Next month marks the 40th anniversary of the Tito-Stalin split; in stark
contrast to the tensions of that period, the political declaration
signed during Gorbachev’s March 14–18 visit to Yugoslavia inaugurates a
new era in bilateral ties, one in which both sides now pledge to
cooperate actively across the spectrum of relations. The attached
analysis examines the implications of the visit results and concludes:
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research2
THE GORBACHEV ERA IN
YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS
A New Era. Viewed from one perspective, the
political declaration on bilateral relations signed during
Gorbachev’s March 14–18 visit to Yugoslavia codifies the improvement
in ties since Gorbachev assumed power in Moscow. From another, it
inaugurates a new era in the bilateral relationship, one in which
both sides are specifically pledged to cooperate actively across the
broad spectrum of relations.
Direct party-to-party contacts, a critical bellwether, have improved
significantly in the last three years. The Yugoslavs dispatched a
high-level delegation to the 70th anniversary October Revolution
celebrations, the first such party representation since 1948. The
same delegation also attended the November meeting of over 150
Communist and “progressive” parties in Moscow, the first attempt at
an international communist party gathering since 1976. And Assistant
Foreign Secretary Strbac has indicated that future party contacts
will be much broader than in the past.
The improvement in relations is notable when placed in context with
the moribund period of the early 1980s when bilateral party ties
were all but nonexistent. Nonetheless, Moscow is only just beginning
to approach the level and depth of political access the West has
enjoyed over the past decade in Yugoslavia.
Gorbachev’s New Approach. . . Gorbachev has
shown a greater tactical flexibility and willingness to experiment
in overtures to Belgrade than any of his predecessors, but he also
operates on a realpolitik recognition of the existing realities in
post-Tito Yugoslavia. He clearly attaches more importance to
relations with Yugoslavia, judging by the number of high-level
Soviet-Yugoslav exchanges and the fact that his recent visit was his
first to a non-Warsaw Pact socialist state, and Gorbachev has
expended greater effort of any Soviet leader since Khrushchev to
improve those relations.
. . . different paths. . . More explicitly
than ever before, Moscow has also recognized and accepted the
existing status quo, i.e., independent, sovereign parties and states
pursuing separate paths in building socialism. In the new
declaration, Belgrade received the strongest reaffirmation since
Khrushchev of the principles of mutual respect, equality and
non-interference enshrined in the 1955 and 1956 Belgrade and Moscow
Declarations. And, for the first time in any joint document, Moscow
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made positive
references to Yugoslavia’s unique system of socialist
self-management.
. . . minimizing ideology. . . Moscow also
seems more willing to minimize ideological differences. The
Yugoslavs have indicated that the first draft of the new declaration
was heavily ideological in tone but the Soviets agreed to remove
objectionable passages on such issues as “socialist
internationalism” without debilitating polemical exchanges. In
another first, the Soviets agreed to refer to the Non-Aligned
Movement as an independent entity existing outside of the Blocs.
Previously, Moscow had only referred to the NAM if its international goals coincided with those of
the USSR.
. . . acknowledging problems. . . In still
another first, Moscow now publicly acknowledges past errors in
dealing with the Yugoslavs. Although Gorbachev stopped short of
blaming Stalin directly for
the 1948 schism when he addressed the Yugoslav assembly, he stated
that “unjustified accusations” were made against the Yugoslav party
and as a result of the split, “great damage” was inflicted on both
countries and on the socialist movement as a whole. “Specialists”
reportedly will meet later this year to discuss the 1948 break, the
first talks to be held on that sensitive issue. Gorbachev clearly
hopes to lay the events of 1948 to rest and go forward on a more
positive footing.
. . . between unequals. Unlike Khrushchev,
however, Gorbachev appears far more conscious of his status as the
head of a superpower and of Yugoslavia’s declining international
stature. Gorbachev’s statements and actions during his visit made
these points implicitly clear. He praised self-management, not for
its current status but for its initial innovativeness in adopting
socialist theory to local circumstances. Nor was his acknowledgement
of the NAM’s still influential
international role very lavish, reflecting the fact that the
movement has lost much of its former prominence. But the Soviets
also clearly want to move bilateral relations forward. During his
talks with Yugoslav President Mojsov, Gorbachev stated Soviet
willingness to have as close a relationship with Yugoslavia as
Belgrade wanted.
Prospects
Both sides see economic and trade relations as the greatest potential
for future growth, to judge by the recent adoption of an agreement
of general principles on Yugoslav-Soviet economic and
scientific-technical cooperation to the year 2000. Bilateral
economic relations are slated to develop more intensively through
inter-state banking cooperation, bilateral approaches to third
countries and Yugoslavia’s selective participation in the CEMA 2000 S&T program. Sales of critical weapon systems such
as the MiG–29 could also be continued if the country’s economic
crisis forces Belgrade to postpone indefinitely the development
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of indigenous programs
such as the Novi Avion fighter aircraft. At a minimum, Yugoslavia’s
dependency on the Soviet Union as a source of energy and raw
materials imports will increase if Belgrade agrees to expanded
natural gas deliveries via Hungary and Bulgaria. This could help
redress Yugoslavia’s estimated U.S. $1.4 billion trade surplus,
however, given the continued importance of the USSR as a market for goods
unmarketable elsewhere.
Moscow and Belgrade also share a particular interest in promoting
“higher forms” of economic relations. At the conclusion of the
Gorbachev visit, President Mojsov indicated two joint ventures had
already been established and ten additional such undertakings would
likely be agreed to by the end of 1988. The Soviets subsequently
indicated that during the bilateral discussions the Yugoslavs made
over 30 proposals for joint ventures.
Maintaining Momentum. The challenge now for
both sides will be to maintain the positive momentum. Moscow quickly
followed up on the Gorbachev visit by dispatching Politburo member
and premier of the RSFSR Vorotnikov on a four-day visit to the republics of
Serbia and Montenegro. The Soviets have also accepted the Yugoslav
invitation for Premier Ryzhkov to visit Belgrade. Gorbachev also has the
option of taking up Belgrade’s invitation for second visit to
reinvigorate ties should conditions warrant.
Trade Problems. Further progress in bilateral
relations, however, promises to be slow going. While Belgrade and
Moscow are willing to sidestep their divergent security interests
and basic ideological and political differences, the two sides must
agree on a mechanism to reduce the Yugoslav trade surplus—the most
pressing problem in bilateral dealings—if these relations are to
advance beyond their current level. The upcoming Ryzhkov visit no
doubt will be used by the two sides for followup discussions on the
framework arrangement hammered out during Gorbachev’s visit on
reducing Yugoslavia’s surplus. Like past efforts, however, there is
no guarantee the talks will prove successful.
Bilateral trade relations are also troubled by other problems.
Although the USSR has been
Belgrade’s largest and most important trading partner since the
mid-1970s, the volume of this trade has declined in recent years and
in many areas direct economic cooperation is still in a nascent
stage, such as joint venture arrangements. Equally important, both
economies have significant structural problems and it remains to be
seen how extensively these enterprise-to-enterprise contacts will
develop. Trade relations will be burdened by the high Yugoslav
inflation rate; many Yugoslav firms have integrated Western
technology heavily into their production processes and must obtain
re-export licenses; most Soviet enterprises have only taken the
first steps in adjusting to Gorbachev’s reforms; and only the most
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competitive could hope
to meet Yugoslav demands for hard currency compensation—if they are
willing to do so.
External Dynamics
External influences are likely to affect Yugoslav-Soviet relations
more during the next decade than they did at any time in the postwar
period. Yugoslavia’s evolution toward Western political, economic
and social norms and the degree of success Gorbachev achieves with
his programs will significantly condition the respective Yugoslav
and Soviet approaches.
Centripetal Forces. The political importance
to Belgrade of its ties to Moscow will increase in direct relation
to Yugoslavia’s continued drift toward westward political, economic
and social norms. Belgrade’s economic interaction and dependence on
the West—formal relations with the IMF for the next several years and continued
reschedulings of long-term official and commercial debts—will
compound that importance.
This trend will likely be reinforced by the ever higher premium
Belgrade places on maintaining its credentials as a non-aligned
state. Even those leaders who are actively promoting the
Western-style evolution of Yugoslav domestic policies will want at a
minimum to maintain at least the facade of equidistance between the
superpowers.
And, if Gorbachev proves more successful in implementing his domestic
and foreign policy agenda, the Yugoslav conviction that Gorbachev’s
“new thinking” is pushing the Soviet Union closer to key Yugoslav
political positions will likely become stronger. Equally important
during a period of prolonged political and economic strain, the
Yugoslavs will need the international prestige associated with
Gorbachev.
The ideological component of Yugoslav-Soviet relations could also
assume greater prominence as ties with the West deepen. As this
Westward drift becomes more pronounced, continued association with
Moscow will provide Belgrade with a degree of ideological
legitimacy—due to the Soviet Union’s unique status as the first
socialist state.
Centrifugal Pressures. Besides fundamental
mistrust of Moscow’s long-term objectives, that same inexorable
drift toward Western norms will remain one of the key limiting
factors on the development of closer Yugoslav-Soviet ties. The
partisan leaders who led Yugoslavia for the better part of the last
four decades are rapidly passing from the scene and are being
replaced by a postwar generation that looks increasingly to the West
for new ideas. Despite Gorbachev’s perestroyka and glasnost, he has
little new to offer the Yugoslavs in terms of policy
innovation—Belgrade initiated a more fundamental reordering of its
socialist society two decades ago.
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To the extent Gorbachev’s domestic reforms do actually influence the
Yugoslavs, however, their influence may, paradoxically, have a
debilitating effect on his efforts to
expand bilateral ties by undercutting the more conservative and
ideological elements within the Belgrade leadership—the most likely
groupings to favor Soviet ties. As these elements appear
increasingly less innovative and dynamic than the Gorbachev
leadership, they may be more easily outmaneuvered by their more
liberal opponents within the Yugoslav leadership.
At a broader level, Gorbachev’s very success in developing closer
ties may have a further burden on relations by instilling a sharper
sense of the Soviet threat within a Yugoslav leadership which has
never had broad, intensive contact with Moscow. At a minimum,
increased contact with the Soviets will generate expanded Yugoslav
counter-intelligence activities. Should Belgrade become overly
sensitized to potential Soviet interference in their internal
affairs, however, it could conceivably restrict ties with
Moscow.
Intensive development of Soviet-Yugoslav economic relations over the
next decade will in any event be limited by Belgrade’s recognition
that Yugoslavia’s economic future lies with the West. If the
Yugoslavs are to actively compete in international markets the
economy must first be modernized but this modernization is
critically dependent on access to sophisticated technology and
financial largesse which the Soviets do not possess or would likely
attach too high a political price for Belgrade to accept.
Potential for a Reversal. Bilateral ties could
experience setbacks and, under certain circumstances, deteriorate
precipitously from their current high-water mark:
- —
- If Yugoslavia’s trade surplus with Moscow continues to
increase unchecked, political relations could be severely
strained, particularly if the Yugoslavs declare a trade
moratorium until a balance is achieved. For the
financially-strapped Yugoslavs, that trade surplus with
Moscow is, in effect an interest-free credit to the
Soviets.
- —
- If Gorbachev’s political position is severely weakened by
factional infighting within the Kremlin, forcing him to
focus extensively on domestic issues for a prolonged period
and relegate ties to Belgrade to the back burner.
- —
- If Gorbachev were forced to use the Soviet military in
Eastern Europe to control an unacceptable situation.
- —
- Or, in the most extreme scenario, Gorbachev is removed
from power and replaced by a leadership seeking to restore
the status quo ante of the Brezhnev era to Yugoslav-Soviet
relations.
Gorbachev could also overplay his hand in dealing with the sensitive
Yugoslavs. While he has demonstrated greater sophistication in
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the foreign policy arena
than his immediate
predecessors, he has also shown that he is not immune to policy
failure; overt interference in Yugoslavia’s internal affairs could
conceivably elicit a pronounced nationalist backlash.
External Implications
Intra-Bloc Relations. The evolving
Belgrade-Moscow relationship will impact on Soviet-East European
relations generally and, to a degree, relations within the world
communist movement as a whole. For the East European leaderships,
the new Yugoslav-Soviet declaration reaffirms—and
extends—Gorbachev’s pronouncements on “socialist internationalism”
made in Prague in April and in Moscow at the 70th anniversary
celebrations when he indirectly legitimized the concept of “separate
roads to socialism.” Although the Yugoslav-Soviet Declaration may
encourage reformers’ propensity to test the limits of Gorbachev’s
“new thinking” in inter-state relations, the East European
leaderships are cognizant that Belgrade’s non-bloc status makes the
new statement unique to Soviet-Yugoslav relations. More to the
point, Moscow has not abrogated its right to defend “socialist
gains” within the bloc.
Western Interests. Western security interests
will be only marginally affected by the expected expansion of
Soviet-Yugoslav ties:
- —
- Moscow may develop increased intelligence collection
capabilities and greater potential leverage to influence
Belgrade’s policies.
- —
- Any Yugoslav accommodation of Soviet requests for
increased port access will likely take the form of more
frequent waivers of the law on limiting the size of foreign
naval combatants visiting Yugoslav ports. (Belgrade recently
adopted amendments in its maritime law that allow a larger
number of foreign combatants to be serviced during a single
port call.) But Belgrade will not readily accommodate Soviet
requests for access to a second Yugoslav port.
- —
- Any improvement in Yugoslav-Soviet security relations will
likely be limited to existing areas of cooperation i.e.,
periodic information-sharing on hostile emigres and
organizations and on international terrorism. Belgrade will
continue to sidestep Soviet overtures for a liaison-type
relationship involving regular exchanges of intelligence
information and coordinated intelligence collection efforts
against the US and NATO.
