315. Letter From Secretary of State Shultz to the Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic (Barkley)1
As you take up your new responsibilities as Ambassador, I would like to review with you our objectives in the German Democratic Republic.
Change is coming rapidly to the countries of the Warsaw Pact. The nations of Eastern Europe are taking on more and more of their own identity. Among them, the GDR has been the most resistant to change because in a divided Germany its legitimacy as a separate state is the most fragile in the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, an aging GDR leadership is finding that it must come to terms with change.
You have arrived at the end of a period where the tactics of U.S. policy toward the GDR had been to try to solve concurrently several issues on both countries agendas. In the end, the Administration decided to deal with each issue on its own merits. However, in the process, the U.S. initiative provided a vehicle to expand our bilateral dialogue with the GDR. You should work to preserve and expand the dialogue the initiative enabled us to get into.
Originally, the U.S. relationship with the GDR served primarily to support the FRG’s policy of trying to improve the quality of life in the GDR. In recent years the imaginative diplomacy that created a bilateral dialogue with the GDR has given the relationship a second purpose. The goal has been the development of our own agenda in the form of practical progress on issues that are directly in the U.S. national interest.
Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, in keeping with our policy of differentiation, we have taken a similarly pragmatic approach to indigenous initiatives in order to encourage democratic government and market-oriented economies. Our efforts in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will have to be carefully coordinated to achieve our overall goals in the region.
Of course, the East German relationship with the Soviet Union limits our capacity to advance U.S. interests in the GDR. The GDR-Soviet relationship has been strained by the fear of spillover of the reform efforts in the USSR, but it is too important to both countries for them [Page 985] to allow it to unravel. Nonetheless, the situation offers opportunities for American foreign policy, not only in the GDR but also in the region.
Our objectives in the German Democratic Republic are (1) to encourage liberalization and improved human rights performance; (2) to pursue U.S. citizens’ property claims and assist the Jewish community with its parallel, but separate effort; (3) to reinforce the westward orientation of the GDR populace and communicate U.S. views along with information on the U.S.; (4) to encourage development of independent policies within the framework of the GDR’s own interests; (5) to promote more substantive GDR associations with the free nations of the West and expand U.S. access to decision makers in the GDR; and (6) to develop non-strategic trade with the GDR consistent with existing U.S. policies.
The GDR government’s human rights policies, more than any other single activity, influence our bilateral relations. We must continue to voice our concerns and stress that progress in U.S.-GDR relations hinges on continued improvements in this area. Our concerns include GDR recognition of and respect for fundamental human freedoms; binational marriage and family reunification cases involving U.S. citizens; other humanitarian cases of interest to the U.S., such as political detainees and emigration cases; and restrictions on contacts between GDR citizens and our Embassy. We will be looking to you to (1) continue to press this issue vigorously, (2) work directly with other embassies and missions on such matters, and (3) keep us informed of changes in GDR policies and practices.
Like binational marriage and family reunification cases, the claims issue involves the direct interest of U.S. citizens, and the U.S. Government continues to seek a resolution of these property claims. The GDR has acknowledged its responsibility to settle these claims, and during the ninth round of claims negotiations in April the two sides reached ad referendum agreement on almost all issues, except the amount of the settlement. We expect you to continue the dialogue with GDR officials and assist the Department in coordinating negotiation strategy and in consulting with Congress. You should also confer closely with the representatives of the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany to assure that our efforts reinforce each other to the extent possible.
The GDR public has long enjoyed greater access to Western media than the other peoples of Eastern Europe. West German broadcasts reach nearly every corner of the GDR. While the GDR’s own information policy has had to take this fact into account, the government has continued to control domestic media very tightly. Editors have been disciplined. Church newspapers are censored. Western print media still cannot circulate freely (despite some loosening up), and even Soviet and East European publications have been banned.
[Page 986]In addition to encouraging a more open press policy and reinforcing the Western orientation of the GDR populace, a specific objective for your Embassy will continue to be communicating U.S. views on major issues and disseminating information about the United States. Further improvement in access for GDR citizens to U.S. programs is a prerequisite for achieving those goals as is access for U.S. citizens and officials to GDR officials. In your discussions with GDR leaders, you should continue to stress the importance the U.S. attaches to free and open access. Moreover, USIA’s negotiation of a cultural agreement with the GDR should serve to enhance access and reinforce the populace’s Western orientation.
In light of its current policies, the GDR cannot expect most-favored-nation status, but it is in our mutual interest to see non-strategic trade expand. You should promote this view and assist U.S. firms in contacting GDR buyers through your participation in annual trade fairs and dealings with GDR government officials. You should also impress on GDR officials the need to improve conditions for representatives of U.S. businesses. Finally, you can identify trade opportunities of interest in the GDR and help keep the U.S. business community aware of them.
Although political realities limit our ability to effect changes in the German Democratic Republic’s political alignment or system, the recognition of the need for reform is growing both in the GDR and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The situation is fraught with dangers but also with opportunities. You will need to monitor the relationship with the Soviet Union carefully and to report frequently and in detail so that the Department can coordinate our approach to the region. The internal situation in the GDR will also require close attention. As the end of the Honecker era approaches, we will need your assessment of the new leadership and your policy recommendations.
You will also need to report extensively on the burgeoning GDR-FRG relationship. The U.S. has always supported the FRG’s efforts to improve life in the GDR. In recent years the dialogue between the GDR and the FRG has grown enormously. The FRG regards this relationship as extremely important, and in the interest of a coherent Western policy, we need to be kept abreast of the relationship’s development and to assess its impact on U.S. interests in the NATO alliance as well as the East-West framework generally.
In this fluid situation, our basic approach remains to seek a stable, pragmatic, constructive bilateral relationship with the GDR. This approach offers not only the best means for addressing our interests in improved human rights performance, in resolution of U.S. and Jewish claims, and in increased trade but also the most effective base for expanding our influence on the GDR’s foreign policy. In the past, we encouraged the development of GDR foreign policies at variance with those of the Soviet Union. At present the GDR has become bolder about the exercise of its limited sovereignty. We still want to see more independence for the [Page 987] GDR, but in many areas Soviet policies are now more flexible than those of the GDR. Worried about Soviet and East European instability, the GDR has sometimes used its greater leeway to repress rather than to reform. It has permitted more travel and emigration as well as statewide religious assemblies, but it has also not abandoned the instruments of control. In this environment, a stable but constructive, critical but consistent U.S. approach makes our policies more comprehensible and persuasive. Our aim is to encourage reform and liberalization that reflect the GDR’s own self-interest and national agenda.
Our step-by-step approach also provides a framework for engaging the GDR in a process of addressing our other international concerns such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and environmental protection. Our dialogue on terrorism, for example, has been difficult, but we have made the GDR aware of the seriousness with which we view its activities. Although the GDR has not always acknowledged its response to our representations, it has taken some steps. It has been more forthcoming in reacting to our approach on narcotics control, and you will want to develop this trend. You should encourage the GDR to take concrete steps in this growing dialogue as a means of changing its international behavior and bringing the GDR into the community of responsible nations. Our overall goal is to entwine the GDR in more substantive associations with the free nations of the West.
Management of resources, programs, and staff is central to your role as Chief of Mission. Good management will be key to maintaining a staff with sufficient morale, loyalty, and expertise to meet the exceptionally high standards I demand from all posts. Language competence for our personnel is a priority concern.
Ultimate responsibility for security is inherent in the job you are assuming. The security of people, facilities, and information is vital to your mission. I cannot overemphasize the importance of identifying and controlling potential security problems before they become real ones.
As the senior management official, you should ensure the integrity of post communication and communications facilities as well as the security of all national security information held by the Embassy. Protection of sensitive information is basic to our effectiveness, and failures in security can destroy years of work. You are responsible for ensuring that an emergency action plan is in place, that post security briefings are given, and that public access controls address foreseeable threats.
Your ability to manage your post depends on the adequacy of resources, including staffing. Therefore, you should take an active interest in the budget process and see that an effective system of internal controls prevents waste, fraud, or mismanagement. In this era of continuing and severe budget constraints, you must ensure available resources are carefully husbanded and intelligently applied to meet the most important requirements.
[Page 988]You must also evaluate the administrative impact of requests by other agencies for additional staffing or programs. You should approve additions only if you judge them to be necessary and administrative staff and resources are sufficient to handle the increased workload.
You should develop annually with your mission colleagues goals for approval by the Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs and an Embassy workplan for their implementation. The goals and workplan should be the basis of your mission’s major activities and resource allocations, including the programs of other agencies. I encourage you to include significant managerial and administrative goals in your plans.
Your management team and first-line supervisors must understand and be reminded regularly that good management gets the best performance from employees by showing interest in them, their success, and their individual and collective concerns. Males and females, minorities and non-minorities, professionals and non-professionals, and American and Foreign Service National employees must see you as one who is fair, supportive and sensitive to their concerns and as a firm believer in equal employment opportunities and affirmative action. I am counting on your personal leadership for the development of an atmosphere conductive to cooperation, loyalty, professional growth, and equal opportunity.
As Ambassador, your authority flows from the President to me, and from me through the Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs to you. I look to the Assistant Secretary to issue instructions in my name and to serve as the primary communications link between us. You should channel all messages dealing with policy proposals, policy implementation, program activities, personnel and post operations to or through her, with the understanding that for extraordinary situations there is a direct channel of communication with me through the Executive Secretary that is available for your use.
In accord with the above, you should transmit all messages dealing with policy proposals, policy implementation, program activities, personnel and post operations through regular established State Department communications channels. The only two exceptions are: (1) if the President personally or the National Security Adviser on the President’s behalf instructs you to use a private channel (in such cases you should advise me personally—or the Acting Secretary in my absence—of this instruction unless you are explicitly directed not to by the President); and (2) if I, or in my absence, the Acting Secretary or the Executive Secretary, instruct you to use a non-State channel.
I wish you well in your important and challenging assignment. You have my full confidence and best wishes.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Secretary George Shultz Papers, Official Memoranda (12/16/1988) (3). Secret. Drafted by Charles B. Skinner (EUR/CE) on December 7. Ridgway sent the letter to Shultz under a December 15 action memorandum, requesting that Shultz sign the letter and authorize its transmission. A typed note at the top of the page indicates the original letter was sent to the Mission in West Berlin for Ambassador Barkley, who presented his credentials on December 19.↩