Although the government of Yugoslavia acknowledges past dealings with
international terrorist organizations, it has publicly and privately
denied such relations continue. We believe, nevertheless, the evidence
shows that Yugoslavia still provides a range of assistance to
unequivocably terrorist groups (elaborated in attachment). At a minimum
this includes safehaven and transit privileges, both of which contribute
significantly to a group’s operational capabilities. Evidence exists,
but it is less strong for current government involvement in training,
financial facilitation, and arms transfers. Although its ties to
terrorist groups are not as extensive as major patrons such as Libya and
Syria, Yugoslavian help is qualitatively distinct from the passive
indulgence provided by some other European governments, most notably
France and Austria.
Although the activity we detect has been carried out by Yugoslav secret
police and intelligence organizations, our general understanding of the
workings of these organizations leads us to believe they are acting
under guidance approved at higher levels of government or party,
[Page 698]
specifically the presidency
(the Federal Executive Council), the Defense Council, or the
Politburo.
Yugoslavia is motivated in its approach to terrorists by several factors.
First, like some other countries, Yugoslavia is willing to subscribe to
a modus vivendi with terrorists to deflect attacks from itself.
Relationships with terrorist groups also are helpful to Yugoslavian
intelligence operations. However, Yugoslavia has in the past
demonstrated that its interest goes beyond this level by actively
welcoming groups. Presumably, both Yugoslavia’s self-image and the image
it wishes to project as a “progressive” state with its own guerrilla
tradition and national mythology may explain this attitude.
We have presented our best analysis of the present situation as we
perceive it. I understand that Bob Oakley is sending you a separate
memo3 detailing what we
are doing to modify it.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research4
YUGOSLAVIA: RECENT RECORD ON AIDING TERRORISM
While information linking Yugoslavia to terrorism dates from the
early 1970s, the cases listed below focus on activity over the last
two years.
The Abu Nidal Group. In a November 1983
meeting with the radical Palestinian Abu Nidal, the then Federal
Secretary for Internal Affairs, Stane
Dolanc, and his advisor, Jovo Milos, agreed to
provide arms, training, safehaven, and medical aid in exchange for
hard currency and information on other terrorist groups, [less than 1 line not declassified]. The Abu
Nidal organization reportedly later transferred $2 million to a
Yugoslavian bank. Dolanc
apparently sought the meeting to help insure that the Abu Nidal
Group would not disrupt the Winter Olympics in Sarajevo and to learn
if any other terrorist groups might have plans for operations at the
games.
The Dolanc-Abu Nidal conversation indicated that the Yugoslav
Government and the terrorist group had had ties for several years.
The “bilateral collaboration and coordination”—as Abu Nidal termed
[Page 699]
it—while apparently
based on exchanges of information, involves other elements as well.
The conversation clearly indicated that Belgrade granted safehaven
and transit privileges, as well as weapons, to members of the group.
It also appeared that Yugoslav authorities were aware of Abu Nidal
organization members among the local Arab-student population and
that a local cell leader maintained liaison with the Yugoslavs.
There has reportedly been at least one major meeting between Yugoslav
officials and Abu Nidal since May 1984 when the USG complained to Belgrade about its
support for terrorists. [less than 1 line not
declassified] a Yugoslav delegation, headed by the Interior
Minister Dobroslav Culafic, visited Libya in February 1985. The trip
had been arranged through the auspices of Abu Nidal representatives
in Yugoslavia. During the visit, Culafic’s senior advisor, Jovo
Milos, personally met with Abu Nidal. Although we have no report of
what was said, we doubt that the meeting was used to terminate the
relationship with Abu Nidal.
On the contrary, we have strong indications that this close
relationship is still functioning. [1 line not
declassified] the group maintains an important support
structure in Yugoslavia with the
consent of the authorities and [less than 1 line
not declassified] Abu Nidal visited there during 1984.
[less than 1 line not declassified] an
internal debate within the government concerning whether Yugoslavia
should continue having ties to violent terrorist groups. The
security services, which supported continued links, won out, basing
their argument on the benefits to long term foreign policy goals
accrued by remaining friendly to a wide spectrum of Middle East
factions. The Yugoslavs were maintaining senior level contacts with
Abu Nidal as of May 1985, [less than 1 line not
declassified].
[less than 1 line not declassified] speaking
in November 1985, stated that it is “common knowledge” within
official circles that Yugoslavia has agreements with various
terrorist groups. These agreements allow terrorists to use
Yugoslavia as a staging area in return for pledges not to mount
attacks there.
The likelihood, that Abu Nidal operatives retain safe passage
privileges in Yugoslavia is borne out in the itineraries of both the
Egypt Air hijackers and the Rome airport attackers. All three
airliner hijackers traveled to Athens from Belgrade, where they
purchased airline tickets. At least two of the Rome assailants spent
time in Yugoslavia just prior to the attack. One stated that he had
also been in Yugoslavia prior to another operation in France earlier
in the year. While there, he received several thousand dollars from
a Palestinian at a Belgrade address his headquarters provided in
advance.
[Page 700]
Another factor pointing to a continuing relationship between
Yugoslavia and Abu Nidal are the positions occupied by Stane Dolanc and Jovo Milos. Both
men, who have dealt personally with a number of figures from the
terrorist world in the past, continue to hold very senior jobs
dealing with internal security and terrorism matters. Dolanc, [less
than 1 line not declassified] played a key role in
orchestrating Yugoslavia’s aid to Abu
Abbas after the Achille Lauro
affair.
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
(ASALA). [less than 1 line not
declassified] an apparent modus vivendi between Yugoslavian
officials and Hagop Hagopian, an ASALA leader who is known for his
advocacy of indiscriminate violence. Hagopian was directly
responsible for the bomb blast at Orly Airport in July, 1983 which
claimed seven lives and injured over fifty.
Hagopian lived in Zagreb for seven years, reportedly without the
knowledge of the authorities [less than 1 line not
declassified] and then moved to Damascus. In the past two
years he has made several trips back to Yugoslavia, with the consent
of
the government. His trips are ostensibly for medical treatment for
himself and his Yugoslavian wife. However, on at least one occasion
in 1984 (and indications are more) Hagopian met with Jovo Milos. The
substance of their meeting is unknown. [less than
2 lines not declassified]
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF).
This group, composed mainly of Marxist Lebanese Christians, carried
out a number of attacks against US
diplomats in France in 1982–84. LARF members under arrest in Italy
have admitted they spent extended periods in Yugoslavia in 1983–84,
including as late as the fall of 1984. One stated he obtained
explosives from an individual there. [less than 1
line not declassified] the group maintained a safehouse in
Belgrade.
While we have no evidence of direct contacts between the Yugoslav
authorities and LARF, such links can be inferred by the fact that
LARF went to the trouble of maintaining a support structure in
Yugoslavia when its main area of operation, France, lay several
international borders away. Also, LARF chose to rent several
apartments in a country like Yugoslavia, although police monitoring
and housing strictures are more extensive than in Western Europe.
The most likely explanation is some understanding with the host
intelligence services. The Yugoslavs, for their part, have been
extremely slow to cooperate in investigating LARF’s activities, [less than 1 line not declassified].
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP). A possible Yugoslav/LARF conduit is the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) with whom LARF has
known links. President Papandreou recently told Ambassador Keeley that his intelligence
services have been providing him with evidence of terrorist training
camps in Yugoslavia. His remarks were undoubtedly based in part on
recent
[Page 701]
Greek
interrogations of a Palestinian who claims to be a member of the
PFLP. The Palestinian states that a group of PFLP members just
finished terrorist training in Yugoslavia and have been dispersed
around Europe to carry out attacks. The veracity of this information
has not been confirmed, though the PFLP is known to have received
training in Yugoslavia periodically since the 1970s.
Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine–Special Command (PFLP–SC). Israel, which
characterizes the PFLP–SC as the most radical Palestinian
organization, is certain that Yugoslavia presently provides the
PFLP–SC with training, weapons, and documentation. Israel also
reports that the PFLP–SC has undergone training that is
terrorism-specific in a Yugoslav army camp, and that it was running
a printing operation in Yugoslavia as late as March 1985. [3 lines not declassified]
Compared to Others
Yugoslavia’s relations with terrorist groups, particularly Abu Nidal,
fall somewhere in the middle of those countries which seek
accommodations with terrorism. At one extreme are nations like Libya
and Syria, which are involved intimately in using Abu Nidal and
other terrorists as hired guns. At the other end are countries such
as France and Austria, which attempt to “buy off” Abu Nidal by
lenient treatment of the group’s imprisoned operatives. In between
is Yugoslavia (and similarly Bulgaria) which provides resources and
safehaven to Abu Nidal in return for certain favors, such as
immunity from attack. This policy provides tangible benefits which
Yugoslavia will likely be reluctant to forsake.
Yugoslavia’s primary motivations in maintaining ties with terrorist
groups appear to be an effort to obtain useful intelligence and to
deflect attacks from itself. Other possible factors include a desire
to maintain revolutionary credentials and an emotional attachment to
the concept of the partisan fighter, arising from the country’s
World War II experience.
