Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

286. Memorandum From Stephen Sestanovich of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, July 24, 1986

SUBJECT

• “Berlin without Barriers”—US Initiative

The attached paper proposes a Western initiative on Berlin. Timed (if possible) to the forthcoming 25th anniversary of the Wall, it sets out a 4-part plan for removal of barriers in the city by 1991. I believe this would serve some important US objectives. It adds an attractive non-arms control component to our pre-summit diplomacy, and also demonstrates that the US is interested and relevant to problems of inter-German relations (an issue that will help Kohl in seeking re-election).

The Allies obviously have to be on board to make this worth proposing, but the first obstacle it faces may be the State Department. I am told EUR has done a proposal of its own,² a much narrower idea limited to improving the air-corridor regime (and likely to have much less impact). Their response to an NSC initiative might thus be a strong “not-invented-here.”

For this reason, the best approach to State may be by passing the concept paper to the Secretary. In addition, I think it’s likely that Rick Burt will raise the EUR initiative with the Vice President during his day in Bonn, so I’d like to familiarize Don Gregg with our ideas before he leaves. Ideally, the VP might get Burt interested in this broader approach; at a minimum, he would be prepared to react skeptically to EUR’s too-narrow concept.

August 13 has some advantages as the unveiling date. If we can get internal USG agreement on the approach, there is still (barely) time for Allied consultations. Failing this, the Quad anniversary (Sept. 3) may be more realistic. In either case, we need to move ahead and get State’s views.

Rodman, Matlock, Cobb, Sommer and Dobriansky concur.³

Recommendations

That you pass Shultz the attached paper as soon as possible.⁴

That you approve passing/briefing it to the VP’s staff.⁵

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁶

Washington, July 24, 1986

“Berlin Without Barriers:” Concept Paper

I. Basic objectives.

To strengthen public awareness that Europe’s division is a vital unresolved security issue, to bolster the legitimacy of the West’s presence in Berlin, and to gain more influence over inter-German relations.

II. Background.

The 25th anniversary of the Berlin Wall (August 13) and the 15th anniversary of the Quadripartite Agreement (September 3) call for official observance. Although there is interagency agreement on the need for a Presidential statement on the Wall, this would lack the impact of an initiative proposing a real change in Berlin’s situation. The time is also ripe for a broad initiative to counter the spreading German view that the Allied role in Berlin is outdated. Such sentiments will probably gain strength as next year’s 750th anniversary of the city draws nearer. Kohl hopes to use the celebrations to political advantage and is interested in a Four-Power Berlin meeting to mark the occasion.

To serve US interests in this setting, any initiative should:

• Protect Four-Power rights, while also recognizing that a greater German role in settling Berlin issues is required than in the past, both to get Bonn’s backing and to interest the GDR;

• Show that the Four-Power framework is relevant to today’s German concerns, especially by exploiting West German (including SPD) interest in closer inter-German contacts, and in measures that ease conditions of life in the East;

• Reject post-war divisions (Berlin, Germany, Europe) and make clear that these are unfinished business to which the West must keep returning.

Gorbachev’s calls for “new thinking” on security issues can be our starting point. We have long feared that the Soviets can use Berlin to pressure us. A good initiative can pressure them.

III. Outline of Initiative.

The President could propose adoption of a four-part plan to radically improve Berlin’s situation by 1991:

• First, agreement on immediate resumption of Four-Power talks on Berlin, to carry forward the objectives of the QA.⁷ To ease German feelings that this excludes them, the FRG and GDR might be asked to host the meetings. We should also consider a more formal role for them, perhaps as co-chairmen of a consultative mechanism that would monitor—but not negotiate—the course of the Four-Power talks and share in implementing agreements.

• Second, the talks would address proposals to reduce (not, at the outset, eliminate) specific restrictions on contacts between the two halves of the city. This part of the agenda might include: more transit points, inter-sector labor hiring, open waterways, cooperative social services, cross-sector (including religious and vocational) schooling etc. The Powers would aim to reach agreement on at least some of the issues within the first year—i.e., before next summer’s anniversary events. They would also set further (more ambitious) milestones at annual intervals.

• Third, the talks would also seek agreement on measures that affect the city’s relation to the outside, including to the rest of Germany. These could include, e.g., the air-corridor regime, presence of FRG ministries in West Berlin, removal of Berlin industrial-production constraints, even the current rapid influx of immigrants, etc. As with inter-sector issues, we would aim at some tangible results by next summer. In preparing the agenda, the two toughest issues will be whether to accept as an inducement to the East any discussion of 1) the GDR’s claim that East Berlin is its capital, and 2) the Four-Power military presence in Berlin.

• Fourth, the Powers would commit themselves to reach within 5 years the goal of a “Berlin without barriers” between sectors (more neutral phrasing than “tear down the wall”).

IV. Pro’s.

The advantages of such a programmatic proposal are:

• It would make Western statements on the division of Europe concrete (instead of—as usual—airy, vague and indefinite.) Attention to progress in one city, rather than the whole continent, would demonstrate practicality.

• It would contribute to a key US objective in the summit⁸ run-up—keeping the focus not only on military issues but on Soviet conduct that creates problems for us and our allies. Gorbachev’s recent reiteration of the Brezhnev Doctrine can be an opportunity for us. (We would invoke Weizsaecker: “Experience teaches that it is not disarmament that points the way to peace, but rather that peaceful relations open the door to disarmament.”)

• The initiative can achieve an anti-Soviet purpose without much anti-Soviet rhetoric (which might seem inconsistent with summit preparations). It can put the Soviets on the spot by joining an ultimate goal that they will want to reject with intermediate measures that seem unarguably reasonable and attractive.

• It reasserts our position that the city remains under continuing Four-Power responsibility, but answers the SPD theme that we should ignore the wall in hopes of making it “porous.” It identifies the real issues on which progress is needed, rather than the peripheral ones on which the Soviets and GDR have been willing to allow movement since 1971.

V. Con’s.

The initiative’s drawbacks include the following:

• Some would call it insincere, designed to be rejected.

• The West Germans might fear it would harm relations with both the Soviets and the GDR. Genscher might also hate to spring this proposal after his Moscow trip, amid signs that Gorbachev’s policy toward Bonn is warming up.

• We risk a Soviet response that picks and chooses among our specific proposals while ignoring the ultimate purpose. SPD circles might see such a response as positive. They might also regard a negative response as proof that the Four-Power framework can do nothing but perpetuate East-West confrontation. In this way, German leftists would seek an argument for ending the Western military presence altogether.

Compared to the burden the proposal places on the Soviets, these disadvantages seem manageable. Significant Allied opposition would, of course, make it counterproductive to go forward. Even if the plan were acceptable to Allied governments, Kohl would weigh domestic consequences, and might want to gain SPD support in advance.

VI. Timetable.

Given the complex history of these issues, very little time remains to prepare an initiative by August 13. We could allow one week at most to gain intra-USG agreement on the concept; one week to sound out the British, French, and Germans; one week to finish the proposal and statement.

This may not be an absolutely impossible schedule, but it is exceptionally tight. If it cannot be met, we should consider whether the President’s August 13 statement,⁹ could foreshadow an initiative to come. He would gain greater attention for the occasion by saying that the Allies had agreed to formulate an initiative for a city without barriers.

Subsequent dates for presenting the initiative itself include the Quad anniversary (which would have the advantage of underscoring the Four-Power framework we wish to preserve) and the President’s UNGA speech (certainly an appropriate forum and, because closer to the summit, more useful for affecting pre-summit atmosphere and jockeying).

1. Source: Reagan Library, Stephen Sestanovich Files, [Germany]: Berlin: 08/01/86–08/12/86. Secret. Sent for action.
2. The paper, entitled “Berlin Initiative: Concept Paper,” is ibid.
3. Sestanovich initialed concurrence for all of these NSC staffers.
4. Poindexter initialed the “Approve” option.
5. Poindexter initialed the “Approve” option.
6. Secret.
7. An unknown hand inserted “on” between “agreement” and “immediate.”
8. Reference is to the Reykjavik Summit, October 11–12.
9. Reference is to Reagan’s statement on the 25th anniversary of the Berlin Wall. See Public Papers: Reagan, 1986, Book II, pp. 1090–1091.