374. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz1
Washington,
June 25,
1984
SUBJECT
- Policy Implications of the Papal Assassination Case
I met with the CIA’s Bob Gates last Friday2 to exchange views on recent developments in the
Papal assassination case. After an extensive analysis of the Italian
State Prosecutor’s 77-page report [less than 1 line
not declassified],3 overall the CIA
remains agnostic regarding the evidence of a Bulgarian-Soviet conspiracy
to assassinate the Pope. However, I should point out two things that
emerged from the briefing:
- —
- As Hugh Montgomery’s piece (attached) points out, a truck left
the Bulgarian Embassy under customs seal in unusual
circumstances several hours after the assassination attempt.
This is a potentially damning piece of evidence. It may have
carried one conspirator and could have held Agca, had he
escaped.
- —
- I asked Gates if his view had changed since he last briefed me
some eight months ago. Gates said that while the evidence is
still unclear, he thought there was a substantial shift at
higher levels in the Agency toward a belief that the Bulgarians
were involved. If that is true it seems inescapable that the
Soviets were somehow aware and involved.
The Agency will, however, continue its quiet efforts to confirm the
various elements of evidence presented in the report, as well as the
facts which have merged from Judge Martella’s investigation.
The defense must now present its case to Judge Martella, after which he will decide
whether to go to trial. (By all accounts, he is determined to do so.) We
understand the trial is unlikely to begin much before the end of the
year—and that it will be lengthy, perhaps as long as a year. In the
meantime, Antonov has again been released from prison and
placed
under house arrest ostensibly for health reasons. Whatever the merits of
the conspiracy case, the Bulgarian defendants are all known intelligence
agents, and the proceedings are certain to produce
[Page 1197]
sensational stories of Bulgarian-Turkish
drugs and arms smuggling, as well as intelligence activities. Despite
recent Italian efforts to return to a more normal relationship with
Bulgaria, this will probably be impossible in such a public atmosphere.
Italian relations with the Soviet Union are also likely to suffer given
Martella’s willingness to establish a logical link through Bulgaria to
the USSR.
We will therefore continue to need an approach to the issue which
preserves our policy options whatever the evidentiary and judicial
outcome. If Bulgarian/Soviet complicity is proven, we must be in a
position to defend our record vis-a-vis the case and to adjust our
policies to these countries accordingly, i.e., downward. If, on the
other hand, the evidence does not support such complicity, it will be
important not to have boxed ourselves into prior condemnation. The
Agency is also of this view. Throughout, we need to keep the U.S.
Government from needlessly becoming a player in this involved case; both
the Bulgarians and the Soviets—and probably some Italians—would be only
too happy to see us in this role.
Therefore, we recommend that we continue to pursue the balanced and
careful approach now in place:
- —
- That we make clear both by our actions and our public
statements that we have confidence in the Italian judicial
system;
- —
- That we avoid pre-judging the case for or against Bulgarian
and Soviet complicity. There will be plenty of damning evidence
produced of illegal Bulgarian activities. We should let the
facts speak for themselves, and not hand the Bulgarians (and
Soviets) a “victory” in the event the specific case of
conspiracy cannot be proven. In this regard, your line with the
Congress was exactly right.
Attachment
Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (Montgomery) to Secretary of State
Shultz4
Washington,
June 21,
1984
SUBJECT
- Newest Evidence on Bulgarian Connection to Papal Shooting—Case
Still Inconclusive
[Page 1198]
Last week we provided you a preliminary assessment5 of the June 10 New York Times article6 that
summarized portions of Italian State Prosecutor Albano’s 77-page
report on the Papal assassination case. Having now reviewed a
translation of the full text of the report, we believe that the
evidence for direct Bulgarian complicity—with all its implications
for Soviet involvement—is still not conclusive.
Based on the evidence in Albano’s report, it seems reasonable to
assert that:
- —
- between July 1980 and May 1981, when he shot Pope John
Paul II, Mehmet Ali Agca was in frequent contact with three
Bulgarian security officers (Antonov, Vasilev, and Ayvazov)
and several other Turkish criminals and right-wing
extremists named in the indictment; and that,
- —
- one plausible interpretation of the
circumstantial evidence contained
in the report is that Agca and those individuals established
their relationship in a conspiracy to kill the Pope.
Nevertheless, we disagree with the Prosecutor’s conclusion that there
can be absolutely no other explanation for
Agca’s contacts with these men and their contacts with him. Aside
from employing a highly polemic tone—unusual for this type of
document—the Prosecutor has made several leaps in logic and engaged
in a priori reasoning. For example, he
concludes that Agca must be telling the truth concerning Bulgarian
complicity in the assassination because Agca, a young man facing
life in prison, surely realizes that honesty is the only route to a
reduced sentence. We believe it equally plausible, however, that
Agca’s desperation could have driven him to construct a
false scenario which he might believe would result in a reduced
prison sentence.
Albano’s thesis rests upon Agca’s credibility, which he goes to great
lengths to establish, both with verified facts and with assumptions.
Some of the assumptions are weak. At one point, Albano asserts that
Agca’s credibility is enhanced because two of the Bulgarians
(Ayvazov and Vasilev) deny Agca’s claim that they know English.
Albano then assumes, without any evidence, that the Bulgarians must
know English because it is the language of diplomacy and commerce.
Thus, they must be lying and Agca telling the truth.
Using Albano’s own rules of logic, we believe it possible to read the
same evidence and conclude that the Bulgarians and Turks established
their relationship with Agca for black market smuggling activities
in which his talent as a cold-blooded killer could be useful. Agca,
of course, appears to have viewed the relationship quite
differently—primarily as a vehicle to help him fulfill his November
1979 threat to
[Page 1199]
kill the
Pope. Thus, Agca is able to recount dates and places of actual
meetings with the Bulgarians and Turks, but may be lying about the
topics of discussion.
That the triangular relationship among Agca, the Bulgarians, and the
Turks might have been for smuggling-related ventures is suggested by
the following:
- —
- Several of the Turks mentioned in the indictment are known
drug and arms smugglers;
- —
- Several other Turks named in Albano’s report are members
of the right-wing Idealist Federation, or “Grey Wolves,” who
are reliably reported to be engaged in lucrative narcotics
smuggling activities in Europe.
- —
- We have convincing evidence that the Bulgarian
intelligence services assist the Turkish underworld in a
host of smuggling and narcotics activities. In return, the
smugglers apparently provide hard currency to the Bulgarians
and also may undertake various low-level
intelligence-related activities.
Based on evidence in Albano’s report, it is possible to view Agca’s
many phone calls, trips, and meetings as part of his involvement in
black marketeering, rather than a conspiracy to kill the Pope. A
low-level intelligence collection function is suggested by Albano
himself. Although glossing over it, he reports that shortly before
the Papal shooting, Agca and an
accomplice, Oral Celik, traveled to Switzerland where Celik obtained
secret documents on military installations and other matters
pertaining to Switzerland and Austria. Agca says he delivered these
documents to Vasilev in Rome in April 1981.
Involvement in smuggling and/or intelligence activities with the
Bulgarians could explain how Agca knew that a special customs-exempt
truck was scheduled to leave the Bulgarian Embassy in Rome the very
day of the Papal shooting, May 13. Agca claims that this truck was
to provide his escape from Italy. The fact that the truck departed
that particular day is remarkable and there is no question that it
is the strongest fact supporting Albano. Yet, we know from Agca’s
own records that he was considering several other days—May 17 and
20—as possible times for assassinating the Pope. He may have chosen
May 13 because he was confident the Bulgarians would allow him on
the truck without asking questions.
In our view, no single scenario adequately explains the available
evidence surrounding the Papal assassination case. Albano’s analysis
was made by taking selected facts out of the approximately 25,000
pages of painstaking investigation by Italian Magistrate Martella over a period of almost
two years. Defense counsel for the indicted conspirators are now
working over the same material and are expected to present their
report to the court around mid-July. The
[Page 1200]
court will decide then whether to proceed to
trial. For a final decision on Bulgarian complicity in the attempt
on the Pope’s life, it seems prudent to wait for the evidence
produced in court.
