Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

57. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

EUR–M–88–20081

Washington, May 12, 1988

Impact of Polish Strikes on Eastern Europe: A Warning Bell [portion marking not declassified]

Although Poland’s recent labor strife will have little immediate impact on other East Europeans, the crisis confirmed for all the perspective that the region is becoming more unstable and that periodic unrest has become more likely. The other regimes are glad that Warsaw showed it would use force and not just make concessions and that Jaruzelski moved more quickly and effectively than previous Polish leaders to bring unrest under control.² Nevertheless, all East European leaders are aware that their domestic economies have weakened, that their societies have become less willing to accept austerity placidly, and that they too could be faced with greater open resistance in the not too distant future. [portion marking not declassified]

The regimes were further reminded that while a crisis was still in its early stages, the Soviets would be supportive but would expect them to handle it on their own. They also have been reinforced in their belief that while the US supports economic reforms, it puts high value on political liberalization and will not help bail them out in the absence of progress on that score. They may believe otherwise about some US allies. [portion marking not declassified]

Summary

The recent strikes in Poland had little immediate impact on the rest of the region, partly because of their short duration, partly because the Jaruzelski regime showed it had learned important lessons about the use of force from 1980/1981, and partly because of factors unique to Poland. Polish worker organization and activism, supported morally and organizationally by a powerful church, remains relatively unique in the Bloc. [portion marking not declassified]

Warning Bell for the Other Regimes

Even though the strikes probably did not come as a surprise to East European leaders and to some merely confirmed their negative assessments of the Polish communists’ ability to rule effectively, the strikes probably did set off warning bells. All realize that their domestic economic situations have become more fragile, that some structural changes will be needed in coming years to prevent a further slide, and that these changes will impose greater hardships on their workers, and consequent risks for their regimes. They also realize that Moscow will not be there to ball them out, largescale help from the West will likely not be forthcoming, and Gorbachev’s calls for change and glasnost make it unlikely people will accept adversity as stoically as they did in the past. For the immediate future:

• Conditions in Hungary are edging closer to those in Poland. Austerity measures have increased grumbling, party and trade union organizations are in disarray, and discussion of the need for political reform is more farreaching than anywhere else in the Bloc. The developments in Poland almost certainly have made Budapest’s leaders especially anxious because they have determined upon a somewhat similar policy course.

• The East Germans, in contrast, will likely remain smug about their successes, and continue to deny the need for reform. Even before the strikes, East Berlin had begun to clamp down on the dissent that had burgeoned since last fall. At the same time, however, the GDR economy has begun to seriously stagnate.

• The Czechoslovaks and Bulgarians, under less immediate economic pressure, will continue tinkering around the edges of their economic bureaucracies with little demonstrable effect. Prague, however, may increase controls on intellectual and religious dissidents. Zhivkov in Bulgaria probably will continue his efforts to limit the impact of glasnost and inhibit the spread of independent activity.

• The Brasov riots in Romania last November³ were a clear signal to Ceausescu of the potentially explosive situation he faces and of the need to reinforce his effort to maintain control. [portion marking not declassified]

Popular Reaction in Eastern Europe

We will be unable to systematically gauge popular reaction in the region, but that reaction will matter more than in the past because over time the regimes, with the exception of Romania, have lost at least some elements of the control they once exercised.

• More information from the West about this latest Polish crisis has been available than in the past to large parts of the area through radio and television.

• East Europeans may conclude that the Polish strikers were unsuccessful in achieving their political demands, but they may be encouraged about the possibilities of using strikes to achieve economic gains. They may also sense that their regimes are carefully watched by the West in these affairs and that the regimes may not use force gratuitously. [portion marking not declassified]

What the Regimes May Have Learned

Tactics for Dealing with Strikers and Demonstrations

The East European leaderships were probably relieved that Warsaw seems to have learned what the others already believed, i.e. that the authorities, when faced with strikes, must show toughness, including the willingness to use force, tempered by offering limited economic concessions. The others have always believed that concessions alone merely give the impression of weakness and generate increased demands. [portion marking not declassified]

The East Europeans were probably reminded, however, of the importance of keeping strikes isolated and of preventing, early on, any coordination. Hence there is a good chance that they are reaffirming their intelligence capabilities on factory floors and the support of security units. [portion marking not declassified]

What Can Be Expected from Moscow

The East Europeans almost certainly got the message that, at least in the early stages, they will be expected to restore control without visible help from Moscow. We do not yet know what Moscow said to the Poles or East Europeans behind the scenes, but public Soviet media commentary illustrated that the Soviets preferred not to get involved nor to appear prepared to rush to the aid of Poland. Moscow evidently did not view the situation as so serious that it needed to make threatening noises to scare the Poles and thereby risk Western accusations of meddling. Nevertheless, in a prolonged crisis or one that came to a head very quickly, a beleagured East European leadership would almost certainly seek, plaintively if necessary, a more active Soviet role to help restore order. However, Moscow would still want the East Europeans to handle the situation with as little obvious Soviet involvement as possible. [portion marking not declassified]

Western Policy

The other East Europeans were probably reinforced in their belief that neither the US nor Western Europe will seek to actively encourage a crisis, although the broadcasts of RFE, VOA and other western radios will provide considerable information about disturbances and the West will call for major regime concessions during any crisis.

• The regimes will conclude that the US will continue to press what to them are irreconcilable demands. More than ever, they know they will be encouraged to pursue reforms including austerity measures in conjunction with conciliatory political policies to make those measures palatable. The East Europeans will remain unwilling to make concessions that would openly permit powersharing, but a considerable amount of economic decentralization could lead to some dilution of central authority.

• The East Europeans, however, probably perceive even more than previously differing approaches in the West—for example, West Germany’s special concern to maintain and expand relations, as compared with pursuing a specific political agenda based on political reform. [portion marking not declassified]

1. Source: Reagan Library, Rudolf Perina Files, Subject Files, Poland-Substance 1988 (1). [classification making and handling restriction not declassified]. The memorandum was prepared in the Office of European Analysis with a contribution from the Office of Soviet Analysis.
2. Documentation regarding Poland’s labor strife is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IX, Poland, 1982–1988.
3. See footnote 2, Document 167.