Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

284. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Staff (Solomon) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, May 27, 1986

SUBJECT

• The Soviets and Berlin

SUMMARY: The Soviets are behind the current crisis in Berlin, and we need to show Gorbachev that we intend to defend our rights in the city. We should: (1) stand firm in refusing to comply with East German demands in Berlin; (2) join with the British and French in raising our concerns about East German behavior at the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow; (3) work for NATO unity and a strong statement on Berlin in the Halifax communique; and (4) see to it that Berlin is placed high on the agenda of U.S.-Soviet bilateral issues. END SUMMARY.

The Issues at Stake

It would be a mistake to downplay the latest East German efforts to cause problems for Western diplomats at the Berlin Wall. The issue is far from inconsequential. The East Germans may not push the matter to the point of crisis, and they may even show a willingness to compromise on details.² They will almost certainly seek to explain away their actions as a positive response to our request for a crackdown on potential terrorists crossing from East to West Berlin.

All this is beside the point. Behind the East German move is the unmistakeable hand of the Soviets. Moscow is certainly aware of and approved in advance East German plans to institute new controls for diplomats travelling between East and West Berlin.

One can be less certain why at this juncture the Soviets would acquiesce in the creation of new difficulties with the West over Berlin. We can assume the Soviets want no major crisis. We also can assume that the Soviets and East Germans would like some kind of small revenge for our having pointed out that the La Belle disco bombers came from East Berlin without the Soviets and East Germans having done enough to stop them.³ Locally, the Soviets may be glad to see a worsening of relations between East and West Germany at a time when they are trying to “punish” the Kohl government for signing an SDI agreement⁴ and for its overall support of U.S. policy.

In addition, Gorbachev may see trouble in Berlin as a way of proving his mettle and underlining Soviet power at a time when Soviet prestige has suffered setbacks. By having the East Germans underline our vulnerability in Berlin, Gorbachev could be trying to get even for the slights he felt he suffered at our hands over Libya and more recently the Chernobyl incident. It is worth noting that Gorbachev came of age politically under Khrushchev, an impetuous leader who repeatedly used tensions over Berlin to make the West take Soviet power seriously and to underline Soviet demands for “equal” treatment by the United States.⁵ Consciously or unconsciously, Gorbachev may be mimicking Khrushchev in allowing tensions to escalate in Berlin.⁶

Our Response

In responding to the latest developments, we need to be firm in upholding our rights in Berlin. Soviet vital interests are not engaged in this issue, and the Soviets have not yet fully committed their prestige to backing the East Germans. There is some chance, then, that we can get the Soviets to reverse themselves and to pressure the East Germans to cancel the new regulations.

To encourage Gorbachev to rethink his position on Berlin, we should adopt the following general policies:

(1) We should stand firm in resisting East German pressures in Berlin for as long as possible, even if it means considerable inconvenience for our personnel in both parts of the city.⁷

(2) We should join with the French and British in raising with the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow our concerns about the East German actions.⁸ We have already protested to the Soviet embassy in Berlin, but we need a demarche in Moscow⁹ to impress our concerns upon Gorbachev.

(3) We should strive for NATO unity and if possible a reaffirmation of our policy on free movement in Berlin in the Halifax communique.¹⁰ Achieving unity will not be easy. Different NATO countries will be affected differently by the new regulations. Some may not attach much priority to Berlin. But we should strive for a joint statement as a way of signalling the Soviets and committing our Allies to a consistent policy in the coming weeks.
It is particularly important for us to obtain West German support. Kohl and Genscher will be tempted to downplay the Berlin events to protect themselves from opposition charges that they have mishandled relations with the Soviets and East Germans. If necessary, we should demand West German support by reminding them of the symbolic importance we attach to Berlin, and stressing that American public opinion and the Congress would not understand if West Germany failed to support us in defending our rights in Berlin—rights which are being called into question by a chain of events that began with a Libyan attack against U.S. soldiers on German soil.

(4) We should keep the issue of Berlin at the forefront of¹¹ U.S.-Soviet relations. Gorbachev is a new leader who does not have Brezhnev’s political and psychological investment in the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement, and who may believe that he can whittle away our position in Berlin without paying costs in U.S.-Soviet relations. By placing Berlin on the agenda of our next high-level meeting with the Soviets, we will disabuse him of this notion and lay the basis for better relations in the future.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Peter Sommer Files, Berlin 1986 (1). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Van Oudenaren; cleared by Ledsky. Solomon wrote “Dick” next to his name in the “From” line on the first page of the memorandum.
2. An unknown hand underlined “show a willingness to compromise on details” and wrote in the adjacent margin “already have.”
3. La Belle disco in West Berlin was bombed on April 5 by Libyan terrorists.
4. Telegram 10108 from Bonn, April 26, described German reactions to the signing of an agreement on research for the Strategic Defense Initiative. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860248–0216) Telegram 12367 from Bonn, April 18, reported on the controversial Bundestag debate in which German participation in SDI research was discussed. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860297–0265)
5. An unknown hand drew a line in the margin adjacent to this sentence and wrote “??”
6. An unknown hand drew a line in the margin adjacent to this sentence and wrote “?”
7. An unknown hand drew a checkmark in the right-hand margin adjacent to this sentence.
8. An unknown hand drew a checkmark in the right-hand margin adjacent to this sentence.
9. See Document 285.
10. A unknown hand wrote “Did” in the right-hand margin adjacent to this sentence. The text of the Halifax communiqué is in the Department of State Bulletin, August 1986, pp. 53–54.
11. An unknown hand underlined “issue of Berlin at the forefront of” and wrote “?” in the adjacent margin.