Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

415. Telegram From the Embassy in Bulgaria to the Department of State¹

511/Depto 10030.

Sofia, February 4, 1987, 2257Z

SUBJECT

• Deputy Secretary Whitehead’s Meeting With Czechoslovak Prime Minister Strougal.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary.

Prime Minister Lubomir Strougal met with Deputy Secretary Whitehead for ninety minutes on February 2. The Prime Minister welcomed the Deputy Secretary’s visit to Czechoslovakia, and observed that bilateral relations are at an unsatisfactory level. Strougal described the process of change which is taking place in Czechoslovakia, and expressed the opinion that it would eventually lead to greater democracy for the country. He was critical of those who oppose these developments. The Prime Minister supported a step-by-step approach to broadening bilateral relations, stressing that even in the area of human rights progress could be made. While not agitating now for MFN, he said he hoped that conditions could be created so that Czechoslovakia might eventually enjoy its benefits. Strougal welcomed the idea of an increased exchange of views on international issues, and said that Moscow wants very much to resolve the conflict in Afghanistan.

The Deputy Secretary described bilateral relations as unnatural and pointed to the American perception of Czechoslovakia’s human rights practices as a primary reason for this. He said that MFN should remain a goal for the future, but that at the present time we need to proceed with a step-by-step approach to developing relations. Mr. Whitehead suggested that the two countries broaden their dialogue on international issues including arms control and regional problems. End summary.

3. In meeting with the Deputy Secretary, Prime Minister Strougal noted that visits to Czechoslovakia by senior U.S. officials have been rare, and stressed his pleasure that the Deputy Secretary had come. He hoped there would be open dialogue on all issues. Strougal observed that U.S.-Czechoslovak relations are not at a satisfactory level, and suggested that when historians evaluate the situation of today they will be critical of it.

4. Looking to the past, Strougal described the positive traditions and deep-rooted ties upon which we can build. Since 1948, however, relations have been at a low level. Strougal obseved that several attempts had been made to broaden the relations, including the conclusion of the 1982 claims/gold agreement. However, none had yielded any long term results.

5. Strougal told the Deputy Secretary that a better understanding of each other would contribute to the building of a better relationship. It is impossible to conceive that the two countries could or would reach agreement on all issues, but Strougal stressed that a pragmatic approach should help us to resolve some problems. Strougal noted that Czechoslovakia’s emphasis on ideology had done the country a great deal of harm. He stated that the Czechoslovaks are beginning “to deideologize” the manner in which they conduct their foreign policy.

6. Strougal observed that Czechoslovakia is often described as a country in which there is an absence of a democratic discussion of issues. In his view, something can be done in this sphere because Czechoslovakia has democratic traditions, which is an advantage. He criticized the lack of public discussion of significant issues in the country. The Prime Minister noted that it is not easy to govern, especially when people are demanding more information and greater participation in the decision making process.

7. Strougal commented that change is hard, particularly for people who have been in responsible positions for a lengthy period. He stressed, however, that change will occur not only in the political sphere, but also in the ideological sphere, although the process will not necessarily be easy. Strougal described Czechoslovakia as in the midst of evolution, with the eventual final results being a product of the specificity of internal conditions. He said that the restructuring that is occurring has encountered some opposition, largely because of a failure to overcome dogmatism. Previous attempts at change had failed as the result of various obstacles; the reforms of the mid-1960’s, he noted, had “unfortunately” come to an end in 1968—”for reasons which I don’t need to elaborate and for which one must have a sense of guilt and see not only the guilt of others.”

8. Strougal described the process of “restructuring” as containing two key elements, democratization and rationalization of the socio-economic process. It will develop as an evolutionary process drawing in part on experiences of other socialist countries, but consisting largely of measures reflecting Czechoslovakia’s specific circumstances. Strougal predicted that in the next ten years Czechoslovakia will make major technological advances putting it on a world level.

9. Strougal told the Deputy Secretary he is critical of the manner in which the U.S. is covered in the Czechoslovak media. He observed that the flow of information about the United States is inadequate and that occasionally unacceptable attacks are made against senior American officials. Strougal said that media coverage of the U.S. should be more balanced, looking both at the strengths and the weaknesses.

10. On the political-ideological front, Strougal said that there are many areas in which we disagree. However, the U.S. needs to understand better what Czechoslovakia is about and realize that it is going through an evolution. Not everything is clarified yet, and serious efforts are being made to eliminate negative aspects. Strougal stated that there are unnecessary problems in the human rights area stemming largely from an unrealistic approach from the bureaucracy. He sharply criticized the mentality of the country’s police force for the useless steps they take, adding that “it is foolish to pay people to take irrational measures such as watch houses.”

11. Describing the United States as “a great country,” Strougal urged that the U.S. media cover Czechoslovakia in a more objective manner. From his experience, Strougal said there is too much media stress on such subjects as Charter 77 and the privileges of the Czechoslovak leadership.

12. Strougal observed that he is not agitating for MFN treatment for Czechoslovakia now since it is not yet on the agenda of the day. He pointed to problems created by COCOM restrictions since Czechoslovakia needs access to technology to modernize its industrial base. Nevertheless, he did not wish to make an issue of this at the present time. What he did want to stress was a step-by-step approach in all spheres by our two countries designed to broaden the bilateral relationship which is desired by a majority of the citizens of Czechoslovakia as well as a majority of the leadership. In his view such a pragmatic approach could yield desirable results.

13. Mr. Whitehead responded by noting that he had already had lengthy discussions with Party Secretary Bilak and Foreign Minister Chnoupek and did not feel it necessary to repeat everything he had said earlier. The Deputy Secretary stressed the unnaturalness of the present low level of bilateral relations: steps needed to be taken now to rectify the situation and restore relations to a more normal level.

14. The Deputy Secretary noted that the Prime Minister had made some interesting remarks about the level of bilateral trade—such as it is. In the future, he added, there are certain things we could do such as granting MFN and easing COCOM restrictions. While conditions for MFN are not ripe now, it should not be precluded permanently for, as the Deputy Secretary pointed out, some other countries in the area enjoy the benefits of MFN.

15. The Deputy Secretary stressed that the problem surrounding MFN is the American perception of Czechoslovakia’s human rights practices. Describing the roots of American concerns for human rights, which come from our own revolutionary and historical experiences, the Deputy Secretary stressed that when freedoms disappear in a country, it becomes a threat to the security of other countries. This explains why human rights concerns are so high on the American agenda.

16. Returning to the question of MFN, the Deputy Secretary described the requirements for granting it under the 1974 Trade Act. He stated that to make a recommendation to grant MFN to Czechoslovakia prematurely would cause more damage than benefit. Accordingly, it is his conviction that we should wait for the right time when the case for MFN for Czechoslovakia would be persuasive.

17. The Deputy Secretary told Strougal that he believes it is in our bilateral interest to broaden our dialogue on a variety of international issues. We believe it is important that the countries of Eastern Europe hear our views directly from us and not from some other country. He added that we know from talks with other Eastern European leaders that they have at times been erroneously informed about our position on arms control and regional issues.

18. Taking the floor again, Strougal stressed that it is incorrect to assert that Moscow dictates what the countries of Eastern Europe should do. This is, he noted, a practice of the past which has been overcome. The USSR and its allies have open discussions on actions to be taken, and it is often necessary to strive to find a compromise. He noted that just as the West coordinates its policies in NATO, so do the Warsaw Pact countries. According to Strougal, the only difference is that the West discusses its differences publicly which the East does not do. Strougal criticized this aspect of the East’s behavior.

19. On regional issues, and arms control issues, Strougal expressed his view that the USSR wishes to resolve the conflicts in Afghanistan and Kampuchea. In Afghanistan, the USSR’s recent actions have been bold, and it is necessary to create a coalition government. He argued that there is not enough pressure on the opposing forces to reach such a compromise, and he suggested that the U.S. might do more in this regard with the opposition forces. Regarding Kampuchea, Strougal said this is a more complicated issue. The Vietnamese have a mentality of their own in which the concept of a greater Indo-China plays a large role. This must be eliminated but it will take time. Strougal described the new Vietnamese leadership as being more rational. On arms control, Strougal said that the GOC supports what was said at Reykjavik. It welcomes the exchange of views with the U.S. on arms control issues to ensure an understanding of both perspectives on such important subjects.

20. Returning to bilateral relations, Strougal said Ambassador Ridgway’s visit and her suggestion to establish working groups, including one on humanitarian affairs had been useful. In the area of human rights he said the GOC is prepared to discuss everything. He stressed the need to intensify dialogue in this area noting that what looks like a minor problem to one side is an important matter of principle to the other. Strougal said he did not feel there are any obstacles to resolving issues. And if obstacles do exist they are in the eyes of a few people who feel threatened.

21. Strougal described Czechoslovakia as a democratic nation. The people do not like the government, but only suffer it. He stressed that the democratization process now under way should lead to better conditions for the population. (Concerning Charter 77, the Prime Minister noted he shares some of the views expressed in the group’s writings.) We shall move ahead, he said. While it would be improper to go before the U.S. Congress now and say that human rights problems are solved in Czechoslovakia, one should have a vision of the future. And in this sense, Strougal said he is convinced change will come in Czechoslovakia.

22. Participating in the meeting on the American side were Ambassador Julian Niemczyk, NSC Staffer Paula Dobriansky, and EUR/EEY Director Martin Wenick. Czechoslovak participants were Foreign Minister Chnoupek, Otto Schwartzenburger, Foreign Affairs and Protocol Advisor to the Prime Minister, Frantisek Kouril, the Prime Minister’s press advisor, Josef Hotmen, Advisor to the Prime Minister, and Karl Cizek, Protocol Officer.

Levitsky

1. Source: Department of State, Official Correspondence of Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead, July 1982–January 1989, Lot 89 D 139, JCW’s Eastern Europe Trip 1/27–2/7/87 Memcons. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Wenick; cleared by Dobriansky; approved by Grossman. Sent Immediate for information to Prague. Sent for information to Moscow, Warsaw, Bucharest, East Berlin, Budapest, London, Paris, Bonn, and Rome.