260. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency1

GI 83–10201S

East Germany: Soviet Partner in the LDCs [portion marking not declassified]

Key Judgments

East Germany is an active partner in the USSR’s drive to increase Communist presence and influence in the Third World. The East German programs are small compared with the Soviet effort but have grown in size and scope to the point where East Germany now provides a number of complementary services that serve Moscow’s foreign policy interests. These services range from traditional military and economic assistance to specialized activities such as developing local security and intelligence services, establishing party and media links, and providing technical training courses. East Germany has contributed to the establishment or consolidation of a number of pro-Soviet regimes, notably in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Syria. In addition, East Germany has used links with LDC Communist parties, media, labor unions, and front organizations to increase Communist presence and influence in the Third World. East German programs are most heavily concentrated in Africa and the Middle East, but recently have become more active in Latin America. [portion marking not declassified]

We believe that the East Germans in some instances act as surrogates performing duties at Soviet request and in other cases carry out programs in general coordination with Moscow but with the specifics left to East Berlin. The kinds of activities that appear to be most closely coordinated are those dealing with intelligence and security, military assistance, and covert support to nonruling leftist and Communist parties. Other activities—such as economic assistance—are apparently conducted much more independently, although with Moscow’s knowledge and encouragement. [portion marking not declassified]

In addition to supporting Moscow’s foreign policy goals, East German relations with the Third World have been driven by its desire to enhance its own international prestige, particularly vis-a-vis West Germany, and more recently, by economic necessity, particularly the [Page 806] need to gain access to hard currency and export markets. [portion marking not declassified]

We expect that the East German interest in the Third World will continue to increase because their activities provide benefits to the USSR and the LDCs as well as East Germany. Of the various East German programs, intelligence and security assistance and political influence activities are most likely to be expanded and pose the most direct challenge to US interests. While Africa and the Middle East probably will continue to be prime targets, recent East German activities in Nicaragua and Grenada indicate an increasing interest in Latin America and the Caribbean. [portion marking not declassified]

East German Programs in the Third World

Our knowledge about the size and scope of East German programs comes from [less than 1 line not declassified] Embassy reporting, and East German and Third World press. We are confident that our data accurately reflect the general size and pattern of East German activities, but we are less confident about the specific details of individual programs. Our data show that the East Germans are active throughout the Third World and that their programs are most heavily concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. Programs differ from country to country, but one or more of the following elements are at the heart of East German efforts in each target country:

Intelligence and Military Advisers. We estimate that in 1982 there were 1,000 to 1,500 East German advisers in LDCs. Most of them were involved in assisting leftist regimes develop their intelligence and security apparatus. Others were employed as weapons instructors, maintenance and repair technicians, logistic specialists, and staff advisers.
Political Influence Mechanisms. East Germany uses a variety of mechanisms to penetrate or influence key sectors of LDC governments and populations—such as providing political advice and support to Marxist parties; training journalists and supporting leftist newspapers; and exploiting youth, labor, and front organizations. In 1982 friendship exchanges were conducted with fraternal parties in seven LDCs, media agreements were signed with at least six LDCs, and some 300 East German youths were assigned to friendship brigades in nine LDCs.
Military Supply Program. Since the start of its military supply program in 1964, East Germany has signed military sales agreements worth $860 million with about 30 LDCs calling primarily for the supply of vehicles, artillery, small arms, and ammunition. Sales exceeded $300 million in 1982 alone, largely reflecting sales to radical Arab states.
Economic Assistance. East Germany has signed economic agreements totaling nearly $3 billion with some 50 LDCs since the program began in 1955. A large share of the recent agreements has been trade credits that call for repayment in hard currency or oil. In addition, East Germany had some 5,000 technicians in LDCs in 1982—three times the number in 1978—to help organize and develop government administration, install and maintain East German equipment, and work on development projects.
Trade. East Germany’s trade with Third World countries amounted to over $2 billion in 1981, accounting for 5 percent of East German foreign trade, as it has since the early 1960s. [portion marking not declassified]

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

  1. Source: Reagan Library, Paula J. Dobriansky Files, Germany, Democratic Republic of (1). Secret. Information available as of August 31 was used in the preparation of this assessment.