Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

43. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Whitehead) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, August 15, 1986

SUBJECT

• Eastern Europe

It concerns me that Gorbachev is making substantial progress in improving his relations with our West European allies, whereas our relations with his East European allies remain in the deep freeze.

This is a serious matter. For if Western Europe moves toward neutralism and Eastern Europe remains firmly in the Soviet camp, the balance of power in the world will surely change. That is certainly Gorbachev’s objective. I recognize that we are not there yet, that this is merely a matter of trends at this point, but these trends are not in our interest.²

Gorbachev has visited French President Mitterrand in Paris, and visited London just prior to taking office. Spanish Prime, Minister Gonzalez, Italian Prime Minister Craxi, West German Foreign Minister Genscher, and President Mitterrand have all visited Gorbachev in Moscow. Last month Shevardnadze visited London. Possible upcoming trips this year include a visit of Danish Prime Minister Schlueter to Moscow, a Gorbachev visit to Italy and Greece, and a meeting with West German Chancellor Kohl. In contrast, President Reagan has never been to Eastern Europe, and no Eastern Europe head of state has been here in recent years except for Jaruzelski, who was not received by our government.

In all of these high-level contacts, the Soviets urge the Western Europeans to be more independent of the United States. They put their arms proposals in a favorable light, encourage West European “innovation” (i.e. pressure on Washington), and argue that the Soviets and Western Europeans should work together to find “European solutions” to their “common” concerns. This courting of our allies obviously reflects a decision to pursue a long-term strategy to reorient Western Europe away from the United States onto a more independent course.

For our part, we have gotten more aggressive in recent years about briefing the East Europeans about our positions on major issues. (Ken Adelman’s trip to the “northern tier” countries after your Geneva meeting with Gromyko in January 1985 was the most striking example),³ and this helps encourage more independent thinking in the area. But is is small potatoes compared to what the Soviets are doing in the West.

The Soviets are also building strong commercial ties with Western Europe. Soviet trade in 1985 with five of our major allies was as follows:

	Soviet Exports	Soviet Imports	Total
	(Millions of US $)
France	2591.7	1910.8	4502.5
Germany	5066.0	3865.6	8932.1
Italy	2941.1	1579.3	4520.4
United Kingdom	1451.5	815.0	2266.5
Netherlands	1175.2	373.3	1548.5
			21,770.0

Conversely, our trade in 1985 with the four largest Eastern European countries is an order of magnitude smaller:

	US Exports	US Imports	Total
	(Millions of US $)
Poland	233.7	217.0	450.7
Romania	206.5	881.3	1087.8
Hungary	92.1	216.6	308.7
Czechoslovakia	62.6	74.9	137.5
			1,984.7

Admittedly, there are structural reasons for this situation. We have a real Alliance, and our Allies are not tempted to adopt Soviet-style systems. The East Europeans on the other hand are attracted by our system, and are kept in line by force as well as by elite self-interest. The Soviets therefore have to work harder to gain influence among our Allies than we do to gain equivalent influence among theirs. There are also political limits to what we can do with the East Europeans, and we should keep our expectations modest. But that does not invalidate my main point: Within these limits, they are working hard, and we are not. We have practically vacated the playing field.

It seems to me we need a better plan to counter Gorbachev’s efforts in Western Europe and, even more important, to achieve our own objectives in East Europe.

In Western Europe, although governments are generally fairly sophisticated about dodging Soviet blandishments, large segments of the public are susceptible, and a double standard in judging US and Soviet policy is widespread. At the very least, we need to continue our program of very active, continuous Alliance consultations, while finding more imaginative ways to get our message across to publics.

As I understand it, our policy in East Europe is to use the tools at our disposal to encourage East European regimes to distance themselves from Soviet orthodoxy in foreign and domestic policy. If that is our policy it has not succeeded very well in the past year, or, indeed, in the past five years. The Soviets are not in great shape in the area—Poland makes the northern tier shaky and the southern tier is very diverse, if also less important to them—but the least that can be said is that their grip has not loosened over the last half-decade.

If we’re going to correct this, we need a more concentrated and a more focused effort than we have now. I have the sense that progress is possible, if we try, and that every country in the Eastern bloc would welcome the chance for at least a little more independence in terms of either domestic structure or foreign policy autonomy, maybe in some cases both. But we cannot find out unless we try. I realize that we should only move forward on a reciprocal quid-pro-quo basis tied firmly to specific US interests; that our assets are modest, even compared to those of the West Europeans; that any such program must be handled very subtly; and that there exists here lots of right-wing opposition to any adaptation to Soviet satellites. But if the openings we create are seen as giving a bit more freedom to captive people, they cannot be opposed.

Jaruzelski’s offer seems to me to provide a good basis for dealing with an important East European in just the way I’ve been talking about: solid quids for solid quos, toward a result that encourages the kinds of differences from a Soviet-style system that the US should favor in the area. We need to work that package, and look for ways to put similar packages in place with other countries.⁴

If you think there is merit to some coordinated action in this area, it is something I’d like very much to be given some special responsibility for myself. I’ve asked S/P and EUR to give me some practical ideas⁵ for testing how far the various countries can move with us in a reciprocal fashion.⁶

John C. Whitehead⁷

1. Source: Reagan Library, Secretary George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (08/05/1986–08/15/1986). Secret. Shultz’s initials are stamped below the date line. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads “Treat as Original.”
2. In the right-hand margin adjacent to this paragraph, an unknown hand wrote, “Right. And content counts most. GPS 27 Aug. (Secto 17030).” Secto 17030 was not found.
3. Shultz met with Gromyko January 7–8, 1985, in Geneva. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 355–363. ACDA Director Adelman traveled to Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Romania to brief officials about the talks.
4. An unknown hand wrote in the margin adjacent to this paragraph, “I agree. GPS 27 Aug (Secto 17030).”
5. An unknown hand circled “practical ideas,” drew a line to the bottom of the memorandum, and wrote, “equals operational. GPS 27 Aug (Secto 17030).”
6. An unknown hand wrote below this paragraph, “OK; when you get them sorted out, let’s discuss. GPS 27 Aug (Secto 17030).”
7. Whitehead initialed above his typed signature.