Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

407. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State¹

2238.

Prague, May 15, 1984, 1430Z

SUBJECT

• A Conversation With Prime Minister Strougal: Bilateral Relations.

1. C—Entire text

2. Summary. During the Ambassador’s lengthy May 14 meeting with Prime Minister Strougal (the first such conversation since 1978), the Czechoslovak Premier lamented the failure of the two governments to improve their relations, which he characterized as “stagnating”, and observed that progress was made even more difficult now because of the “rockers.” Nevertheless, he urged that something be done, perhaps more meetings, perhaps by “inventing” something. Strougal briefly reviewed Czechoslovak bilateral complaints but surprisingly agreed with U.S. criticism of the Czechoslovak press, blaming this on “others” in a leadership which was not united. He asserted, however, that the man above him (i.e., Husak) shared his attitude on this question. As a “realist”, Strougal said he understood that MFN was not obtainable at this time, and that all that was left on the table was the recent U.S. draft for an exchanges agreement,² which he indicated had been favorably received by the GOC. The question was “what next?” To explore this further Strougal expressed his willingness to meet again with the Ambassador after the latter’s return from Washington on consultations. In contrast to the rote repetition of the Czechoslovak line on bilateral relations which we often hear from lower-ranking officials, Strougal seemed genuinely interested in exploring ways to improve relations, although he himself confessed that in present circumstances he saw no easy way to accomplish this objective. It is an avenue and an opportunity which we should pursue. End summary.

3. In his discussion of bilateral affairs during his two and one-half hour May 14 conversation with the Ambassador, Prime Minister Strougal complained of his lack of information and contacts with regard to the U.S. He said that he had not spoken with American officials for some time and, although he had met twice with Mr. Nixon, neither meeting had occurred during Nixon’s Presidency. He recalled the visit of Secretary Rogers to Prague (1973)³ and remarked that he was more optimistic at that time about improving relations than he was now. In those years he had also met with some members of Congress. He claimed to read U.S. policy statements and other materials regularly, but regretted his sources of information were limited to this, the newspapers, or reports of Czechoslovak diplomats in Washington. These were not enough. He stated that he hoped to have further, even regular, talks with the Ambassador, since even if the situation was complicated, he refused to accept that there was “no way out.”

4. Strougal recalled that after the settlement of the gold/claims dispute, he “did not expect miracles”, nor did he believe that MFN would follow the “next morning.” Nevertheless, he had not expected things to get worse. But they had following the NATO INF deployment, a factor which placed a great burden on the bilateral relationship, as well as on the international environment, and U.S.-Soviet relations in particular. He complained of the lack of “official” political consultations, the low-level of access to U.S. officials that Ambassador Suja faced in Washington and the negligible amount of trade between the two countries, noting that the only “star on the horizon” was the proposed agreement on “scientific and technical” exchanges. Strougal said that the recent U.S. draft on this subject had been greeted positively by the GOC, and he saw no obstacles to its favorable consideration. “But that was it.” The Prime Minister said that he realized that it was “unrealistic” to talk of MFN today since the conditions simply do not exist. There might be some developments on the legal side, and perhaps more meetings of the U.S.- Czechoslovak Trade and Economic Council, but “realistically” there was not much to be done.

5. The Prime Minister said that his desire to improve relations with the U.S. did not stem from any egotistical motivations, or simply “to make business.” He claimed to be quite satisfied with the situation of the Czechoslovak economy, particularly its low debt repayment position, and said that the GOC balance of payments situation was the best of all the “socialist” countries. Not only the West, but also vis-a-vis the other CEMA nations. The only exception to this was the current account balance with the Soviet Union. He claimed that if one took account of other factors such as Czechoslovak investment in the CSSR, even with the Soviets the overall balance was positive.

6. Strougal observed that the Czechoslovak people thought that relations with the U.S. were bad, and they were correct, adding that since it was necessary to respond to public opinion any small step or measure to improve the situation would be welcome. Surprisingly, Strougal then expressed his agreement with U.S. criticism of the Czechoslovak press, stating that he did not approve of “certain things” that were done. He felt it correct to argue over politics and policy differences, but stated that in his view this should not include insulting leading U.S. personalities. The Prime Minister observed that the U.S. view of his government was too often that there was a unified leadership. This was incorrect. He claimed to have argued with his colleagues on this point and that “the man above me”, (i.e., Husak) was of the same opinion. Strougal said that those who opposed him replied that he should read the U.S. press, but his answer was that this was of no relevance since his own norms and standards did not depend on those of others. Strougal also claimed to have argued internally that the Soviet press was at times more lenient on the U.S. than that of his own country, asking why “we” should attack the U.S. in forms which “exceed the limits of decency.” He agreed that such things constituted a burden on our relationship and that they were foolish and useless. The Prime Minister asserted that the “authors” of these articles were held to account, but that these “authors” had other people who backed them. Thus, there is no unity of view on this question.

7. Concluding his long monologue on this subject, Strougal characterized U.S.-Czechoslovak relations as being in a state of “stagnation”, a situation harmful to both societies and individuals. He asserted that even if he does not know the U.S. well, he tried to understand it, and what limited contacts he had had with American officials were always open and frank. (He last met an American Ambassador in 1978.) He urged that both sides attempt to do something to improve the relationship, if only for future generations, noting that President Husak had specifically asked him to hold this conversation with the Ambassador, and to work out a plan with the Ambassador. He said that, despite everything, his one source of hope was the fact that there was a period of time before the war and up to 1948 when relations has been good. He realized that since that time relations had worsened, and that the image of Czechoslovakia in the U.S. Congress, for example, was an extremely negative one.

8. Strougal suggested that he and the Ambassador continue their contacts and discussions at a later date, adding that the GOC would be glad to sign a “scientific and technical” exchanges agreement, but needed to know where we might go next. Perhaps more meetings of the bilateral Trade and Economic Commission, perhaps it would be necessary “to invent” something. There was no clear answer on this, even though he had consulted a variety of ministers and asked for their suggestions.

9. Following Strougal’s long and unprovoked monologue on bilateral relations, and other subjects, the Ambassador reviewed with him the talking points on U.S.-Soviet relations (State 140525),⁴ handing him a non-paper⁵ containing these, and some further points on bilateral relations (which we will pouch to EUR/EEY), including reference to the U.S. draft exchanges agreement, the proposed consular agreement, the success of the Judaica exhibit and our satisfaction with the release of the Czechoslovak citizens held by UNITA and the recent CSCE consultations by DAS Dobbins. The points also included our concern with the distorted attitudes expressed daily in the Czechoslovak press and regret at the decision of the Czechoslovak Olympic Committee not to participate in the Los Angeles games. Strougal expressed particular pleasure in receiving the points related to U.S.-Soviet relations, remarking that it was not often that he received a “serious” document during such conversations.

10. The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for the Prime Minister’s candid remarks, and for the fact that he appeared seriously committed to improving bilateral relations. He agreed to meet with the Prime Minister again following his return from Washington on consultations at which time they could further explore ways to improve the relationship.

11. Comment: Despite the Prime Minister’s reputation as a “closet liberal” (within the Czechoslovak context) and his apparent inclination sometimes to unburden his soul to an occasional interlocutor, we were neither prepared for the length of the session (almost two and one-half hours), nor for some of Strougal’s candid remarks (no matter how self-serving they may have been) during this fascinating conversation. Whether Strougal really does have a mandate from the President to improve relations, as he hinted, or was simply winging it, remains to be seen. In any case, it is clearly in our interest to try and develop this situation and opportunity to the extent possible.

12. It is possible (although we must await further developments) that this may be a probe from Strougal and Husak to demonstrate at least some flexibility in their foreign policy, given what appears to be increasing frustration with some aspects of Soviet policy (the Olympic boycott, INF countermeasures, CEMA). Even if it is nothing of the kind, however, improved access to the Czechoslovak leadership, which use of this channel implies, may provide us with some much-needed insight and information on intra-bloc politics and make possible the sowing of a little more doubt and confusion in this time of flux in Eastern Europe.

13. We will provide the Department with some ideas on how we might best respond to Strougal, and the Ambassador will discuss this further in his Washington consultations.

14. The Department may wish to pass this cable to Moscow and EE posts. I am not planning to brief colleagues here on the details of these conversations and would prefer they not be provided to foreign officials or given wide distribution.

Luers

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N840007–0113. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis.
2. Not found.
3. July 8–9, 1973.
4. Telegram 140525 to Prague, May 12, outlined the areas in which the United States had injected new ideas into the U.S.-Soviet bilateral dialogue. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, N840007–0086)
5. Not found.