Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

292. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

EUR–M–86–20162

Washington, January 6, 1987

East Germany-USSR: Keeping Glasnost at Arm’s Length

East Germany (the GDR) is wary of Gorbachev’s policies encouraging candor and openness (glasnost) in the media and in the arts and resents pressure from the Soviet leader to follow suit. The archconservative East German regime still feels insecure due to its inability to foster genuine popular support for the GDR’s existence as a national state separate from West Germany and with its own culture. To at least some in the GDR leadership, Gorbachev’s efforts are destructively revisionist, akin to Krushchchev’s de-Stalinization campaign. This may have already led to increasing tensions in the party apparatus over the appropriate cultural-political policy for the GDR, reportedly leading to the suicide of a senior official.² The regime’s alienation from the new Gorbachev style of glasnost adds to the range of current economic and political differences between the GDR and the USSR; in this case, the East German leaders evidently hope that conservative forces in the Soviet Union will force Gorbachev to reverse course. [portion marking not declassified]

Frictions and differences between East Germany (the GDR) and the Soviet Union have become increasingly noticeable in recent years, despite East Berlin’s well-deserved reputation for being one of Moscow’s most loyal allies. There has been friction over trade and financial relations; over Soviet pressure to bind East German technical know how to Gorbachev’s economic modernization plans; over the course and pace of intra-German relations; and even over a normally sacrosanct Soviet military decision, the deployment of shortrange missiles in the GDR. [portion marking not declassified]

More generally, the GDR leadership appears to be out of step with Gorbachev’s encouragement of greater openness (glasnost) in the media, cultural policy, or in addressing shortcomings in the society and economy. The contrast between the styles and substance of GDR leader Honecker and Gorbachev was clearly evident at the East German Communist party (SED) congress in April 1986. During his initial long speech, Honecker came across as smug and arrogant as he catalogued the GDR’s successes and painted a picture of a system on the right track. Gorbachev, in contrast, appeared relatively bold and dynamic as he called for dealing more frankly with problems facing socialist societies. The Soviet leader reportedly rankled the East Germans by inserting into his speech references to the necessity for intra-party criticism after listening to Honecker’s opening address. SED officials were particularly upset because Gorbachev gave them no advance notification of the changes. [portion marking not declassified]

The East Germans have not, to our knowledge, reported even factually much less favorably on the details of Gorbachev’s personnel shake-ups or reforms in such institutions as the cinematographers’ and writers’ unions. Editorials and leadership speeches refer only in general terms to the changes underway there and strongly infer that such changes are not applicable to the GDR. This point was made most bluntly in a speech by Kurt Hager, the SED Politburo’s ideology and culture czar, on the eve of the anniversary of the Great October Revolution. Indeed, the GDR sometimes appears patronizing in reference to Soviet efforts to improve the economy, perhaps intending to suggest that Moscow is only trying to achieve a degree of efficiency that East Germany has enjoyed for years. Some SED leadership officials reportedly consider Gorbachev top revisionist and compare his openness campaign with Kruschchev’s de-Stalinization program, which they believe destroyed the image of the Soviet model in the world Communist movement. These senior officials may also be concerned that intra-party criticism could lead to elite instability and endanger their own positions. [portion marking not declassified]

Although in a recent conversation with a senior U.S. official in Washington the East German ambassador said he welcomed Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov’s release³ as a necessary step by Gorbachev for creating appropriate conditions for his domestic reform effort, it is virtually inconceivable that the SED Politburo subscribes to such a view. Like the Soviets, the East Germans would not tolerate the powerful—and telling—criticism from a person like Sakharov; unlike the Soviets, the GDR leaders would not risk validating this criticism by releasing him. The GDR dissident closest to Sakharov in intellectual stature and political courage was Robert Havermann who was kept under house arrest until his death in East Berlin several years ago. [portion marking not declassified]

Media Policy

[less than 1 line not declassified] the East German regime has been extremely unhappy with Gorbachev’s new media policy that advocates greater openness and self-criticism. They especially resent being prodded to follow suit. Although a few ministers have appeared on radio call-in shows answering listeners’ questions—sometimes pointed—about economic conditions, the East German press remains as hidebound as ever. Primarily concerned with administering heavy doses of the party line to the faithful, newspaper articles recount one success after another—albeit with exhortations to achieve new heights—not expose serious shortcomings. Unlike the Soviet television news program Vremya with its occasional investigative journalism, the GDR’s counterpart Aktuelle Kamera is such a boring recital of the next day’s party newspaper lead stories that even East German officials are privately embarassed. [less than 3 lines not declassified]

The satirical weekly Eulenspiegel makes a somewhat colorful counterpart to the dull boosterism of most GDR media. “Eule’s” 450,000 copies are eagerly snapped up by readers—who frequently must buy them under the counter—in part to read the 15 or so letters printed each week that complain about the thousand little frustrations of being a citizen of the GDR. The paper is reportedly bombarded with 300–350 such letters each month criticizing shortages, the poor quality of goods and services, and especially the post and railroad. As anomalous as this readers’ forum is in the GDR scene, Eulenspiegel does not qualify as evidence for East German glasnost. Rather, it appears to be more in the tradition of the USSR’s satirical Krokodil, in which, for example, bureaucratic foibles might be lampooned but no systemic criticism allowed. Eulenspiegel, therefore, serves a ventilation function for the public’s irritations at everyday life, but never hints at such a serious source of discontent as restrictions on freedom to travel. [portion marking not declassified]

Cultural Policy

The dead hand of Kurt Hager and his cultural watchdogs has ensured that the East German cultural landscape remains bleak and unaffected by any winds of change blowing from Gorbachev’s Soviet Union. While Hager’s pragmatism makes him a less baleful overseer than, for example, the crude and aggressive former East Berlin SED boss Konrad Naumann who constantly intruded on the cultural scene, he has made clear in conversation with the U.S. ambassador his disdain for intellectuals. For him they are “an odd bunch” that ought to be controlled. The Writers’ Union, with a few exceptions, consists of hacks and timeservers. Many of the best writers have emigrated to West Germany or, if still in the GDR, either refuse to join the organization or are blackballed. In any case, non-membership is tantamount to non-publication. [portion marking not declassified]

A small peak in the otherwise featureless plain of East German cultural blandness is Ein Tag laenger als ein Leben, a play by Ulrich Plenzdorf first staged in October 1986 at the Maxim Gorki Theater in East Berlin. Based on a novel by the Soviet writer Chingis Aitmatov, the play’s depiction of the remoteness of the Soviet state from its citizens, interspersed with flashback references to Stalinism and de-Stalinization, might be fairly mild stuff in today’s USSR, but it is quite daring for the GDR. Not surprisingly, the author had to bowdlerize his script, and he feared the play would be withdrawn right up to the opening night. [portion marking not declassified]

If Ein Tag . . . is a slight touch of glasnost, then the treatment being meted out to the talented young writer Gabriele Eckart is more typical of the regime’s inhospitableness to unwelcome truths. Using tape recorded interviews with inhabitants of East Germany’s Havel fruit-growing district near Potsdam, Eckart wrote an expose of everyday living and working conditions. It touched on, for example, the pain of separation in a family when a borderguard son has fled to the West or the bitterness of a middleaged party member when he is not trusted enough to be given a visa to travel abroad. Since the time Eckart’s So sehe ick die Sache was published in West Germany, predictably she has been harassed and even beaten up by the secret police. [portion marking not declassified]

The East German film production company DEFA has a modest tradition of treating candidly some touchy subjects. Der Aufenthalt (The Stopover), for example, deals with a miscarriage of justice committed by the Polish authorities against a German P.O.W. shortly after World War II, and Solo Sunny is a realistic portrayal of a young woman’s life in contemporary GDR society. These are exceptions, however, and in this most modern and potentially influential of arts there are no signs of a similar ferment that led to the ouster of the leadership in the Soviet film association. The more typically East German response to artistic frustration like that appears to have been emigration. Our Embassy in East Berlin reports that the GDR is currently losing a lot of film people to the West. [portion marking not declassified]

Why So Obstinate?

The regime’s fundamental insecurity and conservatism in cultural policy stem from the fact that, unlike other East European states, the GDR has no genuine, separate national culture. Attempts to fabricate a “proletarian culture” combining ideology, Soviet models, and GDR-specific cultural themes have failed miserably in the face of West Germany’s overwhelming influence and the German cultural heritage shared by both states. Disappointed in its attempts to elicit an active commitment from the populace, the regime has settled for passive acceptance while still showing little tolerance for dissent. Thus, the authorities no longer jam West German television signals—in part because they recognize the value of the escapism afforded the public from such favorite programs as Dallas and Denver Clan—but Western television remains a private affair not a stimulus for open discussion. [portion marking not declassified]

The increasing confidence the GDR displays in international affairs—Honecker’s Westpolitik—is not replicated on the domestic cultural front by any self-assurance in letting critical voices be heard. Officials such as Ursula Ragwitz, head of the Central Committee’s Cultural Department, seem incapable of seeing culture except in “socialist realism” terms: culture is meant to transform society, promote identification with the state, and secure the party’s grasp on power. [portion marking not declassified]

This does not exclude the possibility of debate within the party leadership. Indeed, there is evidence that some younger, lower-level SED bureaucrats would welcome some of Gorbachev’s dynamism in the party. In mid-November, the East German media announced the suicide of Hans Koch, Director of the influential Institute for Marxist-Leninist Cultural and Artistic Sciences in the party’s Academy for Social Sciences and a key player in cultural policy. It is almost unheard of that the suicide of a leading figure in the party is announced, and, [4 lines not declassified].

Outlook

We have little reason to believe that the GDR will begin to imitate Soviet-style glasnost any time soon. (Even the unusual frankness in announcing Koch’s suicide appears primarily defensive rather than a bow to the new style. The leadership probably wanted to avoid a repetition of the situation after an ambiguous death announcement following the suicide in June 1986 of Dean Reed, an American expatriate political balladeer and long-time resident of the GDR, led to rumors that the secret police had done him in). Being out of step with Gorbachev over time carries its risks, but Honecker evidently believes that glasnost, if applied to the GDR as an invitation to criticize, would be an immediate threat to internal order. The East Germans might also be taking a wait-and-see attitude in anticipation that Gorbachev’s shakeup like that of Kruschchev will be reversed by Soviet conservatives. [portion marking not declassified]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis, Job 02–06156R: Intelligence Publication Files—Record Copy of Finished Intelligence Pubs (1982–1996), Box 2, Folder 320: 6 January 1987, East-Germany-USSR: Keeping Glasnost at Arm’s Length [EUR–M–86–20162]. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the East European Division, Office of European Analysis, in response to a request from Harry Gilmore, Director of the Office of Central European Affairs, Department of State.
2. Reference is to Hans Koch, Director of the Institute for Marxist-Leninist Cultural and Artistic Sciences in the Communist Party’s Academy for Social Sciences.
3. Gorbachev ordered the release of Sakharov from internal exile in Gorky in December 1986.