Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

86. Letter From President Reagan to Romanian President Ceausescu¹

Washington, January 5, 1982

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter supporting United States’ efforts to reduce the number of intermediate-range nuclear weapons was very much appreciated.² I share with you the deep and sincere hope that the negotiations which we have just begun with the Soviet Union in Geneva will make a significant contribution toward this goal.

As I emphasized in my speech of November 18,³ the United States is willing to forego planned deployment of Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe if the Soviet Union dismantles its SS–20, SS–4 and SS–5 missiles. If accepted by the Soviet Union, this proposal would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war and immeasurably enhance international peace and security.

As members of my Administration and I have often pointed out, the NATO decision in 1979 to pursue modernization of intermediate-range nuclear forces was taken to correct a major imbalance in these forces resulting from the massive and ongoing Soviet buildup of intermediate-range nuclear forces, particularly the SS–20 missiles. It is this imbalance that represents a great threat to peace and security in Europe at the present time.

You will recall that a parallel decision was also made in 1979 to seek to restore a balance through arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.⁴ The NATO modernization program can be rescinded only as a result of a concrete agreement that altogether eliminates the comparable missiles on the Soviet side. Any other approach would undermine the prospect for a successful outcome of these negotiations.

Acceptance of the long-standing Soviet proposal for a moratorium on further deployments of intermediate-range nuclear forces, which President Brezhnev repeated during his recent visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, would merely perpetuate the present imbalance and leave the threat to peace and security undiminished. Furthermore, the Soviet Union’s efforts to limit negotiations on intermediate-range land-based missiles only to those based in Europe, ignores the fact that the Soviet missiles which create the imbalance have ranges that make them fully capable of striking targets in NATO countries from bases East of the Urals. It is clear, therefore, that only global limits on such land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles can eliminate the threat to Europe.

As I stressed in my November 18 speech, my Administration is resolutely committed to seeking genuine and significant reductions in strategic and conventional as well as intermediate-range forces. If they are to be effective, such reductions must be embodied in agreements that are concrete, equal and verifiable. Knowing your desire to help reduce the threat to peace posed by the arms buildup threatening Europe, I hope that you will continue actively to support the principles we share in this regard.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Romania: President Ceausescu (8102743) (1). No classification marking. A draft of the letter is ibid.
2. See Document 83.
3. On November 18, 1981, Reagan spoke to the members of the National Press Club about arms reduction and nuclear weapons. See Public Papers: Reagan, 1981, pp. 1062–1067. The speech is also printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 69.
4. Reference is to the SALT II Treaty, signed by Carter and Brezhnev in June 1979. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, USSR, Documents 207–208.