Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

290. Telegram From the Mission in West Berlin to the Department of State and the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany¹

2557.

West Berlin, August 12, 1986, 1727Z

SUBJECT

• The Berlin Wall Turns Twenty-Five (III): The Concrete Has Many Faces.

1. Summary: This is the third in a series of cables Mission has prepared looking at various aspects of Berlin and East-West issues in light of the 25th anniversary of the building of the Berlin Wall. It examines evolutions of Soviet and GDR interests in Berlin during the past twenty-five years as observed from the Berlin perspective. Our basic conclusion is that construction of the Wall served immediate Soviet and GDR interests by consolidating the East German state and giving the Soviets some breathing room in Central Europe. The 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin was a further step in Soviet efforts to manage the situation in Germany, but it also marked the beginnings of a divergence in Soviet and GDR approaches to the Berlin issue.

2. From Mission’s perspective, GDR policy still seems largely dominated by a drive to develop further its own identity. Despite the GDR’s considerable success in consolidating its rule since the building of the Wall, the allied presence in West Berlin and the limitations on GDR sovereignty in East Berlin continue to pose a significant irritation. The Soviets seem more interested in avoiding problems and in using the Berlin situation as a flexible tool in their overall policy with West Germany. Neither the Soviets nor the GDR are likely to be interested in a full-blown Berlin crisis in coming years. The challenge to West Berlin and to the allies will be to maintain the credibility of our occupation regime in the face of relentless Eastern efforts to undermine it. These efforts will in the main be more subtle and indirect. They will focus as much on the psychology of West Berliners and West Germans as on specific threats. End summary.

Tracing the Evolution Since 1961

3. Construction of the Berlin Wall was an admission of defeat. During the 1950’s, the Soviets sought to consolidate the GDR as a state equal in status to the FRG. In its early days, the GDR was more in favor of all-German activities than was the FRG. It called continuously for joint all-German commissions on various issues and stressed in its propaganda the strong GDR desire for German reunification.

4. Soviet strategy in these years was guided primarily by its desire to avoid the integration of the Federal Republic into the West. The famous Stalin note of 1952 was designed to block FRG entry into the planned European Defense Community. Foreign Minister conferences in 1954 and 1959 had the same goal.

5. At the same time, the Soviets were faced with the continued inability of the GDR to gain the loyalty of its own citizens. Economic progress stagnated. Especially after the worker’s uprising of 1953, the GDR found it impossible to compete on anywhere near an equal footing with the FRG. Khrushchev’s Berlin ultimatum of 1958 was the first shot in a new Soviet strategy on Berlin. Rather than establish the GDR as an equal partner, the Soviets decided that removal of the threat represented by West Berlin was the only solution. Construction of the Wall three years later was a double admission of defeat—the Soviets could not consolidate the GDR and they could not drive the West out of Berlin. Sealing off the Western sectors was the only alternative.

6. In the quarter century since construction of the Berlin Wall, the Soviets have succeeded in consolidating the GDR. They have also reached a modus vivendi with the West on management of Berlin-related issues. This modus vivendi is set forth in the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, which celebrates its fifteenth anniversary in 1986. From a Soviet point of view, this agreement represented a major concession by providing Soviet reconfirmation of Four Power rights and responsibilities for all areas of Berlin relations, including the important ground access to and from West Germany. In return the Soviets won two important points: A) they gained acceptance by the West of the GDR as a partner in management of Berlin issues, and B) they obtained Western acceptance of a limitation of the ties between West Berlin and the FRG.

7. These two points have formed the foundation of Soviet and GDR Berlin strategy since 1971. They have also been the focus of most of the differences between East and West on Berlin issues since entry into force of the QA in June, 1973. In essence, the East has followed careful implementation of the practical side of the Berlin relationship. Access, exchange of territory, and visits provisions have been followed scrupulously. In return, the Soviets and East Germans have fought tenaciously to push their very limited interpretation of portions dealing with FRG-Berlin ties and foreign representation of Berlin abroad. The overall goal seems to be to isolate West Berlin as much as possible from its cultural and political base in the West.

The GDR as a Player

8. We should of course recall that the 1970’s modus vivendi on Berlin was negotiated over the GDR’s dead body. Talks did not move forward until Ulbricht was removed in the spring of 1971. GDR officials fought bitterly to limit Soviet concessions. In one especially important instance, Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov was forced to take back agreed language on access arrangements. During the discussions, the Soviets were often uncomfortable when dealing with points which touched directly on GDR interests. The final bargain included another point of potential Soviet-GDR conflict. Although both were undoubtedly pleased that the GDR was included as a full partner with the FRG in management of access arrangements, the agreement also provided the GDR with increased independence and leverage over the USSR. By committing itself to maintain full implementation of the agreement, the Soviets also made themselves somewhat more dependent on GDR desires in Berlin. Events during the past ten years have shown that the GDR has slowly but surely expanded this leverage.

9. In particular, Soviet transfer of operational responsibilities to the GDR has made the GDR an important player on Berlin issues. While allied insistence on dealing with the Soviets as the proper channel for East-West discussions on Berlin has no doubt frustrated this development to a certain extent, Mission’s dealings with the Soviets suggest that the Soviets are often faced with difficult consultations with GDR counterparts who seem to be the prime movers on certain issues. This seems to be the case with Soviet/GDR harassment of allied flag tours and periodic Soviet suggestions that these be cut back or eliminated. It seemed most obvious in the recent sector/sector border controversy that the GDR had initiated action and the Soviets were very late in focussing on its full consequences. Quite naturally, the end result of this trend has been to make the management of East-West differences over Berlin and Germany much more complicated (as has Western consideration of FRG interests).

The Changing Soviet/GDR Relationship

10. Although the GDR regime has achieved a certain degree of consolidation, it still has fallen short of its objective. As Embassy Berlin has pointed out, the East Germans are troubled by their own generation gap and an incomplete sense of identity and legitimacy. In this regard, limitations on GDR sovereignty in its supposed capital are a constant reminder of the distance the GDR has yet to travel and serve as an enticing target. Other facets of Four-Power management of Berlin, such as transit from the FRG, are more livable for the GDR, but their takeover by the GDR also represents long-term goals. In short, although the GDR has been precluded by Western strength (and an apparent lack of Soviet desire) from trying to push the allies out of West Berlin, the GDR’s long term goals and interests mean ultimately it wishes to alter the situation in Berlin. At a very minimum this means the GDR will continue to try to use Berlin as a pressure point to win concessions—especially from the FRG—on other inner-German and East-West issues. Or—as on the asylum issue—the GDR will try to “punish” the West by manipulations concerning the special status of the city.

11. The changing nature of the Soviet/GDR relationship is manifested in the evolution in what might be termed the Soviet management style. The Soviet Ambassador to the GDR for most of the last 25 years, Abrasimov, played a direct role in the QA negotiations and looked upon himself as a keeper of the faith who enjoyed lecturing his Western counterparts. His successor, Kochemassov, has neither the background nor, apparently, the clout or personality to play pro-consul. In addition, at times the Soviets seem unable—either because of their theology that the GDR is competent or because in actual fact they have allowed a transfer of some of their powers to the GDR—to accept responsibility for action even when it is clearly in their interest to do so. The Libyan terrorist threat in Berlin served as an example of this trend. Although the Soviets gave clear indications that (despite their suspicions concerning U.S. motives) they recognized that Libyan-sponsored actions could upset the Berlin situation and complicate Soviet-allied relations in ways harmful to Soviet interests, the Soviets were unable to respond to allied statements of concern in any manner other than to assert GDR responsibility for security in the Soviet sector. Our Soviet interlocutors gave the impression—accurately or simply to try to win diplomatic points—that they regretted that they were extremely limited in their ability to affect the course of events.

12. Perhaps more significant for the future of Berlin, there seems to be a certain ability on the part of the GDR to manipulate their Soviet protectors. The recent sector/sector border episode reflects this new trend. The Soviets apparently were not consulted beforehand by the GDR at a high level, but were assured at the working level that the changes in procedures would not cause much of a stir. As a result, the Soviets clearly did not expect the strong Western reaction. While the Soviets were quick to adjust—and ultimately forced the GDR to back down—Mission received indications from our Soviet interlocutors that there had been some stormy sessions both within the Soviet camp and between the Soviets and the East Germans on the issue.

Mixed Soviet Motivations

13. The key feature and mainstay of the framework of arrangements of managing East-West differences over Berlin and Germany has been the continuing responsibility vested in the Four Powers (U.S., Great Britain, France, and the USSR) which was reaffirmed in the Quadripartite Agreement. Despite continuing disagreement over the area of applicability of the Quadripartite Agreement, the Soviets accepted the continuation of various Four-Power mechanisms (e.g. the Berlin Air Safety Control Center; the administration of Spandau prison) and more or less officially gave up (through regulation of the transit route issue among other problems) any direct effort to push the allies out of the Western sectors of Berlin. Soviet determination to hold onto what the USSR had gained (i.e. East Germany) meant the Wall would remain until the reason for its erection had disappeared. Soviet acceptance of the allies’ presence in West Berlin meant the Soviets saw the situation as potentially stable and long-lasting.

14. Over time, the Soviets increasingly have reaffirmed the impression that, like other Berlin players, they have adjusted to the modus vivendi on Berlin and German questions, and have settled in for the long haul. The Berlin portfolio has been turned over to a successor generation which has to speak up when it wants to get Moscow’s attention. The Soviet Embassy in East Berlin has one or two highly experienced Berlin watchers, who keep book on activities in the Western sectors and who prepare protests over “violations”. At the same time, the general trend has been to handle problems at a lower, working level and to try to isolate Berlin questions from general US-Soviet and East-West issues. While the Soviets have not taken any special measures to avoid incidents, and the hand of Moscow has clearly been evident when higher interests have been at stake, the Soviet Embassy seems to have a mandate to reduce conflict, uphold stability, and establish a business-as-usual relationship with the allies despite distinctly different juridical positions on Berlin’s status. This the Soviets have tried to do even after the most egregious disruptions of Berlin’s tranquility (eg. the Nicholson shooting;² the LaBelle disco bombing).³

Undermining the Western Position

15. Soviet accommodation to the reality of a continuing allied presence in the Western sectors of the city has brought an added element to Soviet efforts here. In addition to traditional policy goals worked with and through the GDR, the Soviets have stepped up their activities within the Western sectors. These activities are generally coordinated with broader Soviet East-West policy goals. Their intent appears to be similar to that of their wider efforts, i.e. to drive a wedge between the Berliners and the Western allies, especially the United States.

16. The Soviets have sought to take advantage of whatever limited access opportunities (primarily to the Germans, but also to the allies) are afforded by the Soviet position as one of the Four Powers. The Soviets have been industrious in their cultivation of peace groups and other organizations possibly favorably disposed towards Soviet policy and have made or tolerated various other East Bloc efforts to use Berlin for technology transfer and trade. The Soviets have achieved sufficient success in this effort that a small but increasing number of Berliners assert that if the allies were to leave, the Wall and West Berlin’s status in general would remain unchanged because of Soviet “self-interest” in maintaining the existing situation. While this is clearly a specious argument, it suggests the extent to which the Soviets have succeeded in undermining popular conceptions of the necessity to maintain the allies’ presence.

17. Despite clear indications that the Soviets wish to avoid a full-scale Berlin crisis, they also continue to countenance GDR efforts to increase its sovereignty at the expense of the allies. The Soviets have hardened their own interpretation of the Quadripartite Agreement, almost guaranteeing that disputes and incidents will occur. The Nicholson murder seems to have been a particularly tragic example of the degree to which US-Soviet relations remain hostage to differing and in this case diametrically opposed approaches to human life. Another example of what appears to have started out as an unplanned dispute was the Berlin air corridor reservation issue.⁴ In this case, the precipitating event seems to have been a near miss between an allied passenger and Soviet military aircraft in early 1984, which led to a stiff allied protest. The Soviet military response to this air safety problem violated the modus vivendi regarding air matters. The USSR military authorities simply began reserving extra airspace, on the (unacceptable) basis that Soviet military flying in the corridors takes priority over allied flights. Only through high-level demarches was the Soviet political side eventually convinced that the Soviet-dictated solution would not be accepted. Eventually the Soviets returned to the principle of Four-Power management of the sometimes-crowded Berlin air corridors.

Wariness of the Germans

18. The Soviets seem to regard the GDR’s increased latitude as a decidedly mixed blessing. Over time, the Soviets have come to live with considerable porosity in the Wall. Relations have developed between the two German states, affecting Berlin, with a dynamism which the Soviets could not have foreseen and would probably not have permitted 25 years ago. This has led the Soviets to see the Wall and preservation of allied sovereignty in West Berlin as securing their veto over German matters (and perpetuating their share of the division of Europe). While the Soviets have offered propagandistic encouragement to peace groups, they have been careful to avoid too close an association with younger and leftist-oriented Germans who advocate a third, Germany-only path for the FRG and, in the end, the GDR. More often, Mission hears assertions from our Soviet interlocutors that we must better control “our” Germans and they need to get a grip on “their” Germans—accompanied by dark hints about resurgent German nationalism. Thus, maintenance of the present status of Berlin has become part and parcel of the Soviet stake in the preservation of a stable and crisis-free Central Europe.

19. Precisely for this reason, recent years have seen a clear increase in Soviet concern over the development of ties between the Western sectors of Berlin and the FRG. Most of the Soviet protests Mission has received have been over speaking engagements, attendance at conferences and other public appearances by FRG officials in West Berlin. While it is clear that allied and Soviet interpretations differ over what is permissible and appropriate under the QA, the allies tend to regard Soviet complaints as relatively minor whereas the Soviets seem transfixed by the issue. Since the Soviets have allowed the GDR to integrate the Soviet sector into the GDR to such a great extent, the Soviets assume that the Western allies are doing likewise. Western responses which treat the issue as relatively minor tend to increase Soviet obsession with the problem.

Keeping Soviet Control

20. As a result of these dual sentiments, we see a Soviet Union which wants its feet to remain firmly planted on both sides of the Wall and which does not want to let go of the levers over Berlin and Germany. Because of this, Soviet activities in and about Berlin have become a bellwether of Soviet policy towards Germany. The pressure on the GDR to retreat from the new sector/sector crossing procedures and Soviet pressure delaying the Honecker visit to the FRG, both demonstrate Soviet determination to keep the GDR less than an equal. Likewise, the Soviet slap-down of the West Germans during the INF debate (when the FRG dared to suggest that it had equal security interests in Europe with the Soviets) was a clear reaffirmation of a similar Soviet attitude toward the Western Germans.

21. While the Soviets have therefore increased the latitude allowed to the GDR, they have still maintained control in certain key areas. Despite their disclaimers, the Soviets in practice do entertain our complaints over the occasional GDR harassment of allied flag tours in East Berlin. Furthermore, in recent times the Soviets have never seriously disputed as such the allied right of circulation throughout all of Berlin. Another example of continuing tacit Soviet respect for the concept of greater Berlin has been the Soviet response to our queries concerning reports that the outer borders of East Berlin were about to be altered as housing projects expanded eastwards. The Soviets maintained that they had nothing more to do with questions concerning East Berlin, yet also assured us that we need expect (for the time being, at least) no change in boundaries.

Conclusion: The USSR as Upholder of the Status Quo

22. The Soviet stake in preserving the status quo suggests that the allied side may have gained increased room for maneuver on Berlin issues. After all, if the Soviet goal is to maintain a cooperative relationship, this should make them willing to bend a bit in favor of the allies to obtain and keep that type of relationship. As most recently demonstrated on the sector/sector border issue, such possibilities do exist. At the same time, it is necessary to recognize that many sometimes-conflicting sentiments and goals permeate Soviet behavior in Berlin. If forced to choose on an issue the Soviets see as affecting their own sphere of influence, it is almost certain that the Soviets would dig in against the allies—even if this meant boosting the GDR more than the Soviets wished to do. Soviet desire to uphold the status quo means that some leverage is therefore available to be used by the allies, but the specific issues on which it is applied must be chosen judiciously.

Kornblum

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860616–0598. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to East Berlin, NATO Collective, Eastern European posts, Bern, Helsinki, Stockholm, Vienna, Geneva, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, Stuttgart, Dusseldorf, Pretoria, USCINCEUR Vaihingen, CINCUSAREUR Heidelberg, CINCUSAFE Ramstein, USNMR SHAPE, JCS, and DOD.
2. Arthur Nicholson was a U.S. Army officer who was shot by the Soviet military on March 24, 1985, in East Germany.
3. See footnote 4, Document 284.
4. Documents relating to the Berlin air corridor are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VII, Western Europe, 1981–1984.