Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

280. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 8, 1985

SUBJECT

• Policy Toward the GDR

ISSUE FOR DECISION

How to proceed with the GDR concerning Ambassador Ridgway’s exploration of a settlement of US and Jewish claims, concerns on human rights, and limited trade concessions.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

For some time, you have had before you a memo on the crucial next step in our dialogue with the GDR.² EUR and EB recommended moving forward with the package which Ambassador Ridgway has been informally exploring with the GDR to settle US end Jewish claims and give the East Germans limited trade concessions short of full MFN. HA and S/P were opposed. Ed Derwinski raised various concerns regarding US interests he thought should be satisfied in any deal with the GDR involving even limited MFN if we decide to proceed.

As you requested, Ambassador Ridgway has met again with me, with Ed, and with others to refine our options and to see if we could come up with an amended recommendation which would (a) preserve the benefits the US has received in overall relations with the GDR because we had this package as a framework for discussions of a wider nature; and (b) reflect a greater degree of consensus at the Bureau level and on the seventh floor.

To some extent, concern remains about two aspects of the problem. All Bureaus are agreed that any deal with the GDR would have to be carefully vetted to insure that, in addition to serving significant US interests, it would be (a) respectful of the concerns on human rights and emigration symbolized by Jackson-Vanik; and (b) compatible with our policy of differentiation. In addition, as indicated below, S/P remains concerned about the relationship between our policy toward the GDR and our wider policy toward “Germany” as a whole.

However, all Bureaus agree that measuring our specific interests in these areas should be deferred until a proposal has been more fully elaborated. In essence, they believe the best course of action now is to preserve our freedom of maneuver by continuing to develop the proposal on a more official level, but avoid commitment at this point on the specific elements of a possible agreement.

All Bureaus are therefore prepared to support the course of action outlined below. Ed Derwinski concurs as well, believing that this course preserves our options for now with regard to the Jackson-Vanik/emigration component of any deal.

The course of action recommended is to:

a. Call Rabbi Miller and tell him that

— after a careful review, we are prepared to take the next steps to develop a formal proposal for the simultaneous resolution of our claims, the Jewish claims, US concerns on emigration, and our interest in mutual trade liberalization, and will be so advising the GDR.

— for statutory reasons, the trade aspects of the proposal belong with STR, and you have asked EUR and EB to work with STR on how to proceed.

b. Authorize Ambassador Ridgway to tell the GDR that:

— we have reviewed the results of her informal exploration of the possibilities for simultaneous resolution of US and Jewish claims, US concerns on emigration, and the GDR’s concerns on trade;

— we are interested in the concept; and

— without commitment at this point on the specific elements of a formal proposal, we are prepared to move the discussion to the official level.

— having done so, there will necessarily be a pause as the appropriate offices of our government take up the question, as we assume will also be the case on the GDR side.

c. Call Bill Brock to tell him where we have come out on this and that EB will be in touch with his staff on how to proceed within the Trade Policy Committee framework.

d. Call Mac Baldrige to tell him how we have come out and express our desire to have State and Commerce stay in close touch.

The alternative we see is to:

— tell Rabbi Miller that, as a matter of principle, we cannot continue to pursue our claims in tandem with his, though we will continue to advise the GDR of our support for the CJMC claims. We would of course have no objection if the CJMC continues its efforts alone; if these are successful, we would not oppose legislation initiated by the CJMC and the Hill, though we could not support it.

— tell the GDR that we do not believe the concept identified in Ambassador Ridgway’s informal discussion serves our interests, and we do not wish to proceed; that nevertheless, we value the expanded dialogue with the GDR and, even as we return to the status quo ante on claims and trade, we hope that dialogue will continue independent of the decisions taken on this particular proposal.

The first course is supported by C, EUR, EB, and H. L does not wish to take a policy position, but sees no legal objections to working out a proposal along these lines.

S/P also can support this approach, understanding that the task ahead is to define the specific elements of a US negotiating position and that no formal linkage is implied between trade benefits obtained by the GDR and East German obligations to pay US and Jewish claims. S/P further notes that it will be necessary in the future to judge the compatibility of any US-GDR claims/trade agreement with US differentiation policy toward Eastern Europe and US interests in Germany and the German question. In that connection, S/P wishes to attach a recent INR analysis (Tab 2)³ indicating FRG concern over increased Western ties with the GDR at a time of inner-German stalemate.

HA is also willing to support this approach. HA believes it is important to use these contacts to press our human rights concerns, and believes we must handle with extreme care the issue of granting trade benefits without GDR compliance with the Jackson Amendment. HA will work closely with EUR and the Embassy as the negotiations unfold in an effort to maximize our human rights gains and minimize the potential complications regarding any apparent weakening of the Jackson Amendment.

Attached for reference is Ambassador Ridgway’s memo outlining the results of her informal discussions with the GDR.

RECOMMENDATION

That you proceed with the first course of action outlined above.⁴

1. Source: Reagan Library, Secretary George Shultz Papers, Official Memoranda (03/08/1985) (3). Confidential; Sensitive. Shultz’s initials are stamped in the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum. Quinn initialed and wrote “3/9” in the left-hand corner of the memorandum. An unknown hand wrote “see note p. 3” at the top of the memorandum.
2. Not attached. See Document 276.
3. Not attached.
4. The “Disapprove” option was checked. An unknown hand wrote on the line, “EUR requested to draft letter as alternative and GPS will consider recommended course of action.” For the letter, see Document 281.