Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

307. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

EURM 88–20069

Washington, April 25, 1988

EAST GERMANY: THINKING ABOUT SUCCESSION [portion marking not declassified]

Summary

Signs suggesting a weakening of Honecker’s authority are prompting the East German elites to consider more seriously the prospects of succession in East Berlin. Some reports indicate that Honecker is considering stepping down at the Party Congress in 1990. While no one apparently has a lock on succession, Central Committee Secretary for Agriculture Werner Felfe, First Secretary for East Berlin Guenther Schabowski, and Central Committee Secretary for Security and Youth Affairs Egon Krenz seem to be best placed to take over from Honecker. Moscow is unlikely to move against Honecker or interfere in the East German pre-succession jockeying as long as he maintains a reasonably firm grip on power, controls social unrest, and promotes Soviet security policies in Western Europe. Should opposition to Honecker become open, the Soviets probably would try to influence the outcome. [portion marking not declassified]

Whoever succeeds Honecker will have to grapple with complex and increasingly urgent domestic political and economic issues. The pragmatic and relatively sophisticated Felfe may be somewhat more sympathetic toward glasnost and perestroika than the orthodox Krenz. Neither, however, would risk any real pluralism or undertake fundamental economic reforms that would endanger the primacy of the Communist Party. In the area of foreign affairs there is likely to be a continuation of Honecker’s policies, including obtaining new technology for economic modernization through Westpolitik, using East-West arms control negotiations to bolster East Germany’s own status and continuing to support some Third World terrorist and radical groups. [portion marking not declassified]

The Current Political Scene

Emerging differences in the traditionally consensual East German leadership over treatment of dissidents, Westpolitik, and economic performance have revived domestic speculation about succession in East Germany. The recent erratic regime behavior toward dissidents, in our view, reflected the apparent inability of East German leader Erich Honecker to impose a consistent policy line on his Politburo colleagues. This wavering triggered a spate of reporting suggesting that Honecker’s rule may come to an end sooner that the General Secretary might like. [less than 6 lines not declassified]

The regime’s display of indecisiveness in its treatment of the dissidents last January was also accompanied by some indirect sniping at Honecker by senior Politburo colleagues. The party’s chief ideologue Kurt Hager, for example, on several occasions indirectly criticized the regime’s current efforts to cultivate the West by emphasizing the continuing irreconcilable conflict between socialist and capitalist systems and the need for ideological vigilance. At a Politburo session [less than 1 line not declassified] unspecified hardliners reportedly questioned Honecker’s conduct and concessions that he made during his visit to Bonn. [portion marking not declassified]

Regime frustration with slowing economic growth and a weakened foreign trade position is also evident, and may fuel disagreements over economic policy. The party newspaper Neues Deutschland several months ago published two sharp articles criticizing housing construction and consumer services in some East German districts. Such harsh comments on economic performance conflict with the regime’s usual practice of touting its economic achievements and would seem to require high-level approval, probably from elements in the top leadership, who believe that Honecker is increasingly vulnerable on this issue. In a key address at the last party plenum, even Politburo member Werner Felfe—one of the reputed major contenders for Honecker’s job—failed to show strong enthusiasm for the achievements of the GDR’s economy in the last year. In contrast to Honecker’s public claims of success, the party’s chief economic policy maker, Guenther Mittag, also has emphasized to his Politburo colleagues the need for new measures to modernize the industrial base and improve the country’s foreign trade position. [portion marking not declassified]

Honecker’s Position

The recent criticism probably is troublesome and embarrassing to Honecker, but at the present time it does not appear to be particularly threatening. Honecker has shown that he is still in control. He has attacked his hardline critics and has continued to reject Gorbachev-style political and economic reforms:

[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

• He also continues to hold that Gorbachev’s initiatives are not applicable to East Germany and to rebuff Soviet efforts to forge new, more direct economic links with East German enterprises. [portion marking not declassified]

Honecker probably does not expect Moscow to move against him as long as he appears to have a reasonably firm grip on power and keeps social unrest under control. He probably believes that Soviet leader Gorbachev is facing too many problems at home to want to risk instability in East Germany, which has been Moscow’s staunchest ally in Eastern Europe. Moreover, Honecker knows that he has been useful to Moscow in promoting Soviet security objectives in Western Europe and in the Third World and that a clumsy Soviet effort to remove him would damage Gorbachev’s image as a sophisticated, flexible leader willing to tolerate greater diversity in allied countries. Should the challenge to Honecker become more open, he and others in the East German leadership probably would expect the Soviets to try to lend support to someone most likely to share Moscow’s views on domestic reform and Bloc economic integration, such as Schabowski or Felfe. [portion marking not declassified]

Looking for the Crown Prince

It is still unclear who would succeed Honecker as General Secretary of the party because no one as yet has established a clear claim to the post as Honecker did, for example, prior to Walter Ulbricht’s ouster. The Politburo is likely to turn to relatively younger leaders because most of them have held influential positions long enough to make an interim regime of elders unnecessary. Also the leadership wants to avoid potential destabilization caused by a caretaker government which soon would have to be replaced by a more permanent regime. The principal candidates for Honecker’s position are:

• Werner Felfe (60), Central Committee Secretary of Agriculture and Politburo member, who has reportedly replaced Egon Krenz as the leading candidate. Felfe recently assumed a much higher profile in party affairs; he made the first high-level trip to West Germany after Honecker’s visit there, and he delivered the Politburo report to the Central Committee plenum [less than 1 line not declassified]. Moreover, as Secretary of Agriculture, Felfe probably has improved his position because of the strong performance of the agricultural sector in recent years. [less than 3 lines not declassified]

• Guenther Schabowski (58), Central Committee Secretary and Politburo member in our view is a weaker candidate than Felfe, even though he has a relatively strong power base as head of the East Berlin party organization. His relatively low profile during East Berlin’s 750th anniversary celebrations in 1987 suggests a lower ranking in the Politburo. Nevertheless, the Soviets may prefer someone like Schabowski who reportedly resembles Gorbachev in both style and thinking

• Egon Krenz (51), Central Committee Secretary responsible for Security, Youth Affairs, and Sports, and a Politburo member reportedly has lost some ground as the favorite for Honecker’s position. Although Krenz lacks intellectual agility, he has expertise in key areas such as security and youth matters and ostensibly gets along with everyone. He holds the same Central Committee Secretary job that Honecker held prior to the latter’s becoming General Secretary.

• Joachim Herrmann (60), Central Committee Secretary responsible for Agitation-Propaganda and Mass Organizations and a Politburo member, is also a key player on Berlin and intra-German issues. Although his name has not been mentioned as often as those of the potential candidates listed above, in speculation about succession some West German officials rank his chances higher than those of Schabowski. Herrmann is a close confidant of Honecker with whom he has worked since 1946. [portion marking not declassified]

Secretary for Party Organs and Politburo member Horst Dohlus and First Secretary for the Dresden District Hans Modrow also have been mentioned in discussions about succession. Modrow’s chances of taking over Honecker’s position, however, are slim because he is not a Central Committee Secretariat and Politburo member. Experts on East Germany generally believe that membership in the Politburo is a prerequisite for becoming a serious contender for the position of General Secretary. [portion marking not declassified]

Felfe, despite his recent gains, by no means has a lock on succession. While he will attempt to improve his position further, Honecker may still believe that Krenz, whose career background is similar to his own, would better protect his historical legacy. In any case, Honecker, in the tradition of East Bloc leaders, almost certainly will not name an heir apparent, believing that conferring such power could endanger his own position. Nonetheless, jockeying within the leadership for Honecker’s position has already begun, according to the reporting from the United States Embassy and the West Berlin press. This political infighting is not likely to lead to significant policy changes while Honecker remains in power. The debate over policy, however, will probably become heated. [portion marking not declassified]

Policy Implications of Succession: Domestic Issues

Honecker’s successor will inherit a difficult and increasingly complex social, political, and economic situation in the GDR. On the social and political front, Gorbachev’s espousal of glasnost has raised popular expectations for political change, which already have spurred anti-regime protests. It seems reasonable to assume that either Felfe or Schabowski, who appear more pragmatic and flexible, would be more sympathetic to glasnost than Krenz or Herrmann, calculating that measured liberalization would defuse social unrest and increase the regime’s legitimacy. Felfe or Schabowski might liberalize cultural policy a bit more by permitting publication of some currently banned books and allowing somewhat greater diversity of opinion in the regime-controlled press. They also may show somewhat greater leniency toward dissident groups connected with the Protestant Church, provided the church leadership manages to confine protest to church premises. In contrast, Krenz and Herrmann, whose careers in the security and propaganda apparatuses, respectively, have steeped them in orthodox ideological thinking, are unlikely to be receptive to glasnost. Both groups of potential successors would crack down hard on anyone posing a serious challenge to the regime, however. Any successor would seek to preserve the dominance of the Communist Party. Western hopes that the combination of generational change, increased cooperation between the two Germanys, and the “new thinking” in Moscow will produce greater pluralism in East Germany are unrealistic because they ignore the fact that even a younger East Berlin leadership would be fairly orthodox in its Marxism-Leninism. [portion marking not declassified]

A successor regime will also inherit mounting economic problems. In the last two years, growth has slowed and trade performances with both the West and the Soviet Union show signs of weakness. Although partly the result of harsh winters, energy shortages and past planning failures, the recent poor economic performance reflects mainly systemic shortcomings and the lack of new initiatives to counter them. Honecker’s fervent opposition to economic restructuring makes it unlikely that any significant changes will be implemented during his tenure. [portion marking not declassified]

The slowing economic growth rate will sharpen the debate over both investment priorities and the structure of the economy. With respect to the latter, a successor regime almost certainly will oppose changing fundamentally the central planning system—which determines economic inputs, outputs, and prices—but rather will probably tinker with administrative decentralization. Economic enterprises, for example, may be allowed to keep a larger share of profits and use them at their discretion for investments or bonuses. The enterprises also may be given greater freedom to offer higher wages and other benefits to increase labor mobility. [portion marking not declassified]

Changes may also be made to increase the efficiency of the Kombinate² by reducing their numbers and by cutting government subsidies. Resource commitments to the consumer sector may be reduced to permit larger capital investments; this measure, however, probably would be considered only as a last resort because consumer welfare buys the regime what little support it has. The small private sector—consisting of some shops and restaurants—may also be allowed to expand somewhat. [portion marking not declassified]

Implications for Foreign Policy

There is likely to be much continuity in foreign policy no matter who succeeds Honecker. East Berlin probably will continue Westpolitik as long as East German and Soviet objectives—such as obtaining Western technology and promoting East Bloc security objectives in Western Europe—run parallel. However, if East German trade with the West conflicted with Soviet needs or if intra-German cooperation aroused suspicion in Moscow about the GDR’s reliability, a new regime almost certainly would yield to Soviet wishes to go slower on this front. East Germany will remain dependent on the USSR for oil and other raw materials as well as military protection against both domestic and foreign adversaries. [portion marking not declassified]

A successor government, like the current regime, probably will try to resist greater CEMA integration for fear that Moscow will exploit closer economic cooperation to build up its own economy at the expense of East German resources and trade with the West. If Moscow seriously pressed for compliance, however, East Berlin undoubtedly would give in. The GDR cannot afford to be the “odd man out” on CEMA integration, not only because of its dependence on the Soviet Union for raw materials, but also because the creation of joint ventures by other CEMA countries would reduce East German access to export markets in the East Bloc. [portion marking not declassified]

Exploiting Arms Control

A successor undoubtedly will emulate Honecker’s strategy of using East-West arms control issues to gain wider acceptance of the GDR in the West. The push for chemical and nuclear weapons-free zones in Europe and security cooperation with West European leftist parties will continue. Like Honecker, a successor probably will try to enhance the GDR’s role in the arms control process by acting as a Bloc interlocutor with the West Germans—not only with the left-of-center Social Democrats but also with the center-right Kohl government, which increasingly has bowed to the electorate’s desire for disarmament and growing trust in Gorbachev’s “peace” policies. A new leader in East Berlin might push even more vigorously Soviet propaganda themes, such as the Common European House and a nuclear-free Europe, in the hope of maintaining good political relations with the Soviets. [portion marking not declassified]

Relations with the United States

The GDR probably will increase its efforts to improve relations with the US as long as East-West relations continue on their present course. This is likely to lead to a higher level of political and cultural exchanges and greater willingness by East Berlin to satisfactorily conclude bilateral agenda items that remain in dispute, such as Jewish property claims and family reunification cases. East Berlin probably will also push to expand trade relations and may propose joint ventures in manufacturing areas where the East Germans are relatively strong—such as basic farm machinery, fork lifts, and optical equipment—as an inducement for the US to agree to joint ventures in medium and non-COCOM high technology. East Germany’s trade with the US undoubtedly will be constrained by hard currency shortages, lack of competitiveness, fear of economic dependence on the West which might make East Berlin vulnerable to pressures for political liberalization, and Soviet demands for better goods and more economic cooperation. [portion marking not declassified]

The downside of this normalization process is that the GDR probably would target the US even more heavily for espionage, especially illegal technology transfers. Moreover, the GDR almost certainly would continue to challenge US rights in Berlin and resist Washington’s initiatives for improving the economic situation of the divided city for fear that new arrangements might alter the status of Berlin and negatively affect the GDR’s claims to East Berlin as its capital. Also, the GDR will continue to support Soviet active measures against the United States—such as blaming US bacteriological warfare experiments for “inventing” AIDS—and quietly supporting Third World terrorist and radical groups. [portion marking not declassified]

1. Source: Reagan Library, Rudolf Perina Files, Subject File, Eastern Europe—General 1988 (3). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Office of European Analysis.
2. East Berlin merged all state-run industrial enterprises into about 130 “combines” in the early 1980s. Each combine is a large, generally vertically integrated industrial monopoly that controls all phases of production for the same or similar goods from resource extraction to final assembly. [Footnote is in the original.]