Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

166. Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Simons)¹

Washington, November 9, 1987

SUBJECT

• Luncheon with Romanian Ambassador November 9

I asked new Romanian Ambassador Ion Stoichici to lunch at Aux Beaux Champs November 9. He brought with him his First Secretary Dan Dumitru. Most of the conversation was in Romanian; Stoichici spoke entirely Romanian, while I asked Dumitru to interpret from English for me on occasion. Stoichici said it was the first time anyone from the Administration had invited him out, and seemed appreciative. He also seemed an intelligent man, not uncultivated—we traded Bucharest literary/cultural gossip, and he was very much up to speed—but of course green to foreign affairs and to this country, and careful. Highlights follow.

Wolf/Armstrong Prospects

I said we had the impression that the prospects for passage of the Trade Bill were smaller than before the Wall Street troubles,² but anything could happen. The Department was taking a position of principle, that the Wolf/Armstrong amendments were bad, and that we opposed them. Stoichici said that was good: the Romanians were standing on principle, and were convinced that was the only way to conduct our relations. They were not “speculating” on the current situation.

I complained about the exhibit cancellation.³ Stoichici gave the same explanation he had given to the Deputy Secretary, and I said it was not credible to believe that the exhibit could not go forward because they had celebrations scheduled into January.⁴ Dumitru said the cancellation had nothing to do with MFN: if they had wanted to make a point about MFN we would have seen it in emigration. As proof, he noted that Agerpress had reacted to the Wolf amendment two days after passage; the GOR can move fast when it wants to. In fact it was not retaliating: the reaction had been low-key and careful.

Stoichici said this was true, and general. For instance, the GOR was not making a point—though it could—about our inability to accept many of the people they were giving exit permission to. They were working away on departures; figures have been rising. I said we recognized that, but I could only encourage them to work away and demonstrate progress on all human rights issues of concern to us. He said that was a lot to expect.

I asked whether their position was that if the Wolf/Armstrong amendment became law we would have violated international law; I had noted the President had made this point a number of times. Stoichici said it was, and was made after legal study. Moreover, if one side broke an agreement in this way, it would affect the other side’s obligations too. For that matter, the practical effect would be equally bad. Businessmen simply could not make contracts under these conditions; the necessary predictability would be lacking, whether or not there would be renewal under the old terms. I urged him not to overestimate the influence of businessmen on this issue; I knew many Communists made that mistake, for ideological reasons, but he should not.

I asked Stoichici how he thought the Department should respond to offers from the Hill of a compromise whereby MFN would be suspended for a period, but with contract sanctity for that period, and then automatically renewed under the old terms. Dumitru blurted out “That would be the best,” but Stoichici, on reflection, said he thought the Department should still hold to the position of principle it was now taking.

Jackson-Vanik et al

Following up on the Deputy Secretary’s offer to have me describe U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, I gave Stoichici a thumbnail sketch: in practice for 30 years and formally for more than a dozen, we have sought to develop bilateral relations with each country of the area, to mutual benefit, at whatever pace it could stand, as if they were independent of the Soviet Union, but taking into account our criteria of domestic liberalization or foreign policy independence. Some had sought to change the policy to insist on both domestic liberalization and foreign policy independence, but this had not happened. With regard to Romania, a number of things had however happened over the years. The U.S. had in general become more interested in human rights, so that in practice we consider human rights issues beyond the legal emigration criterion. The domestic situation in Romania has degenerated, partly as a result of the debt repayment program. And the course of events in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev’s leadership has begun to call into question the assumption that any deviation from the Soviet Union is to U.S. advantage.

I said I realized that this was different from the Romanian approach, which was that absolute independence based on absolute sovereignty was necessarily good, but the Romanians would be well advised to keep these changes in mind in dealing with the United States. The internal situation counted, and we believed that Romania as a sovereign country had itself assented to exceptions to its general rule that outsiders had nothing to say about their internal affairs, in signing international agreements including commitments on human rights. Our Trade Agreement and the Helsinki Final Act were examples.

Dumitru said they were different, since the Helsinki Final Act included provisions on sovereignty and non-interference which were often forgotten in the West. Stoichici, while not disagreeing with my point, said reflectively that he thought it would be better to stick to the previous approach. Romania would in any case defend its independence in principle against all comers, East or West.

Stoichici asked how we thought Jackson-Vanik had worked. I said the Administration had opposed it when it was offered, but over time it had proven a useful practical way of relating our human rights concerns, which had risen with the years, to other aspects of our bilateral relations with Communist countries. It had been practical because it was narrow. The problem now was not so much that our concerns were rising, but that Wolf/Armstrong threatened to translate the expansion of our concerns into legislative requirements which were impractical. That was one of the main reasons we were opposing it. We felt that if it passed, Jackson-Vanik could no longer serve as an incentive to other Communist countries to improve relations with us. Romania would no longer be an example of how this worked to the benefit of both sides.

Stoichici commented that countries which had advised Romania against going down this path at the time would be coming back to remind Romania of this and claim they had been right. U.S. and Romanian interests would be much better served by trying to improve relations rather than damage them; he did not think anyone in authority on either side disagreed with that, and we should proceed on that basis. I said we certainly agreed with it, but how to do it was complicated.

How to Move Ahead; What Line for the Hill

Stoichici said the GOR would like to help move ahead by increasing contacts between the two sides. Parliamentary contacts, regular or semi-regular, came to mind. U.S. parliamentarians should visit Romania and see whatever they wanted; Romanian parliamentarians should come here for completely frank exchanges of views. I said we had nothing against the idea, but there were limits to its value. For instance, we were favorably inclined toward the idea of a human rights round table. But the limits were severe. The GOR controlled whom U.S. Congressmen saw in Romania and whom it sent to the U.S.: both would always say that there were a few problems, but basically things are wonderful. So visits are useful, but there is a bottom limit to the kind of credibility they conferred on the GOR, which the GOR should recognize. Moreover, we had to be very careful; we had been pressed hard about support for the delegations of parliamentarians and religious leaders in the spring, on the grounds that we were abetting GOR propaganda. The best thing the GOR could do was perform on human rights issues of concern to us and Congress.

Dumitru said he and Stoichici were going to start going up to the Hill, and asked if there were any advice I could give, very informally, about what line they should take. I repeated that this was a delicate topic, so I would be very informal; we were not really in a position to advise. If I were them, I would be low-key, careful, statesmanlike. I would stand on principle; I would point out the importance of independence to Romania and to our relations, giving as many recent examples as I could; I would make the point about improving rather than damaging our relations. But I would refrain from threats: Congressmen took them even less well than we do. And I would be prepared to answer very tough questions, particularly about the situation of Hungarians in Romania, and to do so soberly rather than stridently or propagandistically, along the lines of the book on Horthyite-Fascist conduct in Northern Transylvania they had given me. I had to say, as a friend of better relations between our countries, that every aspect of Romanian life looked basically the same as it had in my time there, albeit worsened by the economic crisis brought on by the debt repayment program, with the single exception of the Hungarian situation, which seemed to me to have deteriorated not only in absolute but in relative terms as well.

Stoichici did not rebut; rather, he thanked me for the opportunity to discuss things in a spirit of friendly candor.

1. Source: Department of State, Records from Ambassador Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Lot 03 D 256, Chron, November 1987. Confidential. Drafted on November 11. Copies were sent to Ridgway, Kirk, Palmer, Wenick, and Schlamm.
2. Reference is to Black Monday, October 19, 1987, when stock markets in the United States and around the world crashed.
3. Reference is to the “Filmmaking in America” exhibit sponsored by USIA. The Romanians allegedly cancelled the exhibit “for technical reasons.” Telegram 8975 from Bucharest, sent November 2, described the conversation regarding the exhibit cancellation between Romanian officials and the Public Affairs Officer. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870901–0108)
4. Whitehead and Stoichici met on November 3. Telegram 346624 to Bucharest, November 6, summarized their meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870915–0006)