. Ceausescu may seek to manipulate the visit to enhance his “international statesman” image and reinforce Romania’s “independent” foreign policy stance in the context of the Polish crisis. This need not, however, be in conflict with our own interests and gives us a reciprocal opportunity to play our vital concerns about the Soviet actions and intentions against the backdrop of a Warsaw Pact member’s own concerns for the integrity of its national territory and non-interference in internal affairs.

9. To the extent that the Secretary’s presence would signal our interest in a continued measured and dispassionate evaluation of the Romanan financial situation by the international banking community, it might well be of value to our larger interest in preventing a “spill over” effect to the detriment of Yugoslavia’s financial position.

10. We also see in Ceausescu’s invitation an opportunity to demonstrate specifically to Romania that it need not feel that it is being forgotten by the U.S. in the difficult days which have followed the Soviet inspired military takeover in Poland—that the Polish issue does not preclude our creative and pragmatic response to opportunities for exerting positive influence in Eastern Europe. A visit by the Secretary would make clear that Romania continues to have meaningful relations with the U.S. and the West, and has a viable alternative to being drawn (or pushed) inexorably closer to the Soviets. The visit would also signal neighboring Eastern European countries that the U.S. is prepared to continue and encourage productive relations with those countries which are prepared to take even a relatively moderate stance where possible on important international issues different from those demanded by the Soviets.

11. This would in effect underline the fact that the sanctions we have imposed on Poland and the Soviet Union are aimed at the specific situation in Poland and are not inspired by any desire on our part to return to a bloc-to-bloc approach to relations with the nations of the Warsaw Pact.⁶ Such an implied statement would not only be useful for us in our continuing contacts with all the nations of Eastern Europe, but would reassure our allies that we are serious about continuing our policy of differentiation.

12. We believe the Secretary’s oft-stated public commitment to the importance of human rights in the formulation and conduct of our foreign policy would override a contention that his visit would in some way indicate a lessening of our support for civil liberties and human rights. On the contrary, it would present the opportunity for an initiative reflecting our views directly to Ceausescu in our preferred method of action through traditional quiet diplomacy.

13. It is not our intention to overstate the case for the Secretary’s visit to try to endow it with potential benefits that are illusory or unrealistic. We want the U.S. to be seen to be conducting diplomacy in a balanced and constructive way, in the enemy camp, even in a time of crisis, exactly as we have said we wish to do if the conditions and actions of the other side, both spoken and actual, are right.

14. The counterpoint to possible concern about visiting Eastern Europe at this time is that there are millions and millions of people here, who above all are afraid of the Soviet night descending again, and perhaps for their lifetime, over the domestic and foreign affairs of these countries. We believe that the Secretary can exploit and develop that concern to our foreign policy advantage and to the detriment of Soviet policy, if not directly in Romania at least in the pre and post press activities surrounding his visit.

15. The Embassy strongly recommends acceptance of the invitation.

Funderburk

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, Romania (11/30/1981–01/29/1982). Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. Telegram 488 from Bucharest, January 22, invited Haig to visit Romania following his meetings with Gromyko in Geneva at the end of January. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820038–0660)
3. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Documents 137 and 138.
4. A record of this meeting is in telegram 8854 from Bucharest, December 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810592–0545)
5. See Document 84.
6. See footnote 5, Document 84. On December 29, Reagan announced the imposition of economic sanctions on the Soviet Union in response to its role in the repression in Poland. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1981, p. 1209) See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Documents 124 and 125.