Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

231. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Platt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, March 9, 1985

SUBJECT

• Advanced Aircraft Engine Coproduction in Yugoslavia

For the past twelve months, Defense and State have been engaged in a detailed study into the merits of authorizing a commercial coproduction agreement for an advanced US aircraft engine in Yugoslavia.² During this study, which involved numerous government to government exchanges and unprecedented access to Yugoslav industrial facilities by USG personnel, agreement was reached upon the nature of sensitive US technology, the unlikelihood of reverse engineering, the potential for success of the Yugoslav program, the need for a government to government agreement for security, and other facets of such a major program. Based upon the results of this study, the Department of State believes that we have worked out a viable coproduction agreement which can be initiated with Yugoslavia without significant risk to US security.

A decision in this case has major foreign policy and national security implications. Since 1948, we have attempted to support Yugoslavia as an independent, stable buffer against Soviet expansion. The President affirmed this policy most recently in NSDD 133,³ which states that the United States will foster sales of military equipment to Yugoslavia in a manner consistent with our policy on technology transfer. Our participation in the Yugoslav fighter program would accelerate the recent trend in Yugoslav military policy towards linkages with the West, reestablish the US as a significant military partner, and provide a badly needed opportunity to influence the development of Yugoslavia’s governmental, military and industrial sectors. The Yugoslavs view the engine coproduction decision as a key indicator of the extent to which we take them seriously as an independent state, and our relations with them would be harmed severely if we demonstrated a lack of trust.

Our technology transfer concerns can be satisfied through the agreed-upon safeguards. In addition, these engines have already been released for coproduction in Israel and Sweden, and French and British competitors have already indicated a willingness to provide the same or greater technology than we. It is therefore in our strategic interest in the Balkans to proceed with this project. We believe it is important that we, rather than West European competitors, be in a position to influence the flow of technology to the Yugoslavs. On the understanding that the White House is comfortable with this decision, we intend to issue the initial export licenses soon to ensure we do not lose out to the British or French.

CIA Director Casey agrees with the Department’s risk analysis, but Secretary Weinberger continues to express reservations. The Secretary has discussed this case with him on several occasions and believes that his concerns have been adequately dealt with. However, we wish to draw this difference of opinion to your attention before he proceeds.

Nicholas Platt⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984–1989, Lot 92 D 52, ES Sensitive, March 1–6 1985. Secret. Copies were sent to Weinberger and Casey. A typed notation at the top of the memorandum reads, “3/9 delivered via WH courier per S/S—cdb.”
2. Not found.
3. See Document 219.
4. Kenneth Quinn signed above Platt’s typed signature.