Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

192. Airgram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State¹

A–86

Belgrade, June 11, 1981

SUBJECT

• Kosovo Situation Assessment: The Future

REF

• Belgrade 4571²

Summary and Conclusions

Belgrade 4178³ set down what we know (or believe) has happened over the past two months in the Kosovo, and also pointed out that there are two key areas in which our information continues to be critically defective: the degree to which violence is continuing in the Kosovo, particularly the involvement of the military; and the accuracy of the Yugoslav charge that foreign influences, i.e., from Tirana, have been the major factor in instigating and perpetuating the explosion of nationalism in the Kosovo.

More light on these two areas is needed before we can predict the long- or even medium-term impact of the Kosovo troubles with much confidence. Nevertheless, in the short term, Yugoslavia seems to have weathered the immediate crisis in Kosovo with unity and stability intact, and with its determination to defend itself from enemies (internal and external) unshaken. The military has chosen—or been ordered—to keep the lowest possible political profile; this is a good sign of the civilian leadership’s confidence and strength. (However, the degree to which the military’s ability to defend Yugoslavia from outside attack may have been temporarily degraded by the deployment of military units to the Kosovo and the ineffectiveness of territorial defense and social self-protection organizations there is a subject not addressed in this message.)

To say that problems remain is both to state and understate the obvious. Working for a “political solution,” the authorities are clearly resorting to “administrative measures.” Large sections of the Albanian population remain at best sullen and restive, the Serbs and Montenegrins fearful. The party organization at the grass-roots level appears to have in many instances virtually disintegrated. Martial law is long gone, but special security measures are still in effect, and special police and military units from outside the province are still deployed there. Law and order returns only slowly, in some areas very slowly indeed. A widespread purge (“differentiation”) is underway, with hundreds expelled from government and party positions, from the university, and from work organizations, with the Serbs calling for more. Indeed, the Serbian leadership appears increasingly impatient with the slow pace of “differentiation,” and demands for increased “vigilance” by local “social self-protection” organizations—which collapsed in the Kosovo—are the order of the day.

What does all this mean? We fear that such “brotherhood and unity” in the Kosovo as was established after the “nationalist” disturbances of 1968 will not be restored for a long time to come, if ever. The Kosovo, and thus Yugoslavia, may have to endure a persistent element of violence, greater or lesser, for the foreseeable future.

Internally, there has been a tightening up across the board, with reformers at least temporarily more reluctant to press for change and the authorities (in Serbia at least) anxious to avoid moves which could be read as concessions or weakness. This will continue for a time, but there has not been a “hardliner” victory. Those “liberals” who were arguing for a more pluralistic approach before the Kosovo have not abandoned the “dialogue,” rather it has been refocussed on the more narrow issue of increased press freedom to report events fully and honestly, as was not done in the Kosovo. We anticipate that in time the “dialogue(s)” will be resumed—but their advocates will face a tougher row to hoe in post-Kosovo Yugoslavia.

A major, critical question yet to be answered: How could the party organization in the Kosovo have failed so miserably? Are its weaknesses also to be found elsewhere? Could it be that the Yugoslav Communist Party is even less relevant to day-to-day decision making in self-managing Yugoslavia than Western observers have ever imagined? If so, then in Lenin’s timeless phrase, “What is to be done?” Many will agree that the party must be strengthened, its vitality restored, its relevance asserted. But how? We see hope in that the question is being openly put, but no indication what, if any, answers will be found. However, as this “dialogue” resumes (it was in fact underway even before the Kosovo troubles erupted), we do not believe Leninist hard-liners—”dogmatists,” in the jargon—will win. The dialogue will thus be mostly between and among those who will have as their point of reference Kardelj’s “pluralism of self-managing interests.” The danger is that this dialogue will be directed everywhere but to the Kosovo, where solutions are most needed.

Among the few encouraging results of the Kosovo’s travail is the rigorous reevaluation now underway of how decisions have been made and funds expended for the economic development of the Kosovo. This could have a positive echo elsewhere. As for the Kosovo itself, there is for example serious thought being given to directing investments into labor-intensive industry and even—just imagine—to stimulating agriculture, including the private sector. Clearly, economic pressures will grow for more Federal and republican supervision of Kosovo economic development. The republics will henceforth be generally less immune to outside criticism of their economic trends where they are perceived to deviate from national policies. There is thus reason to hope that the shortcomings of economic development policy in the Kosovo will lead to constructive changes in the leadership’s approach to Yugoslavia’s economic problems in general, particularly a strengthened Federal direction of macro-economic planning.

In the foreign policy area, continued unrest in the Kosovo could drain Yugoslav energies, forcing it to focus inward and making it more difficult to sustain a high international profile. Suspicions of “foreign hostile influences” are enhanced, especially of hostile emigres, of Tirana, and also of Moscow, all of whose long-term interests—perceived as destabilization of post-Tito Yugoslavia—are held to coincide.

Relations with Albania are near the breaking point. Tirana accuses the GOY, allegedly locked into a no-win confrontation with its Albanian populace, of having in desperation deliberately “provoked” the tension. Whatever the temptation to break relations, the Yugoslav leaders have so far resisted it. In order to predict the future of this odd-couple relationship, we would have to know to what degree the Yugoslavs will find evidence of Tirana’s direct instigation of subversion. (A leading Kosovar Albanian official told visiting Western newsmen June 3 the GOY does “not yet” have such hard evidence, this despite all the trumpeting to the contrary in the media.) If such evidence is not discovered, we suspect the calmer heads in Belgrade will prevail and Yugoslavia will seek to revive its far-sighted pre-Kosovo policy toward Albania which in anticipation of Hoxha’s passing sought through increased trade and cultural ties to give the post-Hoxha leadership room to maneuver as it faces what Belgrade fears will be a formidable Soviet attempt to reassert its influence in Tirana. It might take years to restore a semblance of normalcy in relations, but this is so clearly in Belgrade’s national interest that we expect to see the GOY begin to work toward that end—always with the caveat, if the “smoking gun” is not discovered.

If on the other hand the GOY comes up with evidence of Tirana’s subversion, past or present, relations could snap, tensions increase yet further, and a new and unpredictable element of instability be added to Balkan interstate relations.

In the Kosovo, the authorities’ “political measures” thus far have not returned the province to normalcy. The “differentiation” process is pressed, with the sanction of force clearly visible in augmented militia and military units on patrol. Essential political issues have yet to be faced, one of which is the general Albanian psychological perception that they are second-class citizens. This has of course a specific manifestation, the claim to republican status for the Kosovo. This claim, added to charges of police brutality and of Serbian “oppression,” are the slogans of a now politicized and unpredictable Albanian youth. There is no hint yet that the present political agenda is addressing these matters frontally. The Slovenes may have such issues in mind in calling for more focus on domestic shortcomings and less on foreign devils; they more than others feel free to speak out, and are doing so. But, if they have allies in Serbia (we suspect they do, in Minic for example) they do not yet apparently feel it possible to speak out publicly. Thus, we see it as a critical failure of the party and state leadership yet to address effectively the political problem posed by the Kosovo—and it is quintessentially a political, not an economic problem. It is also of course a major security problem, but one that will not go away until political remedies are applied.

That said, while extremely serious the eruption of nationalist unrest in Kosovo has not delivered a fatal blow to post-Tito Yugoslavia. The leadership, while shaken and without a clear idea of how to solve the problem in the long term, has shown it has the unity, will, and ability to take strong, even ruthless, action to preserve Yugoslav territory and independence. The Kosovo situation has so far proved to be specific: The contagion has not spread beyond those areas where Albanians live. Serbia is the Republic most affected, and the potential Serbian nationalist backlash will bear most careful watching. There have of course also been negative consequences in Montenegro and Macedonia, particularly the latter. There seems to have been almost no Moslem cast to the Kosovo problem, hence we sense not much spillover effect in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Vojvodina leadership is concerned not so much over attitudes of its own Hungarian minority, but over whether Belgrade’s evident intent to reacquire control of Kosovo decision-making will make it difficult for the placid Vojvodina to retain the high degree of autonomy it now enjoys. A claim by the Serbs to reassert direct control over the Vojvodina as well as the Kosovo will be strongly resisted by Novi Sad, most probably with support from Croatia and Slovenia as well. However, as Consulate General Zagreb has pointed out, there is little evidence in Croatia of sympathy for the Albanian cause.⁴ The attitude there seems to be “a plague on both houses.” The Slovenes, ever serious-minded and pragmatic, are worried lest Serb and Kosovo leaders place too much blame on “foreign influences” and ignore the homegrown social-economic-political roots of the Kosovo problem. They also want to see their development aid monies for the Kosovo put to better use. Both these rational points of view need to be heeded in Belgrade but it remains to be seen whether they will be.

Nevertheless, while the Kosovo and adjacent areas seethe, life in the rest of Yugoslavia has proceeded with remarkable normality. Thus we see the Kosovo not as post-Tito Yugoslavia’s Achilles heel but rather as an acutely painful boil which will require repeated lancing. The inflammation will probably prove containable but it will not soon (if ever) heal. Nothing will be as easy for Yugoslavia henceforth, at home or abroad, but the Kosovo has not injected a fatal poison into the Yugoslav body politic. End Summary and Conclusions.

Three months after the Kosovo disturbances began, no political solution is in sight, special security measures remain in effect, military forces are still deployed, and the situation remains obscured by a jumble of rumor and fact and the continuing restrictive official information policy. Nonetheless, enough dust has settled to enable us to develop further our earlier conclusions (see Belgrade 2754)⁵ regarding the authorities’ ability to contain the unrest, new pressures testing the collective leadership, the likely strengthening of hard-liners (if only temporarily), and increased strains with Tirana and Moscow.

Yugoslav Unity and Stability. Yugoslavia seems to have weathered the immediate crisis in Kosovo with its unity and stability intact and its determination to defend itself from enemies real or imagined, internal or external. Despite some differences on secondary issues, a leadership consensus developed on the seriousness of the threat of Albanian nationalism, the inadmissibility of granting republican status to Kosovo, and the need for a firm response and a closer hold over the most important non-Slav group in Yugoslavia. This in turn has helped to isolate the unrest and narrow the scope for a nationalistic ripple effect whereby a Serbian overreaction leads the Croats to side with the ethnic Albanians against the Serbs.

That said, “brotherhood and unity” has received a serious blow and there is wide recognition that it will be a long time ever—before even a semblance of mutual trust and community can be restored between Albanians and Serbs. Those Albanians favoring union with Albania or republican status for the Kosovo are, in the wake of repressive measures, no doubt even more convinced of the justice of their cause; and “loyalists” in Kosovo are angered and beginning to speak out against generalized appraisals and prejudice which lump them together with “nationalists or irredentists.”

As for the Serbs, we sense that as the initial shock of the crisis wears off, a stronger reaction is setting in. Serb leaders, for example, have publicly pressed for tightening Serbian control over the autonomous provinces and have expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of and Kosovar stone-walling of the “differentiation” campaign. Demands have been made for an investigation of the forced “exodus” of Serbs and Montenegrins from the Kosovo; popular Serbian magazines are fanning emotions with features on this “exodus,” with pictures of gravestones defaced, fruit trees of Serb peasants hacked down, etc.; and a May 20 Croatian party session pointedly warned about a possible revival of Serbian nationalism. Likewise, stinging criticism of the Serbian press (for allegedly being in league with internal and external enemies) from Pristina University and party officials has brought Serbian distrust, resentment, and contempt for ethnic Albanians more openly into the press. On the whole, though, the Serbian leadership seems at least alert to the dangers of a nationalist response.

Crisis Management. In meeting the immediate goal of restoring order, the collective leadership, with the party in the lead and with the help of the military, has shown that it has the unity, will, and ability to act decisively and, if need be, ruthlessly. Beyond police-military security measures, the official response has involved an educational-propaganda campaign, a purge of nationalist elements (“differentiation”), changes in the Kosovo leadership, calls for more party activism in the Kosovo, and a sharp curtailment of contacts between Kosovo and Albania.

Almost all these efforts have been marked—and to some extent undermined—by inconsistent analysis, an ad hoc approach, and the lack of a coherent, long-term positive strategy for dealing with the Kosovo. No one has yet addressed the issue of republican status on its own merits or shown how its denial, however justified for reasons of state, is consistent with real self-determination for ethnic Albanians. Ostrich-like, the official line ignores the dilemma and the ramifications of political and social change in the Kosovo since 1968. The Kosovars, goes the line, “freely” exercised their right of self-determination when they approved the 1974 Constitution and, in any case, except for a small minority, “do not want” republican status. And the issue of police brutality has hardly been mentioned even obliquely, much less acknowledged. Finally, at the heart of the problem lies the ancient animosity between Serb/Montenegrin and Albanian, and the open contempt in which the former hold the latter.

Inconsistency has also been apparent in the presentation of the roots of the problem. Different “definitive” figures on the numbers killed, wounded, and arrested attest to leadership differences over how much to restrict information. The tendency of some (like Interior Secretary Herljevic) to stress foreign rather than domestic factors as the primary cause of the disturbances has been publicly criticized by leaders like the Slovene Smole as a dangerous self-delusion. Initial claims about a return to “normalcy” have been belied by the magnitude of police-military response and by subsequent official reports about the “very complex and tense” situation; sporadic violence—we do not know how serious; small-scale demonstrations; boycotts; and other forms of nationalist protest. Likewise, references to “mass” condemnation of the disturbances by the Kosovars seem hollow as the “differentiation” process reveals how far nationalist sentiment has permeated all levels and areas of Kosovo society, including the party. At the grass-roots level the influence of the party appears virtually non-existent. Resistance to party directives is widespread and so effective that complaints by middle-level officials are now being heard frequently.

Internal Political Repercussions. The Kosovo disturbances are having an impact on the internal political scene; how long range this will be is extremely difficult to judge. For now, at least, hard-liners have been strengthened by the recognized need for stern measures in the face of a clear Albanian nationalist threat. Serbian leaders have shied away from moves which could be read as concessions, vigilance is “in,” the public prosecutors have warned dissidents they will apply the law without regard to foreign or domestic reactions. The dialogue about dialogue has all but vanished, at least for the time being. Reformers have felt it prudent not to press their demands in the present atmosphere. Some, according to a leading dissident (Markovic),⁶ have even been deflected from pressing on now for reforms by their interest in restoring Serbian authority in Kosovo and the Federation. Those advocating “dialogues” have not however been totally vanquished. Rather, they have narrowed the focus of their argument to the issue of full press disclosure of events in the Kosovo.

Second, the leadership has clearly been shaken by these events. It has admitted “surprise” over the sudden eruption of virulent nationalism and pondered how it could have happened. The conclusions: insufficient vigilance, opportunism, lack of party activism, inadequate functioning of the territorial defense and self-protection mechanisms, and a gap between official self-management rhetoric and reality. And the result: the sacking of Kosovo party leader Bakali⁷ and others, the massive propaganda campaign, Serbian party pressures for even more rigorous “differentiation,” criticism of federal security bodies (i.e., Herljevic)⁸ for underestimating the situation, a review of the educational system, and rhetoric about more party activism and keeping in touch with real public attitudes. A most interesting and potentially highly significant development is the emergence, particularly in Slovenia, of a current of criticism which warns against placing too much emphasis on foreign influences and is calling for a thorough look at how well the LC throughout Yugoslavia is playing its self-appointed “leading role.”

Third, in the Kosovo the military has been the dog that has bitten but not barked. We addressed what we know and do not know about the military’s involvement in the Kosovo in Belgrade 3887.⁹ The ambiguities outlined in that message remain unresolved. We note, however, one important non-event of the past three months: While the military deployments to the Kosovo have evidently been (and remain) necessary, and in fact the military presence may indeed still be the key to retaining control as some contacts tell us, the military has assumed as low-key and inconspicuous public position as possible. Generals have done remarkably little tub-thumping about vigilance. Those who have done so—Daljevic¹⁰ and Herljevic, for example—have spoken either in an essentially civilian capacity or have addressed internal military matters (CUIC). There has not been one word spoken in public about the military as the ultimate guarantor of post-Tito Yugoslavia’s internal security. Thus the Yugoslav military has either chosen—or obeyed instructions—not to exploit the Kosovo situation to aggrandize its political role in the country.

Foreign Policy Repercussions. Kosovo unrest has brought Belgrade to the brink of a break in relations with Tirana, increased sub-surface strains with Moscow, and increased Yugoslav fears about Balkan stability and attempts by implacable enemies to “destabilize” Yugoslavia through various forms of “special warfare.” Over the longer run, if unrest continues to simmer in Kosovo and the Yugoslavs are forced to maintain order through force, Yugoslavia may find itself forced to focus inward and less able to sustain a high international profile, particularly on issues where they are at odds with Moscow.

Anticipated strains with Tirana over Kosovo have appeared in spades. Until it becomes clear just how much truth there is to Belgrade’s charge of Tirana’s perfidy, we will not be able to judge whether this public posture of Belgrade’s is justified, results from poor information, or is a conscious construct designed to cover up the depth of anti-Yugoslav feeling among the Albanians. There is no doubt that in any case Belgrade is furious with Tirana’s open support for the demonstrators, its perceived abuse of exchange programs with Kosovo to foment nationalist sentiment, and its unapologetic attitude following the May 23 Yugoslav Embassy bombing.¹¹ Yugoslavs also profess to be perplexed why Tirana would follow a policy which seems so short-sighted and contrary to its interest in Yugoslav and Balkan stability. Belgrade has suspended or cancelled various exchange agreements and is insisting that relations now be conducted through Belgrade rather than Pristina. The impact on planned trade and construction projects such as the Skoder-Titograd rail link remains unclear. We believe there are voices in the leadership urging that trade ties must be retained in Yugoslavia’s long-term interest. These have so far succeeded in preventing a total break, although the ground has been prepared for a break should Belgrade so choose.

Suspicions of Moscow, never far from the surface despite both sides’ attempts to portray relations as developing successfully despite some differences, have surfaced explicitly in late April in a brief editorial exchange with Pravda which raised the 1948 issue of whether Moscow yet accepts Yugoslavia’s full independence and right to separate development. Yugoslav references to “Cominformist” involvement in the disturbances likewise have stirred memories of Moscow’s involvement in the 1974 Cominformist affair and strengthened suspicions that Moscow, as the one power that stands to gain by the unrest, may have had a quiet hand in fomenting it. Although publicly relations with Moscow remain normal and otherwise unaffected by the Kosovo troubles, we have heard privately from many Yugoslavs of their suspicion that the USSR is somehow instigating the unrest, if not working together with Tirana, then separately through hostile emigre groups, but to the same end. Thus, whatever the public posture in Yugoslav-Soviet relations we believe the Kosovo situation has deepened endemic Yugoslav suspicions and fear of “the Russians.”

The Economic Implications. The Kosovo demonstrations will in all probability precipitate significant changes in the GOY’s development policies and the structure of economic decision-making. This may be one of the few positive consequences of the Kosovo troubles. No matter how exclusively the government and party want to attribute the outbreaks to outside nationalist provocations, serious domestic economic difficulties, interacting with acute social and political tensions, were the dominant contributing factors. The substantial financial transfers from the wealthier regions have not, over the past 30 years, closed the development gap or even come close to narrowing it. The census results, which appeared concurrently with the disturbances, point to an even more critical situation in the long term: a 2.7 percent annual growth rate, half of the current population under working age, an increase in the migrant labor force. Over three-quarters of the Kosovars are Albanian and educated through the university in that language—a clear prescription for cultural isolation and economic immobility.

None of this happened unexpectedly and very few observers of these socio-economic trends in Kosovo believed they were leading to anything but a dead end. The difference now is that there is a new license to voice some harsh criticisms of internal investment and educational policies and—hopefully—to try some fresh solutions. Superficially negative remarks were made during public debate over the 1981/85 financing program of the federal fund for under-developed republics and Kosovo. The Slovenes insisted on giving the donors greater say in Kosovar investment schemes and no doubt feel thoroughly vindicated in that the party leadership has now openly denounced the dissipation of development resources in conspicuous public construction and other wasteful ways, as in financing a bureaucracy top heavy even by Yugoslav standards. We are certain, therefore, to see more active participation of federal and republican authorities in the programming of Kosovar economic development.

Liberal economists (that is, those supporting firmer macro-economic direction at the federal level) are predicting a backlash against republic decentralization. We tend to agree but do not see any radical changes in the short term. Certainly, there is a perceptible sharpening in the campaign against economic nationalism and autarchic decision-making at the republican and even municipal level. The Kosovo incidents demonstrated the consequences of failing to exercise some control over local events and will no doubt lead to strengthened accountability throughout the system for fulfilling economic plans. We will probably see diminished tolerance for protracted dogovaranje (collective decision-brokerage) over key issues such as sharing the B/P deficit, paying for annual oil imports, energy conversion, and avoiding duplicative infrastructure investments. Although decision-making will still depend on achieving a consensus, there will be less respect for the principle of republican immunity and less hesitation to criticize “opportunistic” policies or actions which threaten the overriding national interest. A major test of post-Kosovo attitudes will be the fate of separate republican balance of payments schedules. Already under heavy criticism for incompatibility with a unified market, this system has survived largely due to pressure from republican authorities.

Overall, in the economic sphere we do not foresee a trend towards formally aggrandizing power in federal institutions, rather a quickened and more responsible implementation of economic policies formulated at the federal level. The republics will retain considerable independence in critical economic sectors, e.g., investment planning and fiscal policies, but will wield this power defensively and with greater vulnerability to criticism from above and other regions. If this, in fact, is the trend in the economic sector after Kosovo, we welcome it as much-needed support for the GOY’s successful pursuit of its medium-term stabilization program. It should also contribute indirectly to the GOY’s goal of introducing market reforms, in the sense that the political leverage of republican and municipal governments on the economic system is weakened.

Benson¹²

1. Source: Reagan Library, Paula J. Dobriansky Files, Yugoslavia (1). Confidential. Drafted on June 9 by Thomas Dunlop and Richard Erdman; cleared in draft by Shirley Panizza, Sylvia Bazala, Razvigor Bazala, Commander Huchthausen, Marlin Remick, and by David Bennett, and Peter Raudenbush; approved by Benson. Dunlop initialed for Benson.
2. Telegram 4571 from Belgrade, June 5, provided Embassy analysis of the developing situation in Kosovo. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810265–0026)
3. Telegram 4178 from Belgrade, May 21, described the situation in Kosovo as it was emerging. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810241–0783)
4. Not found.
5. Telegram 2754 from Belgrade, April 4, reported the recent student uprisings and unrest in Kosovo. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810160–0503)
6. Not further identified.
7. Mahmut Bakali.
8. Franjo Herljevic, Minister of Interior.
9. Telegram 3887 from Belgrade, May 12, reported conflicting rumors of the engagement of Yugoslav military units stationed in Kosovo. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810225–0036)
10. Milan Daljevic.
11. The New York Times reported that Albania denied the Yugoslav accusation that the Albanians had bombed the Yugoslav Embassy in Tirana (“Albania Denies Role in Bombing,” New York Times, May 30, 1981, p. 4).
12. Thomas Dunlop initialed under Benson’s typed signature.