Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

267. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State¹

1077.

Prague, March 9, 1984, 1700Z

SUBJECT

• Asylum-Seekers.

REF

• (A) Prague 985,²
• (B) Bonn 5654,³
• (C) Bonn 6223.⁴

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary: As a result of intensive recent discussions with the GDR, the West German Government can no longer assure GDR citizens who seek asylum in West German Embassies that they will be immune from harassment should they return to the GDR, or that they will be allowed to emigrate within a stipulated period of time (e.g., 3–4 months) to the FRG. Reportedly, the GDR will henceforward only permit emigration via established “legal” procedures and will not rpt not work out individual deals to “reward” asylum seekers who attempt to emigrate “illegally” by first seeking refuge in West German Embassies in Eastern Europe. We have worked out a set of procedures with the West German Embassy to deal locally with the expected consequences of this change of policy in Prague, but we are not sanguine that these procedures will resolve all the anticipated difficulties from this adverse development. In the meantime, we need to know the details of the “US-FRG agreement” referred to in Ref B. End summary.

Change in Rules of Game

3. In strictest confidence, West German Ambassador Meyer briefed Ambassador March 8 on the conclusions of the March 7 Bonn meeting on policy toward GDR asylum-seekers attended by West German Ambassadors from selected East European countries. The FRG now believes that the rules of the game have been dramatically altered as regards GDR emigration and asylum-seekers. In the past, the FRG felt confident that it could—after negotiations through Bonn with the GDR—guarantee to those GDR asylum-seekers who came to West German Embassies in Eastern Europe (principally Prague) that 1) they would not be harassed or arrested following their return to the GDR, and 2) that within a brief period (3–4 months) they would be permitted to emigrate to the FRG. As a result of recent discussions with the GDR concerning the fate of the greatly increased numbers of asylum-seekers who are either now in or have been processed through FRG Embassies since the January incident in our Embassy in Berlin,⁵ the FRG has concluded that earlier assumptions are no longer valid. (Comment: According to Meyer, the GDR has not stated this directly, but the message conveyed during the discussions was clear).

4. Meyer hastened to add that he still believes that the large exodus of East Germans to the FRG from the GDR itself will continue and that the GDR will continue to allow emigration (perhaps even an expanded number of persons) but will insist that this emigration be accomplished via established “legal” procedures and channels in the GDR, rather than through “illegal” requests for asylum at West German Embassies outside the GDR.

Comment

5. If the West Germans are correct, such a change in policy has important implications in the way Bonn must now approach its present and future dilemma. There are no easy answers. Thirty-six persons now in the West German Embassy in Prague are caught in the middle. We presume that Bonn will attempt to cut a last deal in order to get rid of those already in their Embassies. If they are successful, however, this weakens the new line which they have apparently already begun to use here and elsewhere. Ambassador Meyer has told us that Embassy officials here have successfully turned away a number of new-comers by convincing them that circumstances have indeed changed and that seeking asylum was no longer a viable alternative. This line is immediately undercut if those now in the Embassy do indeed emigrate, and this becomes public knowledge.

6. Here in Prague, and we suspect elsewhere, it will be extremely difficult for the FRG to face the implications of this changed situation. Judging from conversations with Ambassador Meyer, he is not yet prepared to be as discouraging to potential asylum-seekers as he may need to be in the future, if individual deals can no longer be worked out with the GDR. The West German dilemma thus becomes even greater than ours, given their special attitude toward “German” nationality. Nevertheless, Ambassador Meyer Expects his Embassy staff will soon be increased to help deal with the new situation, and we have offered him whatever logistical assistance we may be able to provide in this respect.

7. A final problem for the West Germans is how the Czechoslovak Government may react to all this, particularly if East German citizens continue to accumulate in the Embassy. Up to now the GOC has taken a passive position, although it has made known to the West Germans that it is aware of what is going on and is concerned. For the moment, however, we suspect the Czechoslovaks are as uncertain with how to deal with this situation as everyone else involved.

Implications for Us

8. The above situation also has implications for us and we have begun to examine them with the West Germans here. We have worked out a series of procedures whereby we can notify the West German Embassy of GDR citizens who seek asylum here. We have told them frankly, however, that we cannot agree that a GDR asylum-seeker can remain in the Embassy after close of business. Meyer was given to understand that, as a hard general rule, such persons will not be allowed to remain in our premises beyond the close of normal working hours because the U.S. does not repeat not recognize or practice diplomatic asylum or the granting of asylum within our diplomatic or consular premises. But this will become a real problem if the GDR citizen should refuse to leave our Embassy to go to the FRG Embassy up the street, or if West German willingness to accept GDR citizens waivers or declines, given the fact that there is no longer a functioning pipeline through which to move them on.

US/FRG Agreement

9. Up to now both of our Embassies have worked closely and cooperatively to resolve these problems and we will continue to do so. We cannot exclude the possibility, however, that changed circumstances will eventually result in some friction and disagreement. For this reason also we need to know immediately the terms and conditions of the “US-FRG agreement” referred to in Ref B.

Interesting Sidelights

10. Meyer (please protect) told the Ambassador that in all there had been 86 GDR asylum-seekers in his Embassy in Prague since January who have returned to the GDR under the old arrangements. There are now less than 40 GDR citizens in the Prague Embassy and only four in FRG Embassies in other Eastern European capitals (Bucharest and Berlin). There was no rpt no basis to press reports that these numbers had climbed into the hundreds or thousands. He said that some FRG ministers had been actively and publicly encouraging such asylum seeking in FRG Embassies much to the annoyance of the Foreign Ministry. Also, in response to a question, Meyer said that he believes there are East German provocateurs or observers among the three dozen GDR nationals now taking refuge in his Embassy. He also expressed his deep regrets over Bonn’s initially adverse reaction to the Richter case (Bonn 5654) and hoped that it had not caused undue difficulties for us. Ambassador Luers replied that the important thing was for such differences not to interfere with our cooperation in future.

Luers

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Europe (State) NODIS IN (01/21/1984–04/23/1984). Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. Telegram 985 from Prague, March 2, discussed the coordination in Prague between the American and FRG Embassies in dealing with the case of asylum seeker Christian Richter. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840140–0388)
3. Telegram 5654 from Bonn, March 1, reported FRG dissatisfaction with the U.S. Embassy in Prague’s holding of Christian Richter. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840136–0033)
4. Telegram 6223 from Bonn, March 8, addressed the rising influx of immigrants from the GDR to the FRG, including the case involving Willi Stoph’s niece. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840154–0057)
5. See Documents 262 and 263.