Office of the Historian

80. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) to Secretary of State Haig1

Washington, September 21, 1981

SUBJECT

  • Romania

Your memorandum of September 2 concerning the looming crisis in Romania has been passed on to the President.2 (S)

The issue which you raise is most timely. All the information reaching us indicates mounting internal problems in Romania, which some sources refer to as the “next Poland”. We certainly ought to be alerted to the possibility of defaults on debts and possibly internal disorders in that country. (S)

At the same time, the question to what extent we should help Romania out of her self-induced problems has more than one answer. Romania has been conducting a fairly independent foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and in that sense represents an asset for us. At the same time, it remains the most totalitarian country in Eastern Europe (apart from Czechoslovakia, which is under Soviet occupation). Its internal policies are based on ruthless repression of dissent, and its [Page 247] central economic planning continue the Stalinist trend introduced at the end of World War II. (S)

In this respect there is a fundamental difference between the situation in Poland and that in Romania. Poland is in the throes of unprecedented internal changes which, if successfully institutionalized, will transform that country into a Social Democratic state with powerful societal counter-balances to the Communist authorities (church, trade unions, and private farming). Such a Poland represents a fundamental, long-term threat to Communist totalitarianism. Furthermore, it considerably weakens the offensive capabilities of the Warsaw Pact. (S)

As long as Romania persists in its present course, however, no parallel development is likely to take place there. Politically and economically, Romania presents no challenge to the Soviet Union. For this reason Moscow has left Romania alone, despite irritation with Ceausescu’s foreign policy, while continually threatening Poland. This suggests that Moscow fears more the political, economic, and ideological reforms occurring in Poland than the mild foreign policy challenges emanating from Romania. (S)

Clearly, we could not stand by and watch Romania drift back into the Soviet camp. At the same time, we ought to be aware of the fundamental difference in our interests in Romania and in Poland. If we are to help the Romanians out of their mess, then we should do so only in conjunction with internal reforms that would promise eventual economic self-sufficiency and include some form of participation in economic decision-making process by the workers of the kind now practiced in Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland. Without such reforms there is no prospect whatever of an improvement in the economic situation in Romania and it will become a permanent burden to us. The Ceausescu government appears totally oblivious of the need for reform: the new Five Year Plan initiated in Romania for 1981–85 indicates no concern with popular discontent and proceeds on the “business as usual” premise—a course that is certain to aggravate economic and fiscal conditions. (S)

These are obviously questions of fundamental importance which deserve thorough discussion, since they are likely to come up in one form or another in the years ahead. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Richard V. Allen3
  1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, Romania (9/4/1981–11/17/1981). Secret. A copy was sent to Meese.↩
  2. See Document 78 and footnote 2, Document 79.↩
  3. Allen signed “Dick” above his typed signature.↩