Office of the Historian

60. Note From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Levitsky) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Whitehead)1

Washington, June 29, 1988
John:

The NSC staff memo2 was given to the Secretary by Colin. Apparently Rodman and Ledsky are trying to make a big thing of this. I think they’re wrong as you will see from my comments on their paper.

Mel

Attachment

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Levitsky) to the Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State (Hill)3

Washington, June 28, 1988

SUBJECT

  • NSC Staff Memo on Discussion Eastern Europe with the Soviets

REF

  • Attached memo4
1.
Of course we should talk to the Soviets about Eastern Europe. The question is not whether, but what about.
2.
We should make sure that the Soviets understand we intend to conduct relations with Eastern Europe on the basis of our national interests and depending on the kind of relationships the countries of the region wish to have with us. We need to make clear we do not accept a Soviet role in our choices, or in the choices made by the Eastern Europeans.
3.
It would be damaging, however, to talk to the Soviets in the way the NSC staff proposes, that is, arguing over the broad theme of the [Page 200] postwar division of Europe. This is a theoretical, impractical approach which carries the dangerous implication that the Soviets are the key to solving the problem. Such an approach reinforces the idea that the Soviets have an “organic” relationship with Eastern Europe.
4.
Rather, our focus—and that of our allies—should be on pragmatic steps to break up the barriers by attracting the Eastern European countries to our ideas, political and economic systems, and to the benefits that they can reap by coming our way. Given Gorbachev’s approach, there should be increasing opportunities to do this in the coming years.
5.
My conclusion is that it is our policies toward Eastern Europe and the actions we take in support of them that carry impact, not a dialogue with the Soviets on a theoretical or ideological level.
  1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984–1989, Lot 92 D 52, Super Sensitive, June 22–30 [1988]. No classification marking. The note is handwritten.↩
  2. See Document 59.↩
  3. Secret.↩
  4. Printed as Document 59.↩