Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

221. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State¹

3642.

Belgrade, May 4, 1984, 1430Z

SUBJECT

• Demarche to GOY on Terrorism.

REF

• (A) State 127881;²
• (B) Belgrade 3568;³
• (C) State 130860.⁴

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary. I met alone with Yugoslav Internal Affairs Secretary Dolanc and his assistant, Valiljevic, on afternoon of May 4 to deliver the demarche on terrorism from Ref A. Dolanc was initially taken aback by the statement then took an aggressive stance in which he denied most of the U.S. charges and ended up by officially rejecting the Ambassador’s demarche. The Ambassador expressed strong regret at this position and asked that Dolanc nonetheless pass it to higher GOY authorities. Dolanc made no commitment. However, he did agree to hold on to a typed set of talking points from Ref A “for the record.” When asked how we could continue further with a dialogue on this topic, Dolanc said I should deal with his successor as of May 16. I said I would undoubtedly have to do so. The atmosphere of the meeting quickly became strained, as the topic become clear to Dolanc. While he was aggressive, he remained (for Dolanc in all his potential explosiveness) relatively calm despite some of his more extreme statements. End summary.

3. I met with Dolanc, Vasiljevic and Dolanc’s interpreter on May 4 for 45 minutes to deliver the demarche in Ref A. I began by stating that the USG appreciated the GOY’s efforts to help us in the matter of the Buckley case.⁵ We hoped the GOY would keep up its efforts in this regard.

4. Noting my serious demeanor, Dolanc asked bluntly whether I had any other problems for him. I said that in all frankness, I had a serious formal demarche to make to him which had been forwarded to me by Under Secretary Eagleburger but which reflected the strong position of the topmost levels of the USG on the matter of international terrorism. I then read from the talking points in Ref A and put a set of the points (in a “non-paper” form) on Dolanc’s desk.

5. Dolanc appeared completely taken aback by my statement. He asked how he was supposed to respond to it and then asked quickly whether it was a formal USG demarche. I responded that it was indeed and that it was meant most seriously. Dolanc flushed (redder than usual). He said that, in that case, he would have officially to reject it. He simply could not understand how the USG could deliver such a message. He felt personally insulted by it. It was not in accord with the relationship that had developed so positively between the GOY and USG. I said I strongly regretted his position, since our demarche had not been made lightly and without serious deliberation going back several months. I asked that he nonetheless accept a “non-paper” which listed my talking points and he readily agreed “for the record.” (He asked the interpreter to have them translated immediately at the end of the meeting.) He did not undertake to pass them to higher GOY levels.

6. Dolanc said he did not know how to begin to answer me. As for the matter of Carlos, he would arrest him and “kill him” (sic) if he could lay hands on him. He knew where Carlos was, but could not arrest him since he was not in Yugoslavia.⁶ As for the matter of Arabs, Dolanc noted sarcastically that there were almost 20,000 Arabs in Yugoslavia, mainly students but also diplomats. The bulk of that large group was Palestinian but it was far from monolithic in nature. It included pro-Arafat people, anti-Arafat people, pro-Abu Nidal Black June types and all sorts of elements intent on liberating Palestine. He said it was impossible from day to day to know which group was changing allegiance with another. Dolanc said there was a limit as to how much information the Yugoslavs could obtain on these changing alliances.

7. Dolanc stated that, no matter what any group’s allegiance, the GOY would not allow any group to violate Yugoslav laws by one step. Prior to the Olympics he had ordered over 200 Arabs out of the country for security reasons. More recently, he had had arrested two Arab groups in Novi Sad (Vojvodina capital) which comprised pro-Arafat and anti-Arafat (pro-Black June) factions after an altercation. He had promptly jailed all of them, then expelled them from Yugoslavia. He said the Yugoslav record on dealing with violent Arab groups in Yugoslavia was very good.

8. Dolanc then adopted a more aggressive attitude. He asked how the USG could make these sorts of charges when he knew of Ustashi groups active in the U.S., the activities of Croatian National Congress President Mestrovic and of other ethnic (presumably Albanian) groups which had terrorist activities in mind against Yugoslavia. He found our charges “provocative” and they obviously reflected some combination of factors in Washington which he could not understand. I responded that the charges were based on credible evidence and were not concocted for any conspiratorial purpose. Dolanc said that if this were the case, then he would wish to see the concrete evidence himself. I said I was not sure I could satisfy this request, but commented that in the turmoil of the Middle East, it wass conceivable that incriminating documents had been found which would put Yugoslavia’s position into serious question. Dolanc said if this was the evidence, then we should show it to him.

9. I said that since we were speaking with our usual frankness to each other, I wished to ask several concrete questions. If they were indiscreet, then Dolanc could feel free not to respond. I asked whether the Yugoslavs trained Palestinian terrorist groups. He said the GOY trained Palestinian liberation fighters on a military basis. They were not trained as terrorists. I said this was a fine line. Dolanc replied that perhaps it was but it had been going on for a long time and the U.S. side knew it. I asked if he or his staff had operational contact with violence-oriented terrorist groups such as Black June 4 PLFP. He said flatly “not with any of them.” I asked whether Yugoslavia sold or delivered arms to terrorist groups. Dolanc replied “no,” then added that Yugoslav weapons had been sold to Iraq and Egypt and other countries. It was possible, he said, that the Iranians had captured Yugoslav-made weapons from Iraq and then resold them as Yugoslav weaponry.

10. Dolanc answered these questions with seeming frankness and with no ill humor. He returned to the issue of Carlos. He noted that Carlos seemed to be in the pay of many countries and seemed to be able to move at will by using diplomatic passports. Similarly, other West European allies of the U.S. were in touch with Carlos and other Palestinian terrorist groups. Dolanc asked whether we were in touch with those friendly governments. I said I did not know but would like their names. He said this was not a subject he would discuss now. He then said that he received lots of reports in the course of a working day and if he felt compelled to have demarches made on the basis of them, then he would need a new section. He added the usual Dolanc-style needle by commenting that he had heard of close CIA contacts with some terrorist organizations. I said I knew nothing of this matter.

11. I closed the meeting by asking Dolanc whether, in view of his May 15 move to the State Presidency, I could still discuss this international terrorism issue with him. He said that, for obvious reasons of protocol, I should deal with his successor, Dobroslav Culafic. I said I certainly would do so. Dolanc then added that we could, of course, meet to discuss any other matters of mutual interest. I thanked him for the gesture.

12. Comment. The meeting was grim, as I expected, and Dolanc was his usual aggressive self once he found out what I was there to see him about. However, he was not explosive (as he can be), he was measured in most of his answers, and he did not react sharply to my questions. I am convinced that he will spread news of my demarche through the top level of the party and government that is privy to such sensitive information. We shall have to wait and see what, if any, reaction we receive. In the meantime, I propose to wait until May 16 to see Deputy Foreign Minister Loncar (as he will become on that day) to pass the word outside the intelligence community. I think if I saw Ostojic, the incumbent, right now he would flee to his home in Sarajevo. He is not the bravest of bureaucrats.

13. Action requested. If there is, unlikely as it seems to me, any concrete evidence I can provide to Dolanc, I would be happy to receive it. Despite all we know, he is behaving as if he is from Missouri.

Anderson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N840006–0502. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis.
2. Telegram 127881 to Belgrade, May 2, transmitted the démarche on terrorism and talking points to Yugoslavia. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N840006–0438)
3. Telegram 3568 from Belgrade, May 3, and continued the correspondence between the Department of State and the Embassy regarding the démarche on terrorism. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N840006–0472)
4. Telegram 130860 to Belgrade, May 4, continued the correspondence between the Department of State and the Embassy regarding the démarche on terrorism. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840289–0723)
5. Reference is to William Buckley, an American diplomat serving in Beirut, was kidnapped by Hezbollah on March 16. Documentation on his kidnapping are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Terrorism, January 1977–May 1985.
6. Reference is to international terrorist Illich Ramirez Sanchez, known as “Carlos the Jackal.”