Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

254. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, September 28, 1988

Yugoslavia: Potential Crisis Developing

The push by Serbian party chief Slobodan Milosevic (pronounced Mee-LOH-sheh-veech) for his Serbian nationalist agenda is increasing the chance of a national political confrontation or widespread violence in the coming weeks.

— Milosevic’s immediate goal is for the Republic of Serbia to gain greater control over its two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina). He is trying to intimidate other regional leaders into supporting constitutional amendments that would strengthen Serbian authority by encouraging massive, Serb demonstrations in their regions.

— We believe Milosevic’s longer-term goal probably is to reestablish Serbia’s hegemony in Yugoslavia with himself as the dominant, Tito-like leader. [portion marking not declassified]

Milosevic has strong grassroots support among Serbs and is determined to push ahead against all odds. But he faces strong obstacles.

— Most other regions bristle at Milosevic’s aims and tactics and are trying to preserve the current regional balance and consensual decisionmaking system.

— Milosevic’s support in the Serbian party may not run deep, and it could erode quickly if he fails to make progress on his agenda. [portion marking not declassified]

The current situation is fast-breaking and could play out in several ways.

— Opposition to Milosevic is likely to coalesce, and regional and national leaders probably will take some steps to constrain him. A move could come as early as at a key national party plenum now scheduled for some time in October. Such a move may provoke ethnic Serb violence, but in the long run would best promote Yugoslav stability.

— An alternative would be that other regional leaders try to appease Milosevic by granting him significantly greater powers over Kosovo and Vojvodina and sacking some anti-Milosevic leaders. Such a move may lead to a violent backlash from Kosovo’s Albanian majority. It would also probably encourage Milosevic to push harder for a position in the national leadership, thus risking greater instability.

— Another alternative is that the current tensions may drag on for months with no resolution. This would increase the risks of new demonstrations, moves by Serbia to introduce Serbian police in the provinces, Serbian appeals for support among the Serb-dominated military officer corps, and other provocative actions. The chances of ethnic Albanian backlash and violence would also be high. [portion marking not declassified]

There is also a risk that political confrontation among the regional leaderships or ethnic unrest could aggravate growing labor unrest. In such a case, a police or military crackdown ordered by national authorities would be more likely. [portion marking not declassified]

1. Source: Reagan Library, Rudolf Perina Files, Subject File, Yugoslavia—Substance 1988 (1). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Drafted in DDI/EURA.