Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

162. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the United States Information Agency¹

5733.

Bucharest, July 14, 1987, 1159Z

SUBJECT

• Gorbachev and “Glasnost.”

REF

• (A) Bucharest 4531,²
• (B) May 15 Trimestral Letter.³

1. Post has continued to monitor Romanian reactions to the recent Gorbachev visit⁴ and “glasnost” and can only conclude that the Soviet leader has scored a major public relations coup in Romania.

2. A year ago few Romanians talked about the Soviets, and those who did were negative. With “glasnost”, suddenly everyone is talking about the Soviets and, while many are pessimistic about the chances for the success of “perestroika” in the Soviet Union and even more doubtful that “glasnost” will mean anything for Romania under Ceausescu, there are many others who are beginning to look to Russia for a solution to Romania’s problems and even talk of a pro-Gorbachev faction growing up within the government.

3. With the public relations aspect of his visit a success, the next question is whether there has been a major political gain, and the answer appears to be yes.

4. Romania has a population sick of President Ceausescu’s excesses and the continuing decline of the economy and living standards. The older people see no end to the misery being inflicted upon them, which includes the destruction of their neighborhoods, churches and villages in massive, ill-conceived urban development and collectivization projects.

5. Added to this totally alienated older population is a younger population that has grown up with a distorted view of history with little information on Russian excesses in Romania over the years. The mix is one to which a sophisticated Gorbachev talking of “perestroika” and “glasnost” appears as a savior. The fact that some Romanians now talk of the coming to power of a pro-Gorbachev government faction is little short of revolutionary.

6. Following are comments made by a variety of P&C contacts. The drafting officer has given more space to two individuals, Romania’s principal dissident Mihai Botez and former Ambassador to the U.S. Silviu Brucan, since both of them have given serious thought over the years to U.S./Romanian and Romanian/Soviet relations. They also, conveniently, represent opposite poles on the possibility of “perestroika” in the Soviet Union becoming reality.

Mihai Botez

7. Botez is cynical about the true objectives of Gorbachev and doubts whether he could bring about major changes even if sincere. He spoke of the “monster” made up of party officials and bureaucrats who will fight to the last inch to maintain their positions and perks. He pointed out that they have no alternative profession to turn to if removed from office.

8. He said that there will be resistance from workers who are used to a low work pace and to having all of their needs met, however poorly, by the state. He pointed to managers who are poorly trained and not accustomed to producing and who will fight to preserve the status quo.

9. Botez concluded that there will be some improvements in the Soviet Union under “perestroika” but no major changes. He said the economic system can not be changed without major changes in the political system, changes which would result in a complete reversal of everything that the party has stood for.

10. Botez said there were great expectations in Romania before Gorbachev’s visit. There were many disappointed that nothing concrete seemed to have come out of the visit, but the people were heartened by the criticism Gorbachev leveled at Ceausescu.

11. As one who grew up hearing stories of how terrible the Russian troops were at the end of the war, he said he was shocked to see how general the support is for Gorbachev, and he is concerned that Romanians focus only on those parts of Gorbachev’s speech that criticized Ceausescu, while ignoring some rather ominous statements about closer economic cooperation. He does not feel that support for Gorbachev translates into general support for Russians.

12. While recently in Tulcea, a city on the Danube delta, he noted that Romanians regularly watch Russian TV and was surprised at the high interest shown in local elections then being held in the Soviet Union. He said party officials in Tulcea openly discussed Gorbachev’s strong points, commenting on how a Russian peasant addressed him as an equal, how he is a simple, unassuming man, yet a man of ideas.

13. Botez, who has been assigned to Tulcea as a sort of exile from Bucharest, said he senses a recent change in the way government officials conduct themselves in dealing with him. He said they make a point of letting him know that they are only following orders and have nothing against him. He feels they are uncertain of how “glasnost” will affect Romania and are trying to distance themselves somewhat from the top leadership to avoid being caught too far on the wrong side should a shift come.

Silviu Brucan

14. In contrast to Botez, former Romanian Ambassador to the U.S. Silviu Brucan feels Gorbachev is a serious reformer and will succeed in bringing about changes in the Soviet Union, changes which will have a major effect on bloc countries within the next two years.

15. Brucan has written articles comparing U.S. and Soviet technological development and predicting that the Soviet Union will become a second-rate power early in the next century if it does not make major changes in the economy. He sees Gorbachev’s announcements on “glasnost” as the beginning of these needed changes.

16. Brucan said that Gorbachev made “a tremendous impression” on Romanians at all levels and that Gorbachev had supporters at “even the very highest levels” of government. Brucan claims that many officials are trying to distance themselves from “the royal family” but still retain their positions. He sees the development of a strong pro-Gorbachev faction in the government.

17. When the PAO questioned how “glasnost” could come to Romania given President Ceausescu’s recent rejection of any changes in the economic system, he said there are a number of possibilities. One scenario has Ceausescu giving lip service to minor changes with no intention of making major changes, and, once the changes have begun, they snowball out of his control.

18. Brucan feels Romania will be the last to fall into line but has no doubts that they will. He has developed a political model to demonstrate that Romania, like other bloc countries, has no alternative. He said the Romanians took major steps toward closer ties with the Soviets in 1986 when they became the bloc country with the most investment in the Soviet Union, putting in funds, equipment and even workers into projects in the Soviet Union, including gas fields in Siberia and iron ore mines. He said Romania no longer can afford iron ore from Asia and South America and is dependent upon the Soviets to feed its industry.

19. Brucan also said that 75 per cent of Romania’s trade will be with COMECON by 1990, giving the Soviets even more leverage. He said Romanian trade with the Soviets has increased from 17 per cent to 33 per cent in the past four years, with the losses coming in trade with the West.

20. Comment: Botez, always the critical dissident, naturally would be most cynical about any possibility for meaningful change. Brucan, a man who has predicted disaster if changes are not made and a former government official who probably hopes to be welcomed back as a senior advisor should changes be made, obviously would tend to see the signs in a more positive way. Both, however, are impressed with the amount of support Gorbachev seems to have, and both report movement on the part of government officials to distance themselves from Ceausescu.

Journalist I

21. A senior journalist in foreign affairs who recently returned from the Soviet Union could not believe what he saw happening in the field of journalism and kept repeating: “It can not continue”.

22. He said that the Soviets have “opened Pandora’s box” and that each step taken by the press immediately leads to a further step. This can not continue, he said, because they ultimately will be attacking the very foundations of the political and economic systems, and Gorbachev can not allow this to happen.

23. The journalist had attended “Pravda’s” 75th anniversary celebration and said he saw signs at the celebration of the problems “glasnost” is creating. Gorbachev and other high-level officials were there, he said, but no official delivered a speech. He said Gorbachev could not speak without either praising recent “Pravda” articles, which he would not do, or criticizing “Pravda”, which he could not do without being criticial of his own policy. He said the “Pravda” editor did make a strong speech in support of the new openness but that the newspaper report on the speech the next day was short and contained nothing of the flavor of the editor’s remarks.

24. The journalist had no doubt that Gorbachev would have to take measures to rein in the press and said, for the fifth time: “It can not continue”.

25. While obviously not sanguine about the continued rapid growth of openness in the Soviet Union, the journalist had no doubt that “glasnost” was a major development and said that “the socialist world will never be the same”.

Foreign Affairs Specialist

26. A young specialist at the Academy for Political and Social Studies was so impressed with Gorbachev’s impact on Romanians that he predicted: “If Ceausescu were to die today, there would be a pro-Gorbachev faction in control tomorrow”.

27. He called the PAO’s attention to a recent article circulating in Bucharest in which the Russian newspaper “Nedelya” criticized the Romanian Government’s policy “even more strongly than the Western press”. A foreign correspondent who reads Russian later told the PAO that, while strong coming from the Soviet press, the Romanian specialist had exaggerated the strength of the criticism.

Poet

28. One of Romania’s best young poets could not contain his amusement at how quickly the Soviets had managed to exchange their black hat for a white one. He said that Romanians had begun to think that anything was better than what they now have and said Ceausescu had worked a miracle—in one year he has taken a population that was almost totally anti-Soviet and transformed it into one that likes them. He said, with an ironic laugh, that it is now considered more dangerous to listen to Radio Moscow than to VOA.

Yugoslav Journalist

29. A resident Yugoslav journalist with good Romanian contacts said that his circle of friends had great expectations prior to Gorbachev’s visit and were disappointed in the lack of positive results. At one complaint session, one of the Romanians admonished his colleagues, noting that a year ago they hated the Russians and today were expecting them to provide answers for Romania’s problems. The journalist felt that, though disappointed, his friends still looked to the Soviet Union for help. He also said that, just after Gorbachev’s major speech on “glasnost” (not published in Romania), copies of the speech were being sold in Bucharest’s flea market at 100 Lei ($10) in Russian and 200 Lei translated.

Translator

30. A translator who once was an Embassy employee said she was surprised and dismayed at the enthusiasm young intellectuals show for Gorbachev. She claimed the educational system and lack of adequate historical material for the fact that most young Romanians do not have a sense of history or an understanding of the negative role Russia has played in Romania. She said they now look to the Soviets as a last hope to rescue them from the present disastrous situation.

Students

31. While some students are cynical about Gorbachev’s intentions, a foreign lecturer at Bucharest University reported that others were quite impressed. He was taken aback when one student, who was not yet born when President Kennedy was assassinated, compared the Gorbachevs to the Kennedys. He saw Gorbachev as a young, dynamic, stylish leader with ideas and felt that it was the Soviets rather than the Americans who are now coming up with new ideas.

Sociologist

32. A sociologist who regularly discusses Romanian developments with P&C officers described what is happening in the Soviet Union as “fascinating” and said he looks forward now to reading “Pravda”. He contends that the debates in the Soviet Union are more exciting than anything coming out of the U.S. and feels these developments provide a provocative example for Romanians.

Publishing House Official

33. This individual, a former Ministry of Foreign Affairs official who was eased out of his position at the MFA some years ago, is careful but mildly critical of the government. He said that “many Romanians” are hopeful that “glasnost” will result in positive changes here but that he personally doesn’t see anything in it for Romania. When the reporting officer asked if it might not be important a few years down the line, he said Romania was not the only bloc country with serious questions about Soviet policy and that other countries also were sticking to their own policies.

Senior Researcher, Party Institute

34. A senior researcher at the party’s Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies said Gorbachev’s reforms are much discussed at the institute and that privately some of the top-level administrators there have expressed admiration for Gorbachev.

Religious Family

35. A researcher with good contacts in the religious community said one family he knows “prays for Gorbachev”, hoping that he will be successful and that the reform movement will move to Romania. He said they realize that there is strong opposition in Russia to Gorbachev’s liberalization policies, and some are skeptical that he will be able to accomplish his goals. He also made it clear that these contacts wanted Soviet reforms to cross the border, not the Soviet army.

36. Two elderly friends of this researcher are enthusiastic over information they have that Gorbachev has insisted on less Soviet gas going to Romanian industry and more to homes. Their nephew, who works in the energy field, claims that Soviet monitoring teams have recently arrived in country to see that Soviet resources are more fairly distributed. Whether there is any truth to this story or not, it is an example of the kinds of pro-Gorbachev stories that are in circulation.

Book Dealer

37. This individual feels that the situation can not remain as it is in Romania for long, and when changes come, they will be directed from Moscow. He said “the people” are hopeful that the new look in the Soviet Union will mean changes in Romania and said that considerable expectations are building up for change. The book dealer himself was cynical and didn’t expect to see major changes anytime soon.

Protocol Officer

38. Shortly after Gorbachev’s departure, a young protocol officer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was quick to assure the reporting officer that the Romanians had “made no concessions to the Soviets”. He did admit, however, that “glasnost” was a much discussed topic among Romanian officials and was an important new development.

Historian

39. One of Romania’s top historians has little hope that Gorbachev can accomplish serious reforms given the various groups that stand to lose power, prestige and even jobs should he succeed. He said that opposition from the army, KGB, party and bureaucracy would be too much to overcome even if Gorbachev is a serious reformer, which he doubts.

40. He sees no possibility that the current restrictive climate in Romania will change as long as Ceausescu is in power. He pointed out that, as the government claims, Romania did go through a period of liberalization before backsliding into its present deplorable state. He said that in the 1970’s there was a period when the government released political prisoners, allowed pre-war intellectuals to take up their old jobs, opened up travel, promoted cultural contacts with other countries, permitted a fair degree of literary freedom and allowed some small, private businesses. He ended the discussion by saying sadly: “And you see what we have now”.

Young Academic

41. A young academic at the party academy expressed doubt that Gorbachev would be successful in his reforms, saying that he doesn’t like “to bet on someone so far out ahead of everyone else”. He pointed to recent developments in China as an example of what happens when a communist leader is too innovative.

42. This academic sees little chance of “glasnost” having an effect on Romania, noting that Romania already professes to have the openness mentioned in the Soviet policy declarations and thus has no reason to initiate reforms. He did concede that, if real changes take place in the Soviet Union, these changes would influence developments here.

43. He feels that the real test of “glasnost” will be how the Soviet Union treats the bloc countries, how much freedom they are given to develop on their own. He said he has given Soviet visitors his view that socialism is now safe in Eastern Europe and that the time is ripe for the Soviets to loosen the reins. He said their response has always been that the threats to the bloc are still too serious and that close Soviet attention is still needed.

Government Official

44. A government official, whose husband previously worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, launched into a plea for us to “please not believe the Russians” before the reporting officer could even ask her opinion on “glasnost”. She said Gorbachev is just like other Soviet leaders but that we Americans are being taken in. She explained that Americans are “babies” in foreign policy and expressed the fear that the Jewish lobby, which she characterized as only being interested in getting Jews out of the Soviet Union, would influence U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and result in our being taken in by Gorbachev. This lady is bitterly anti-government.

Senior Researcher

45. A senior researcher at the Institute for Southeast European Studies was pessimistic about the ability of Gorbachev to bring about major changes and saw no possibility of “glasnost” spreading to Romania. In fact, he predicts a continued tightening up in contact with foreigners and even less travel abroad for academics.

Sociologist II

46. A sociologist from the Institute of Sociology said that the Gorbachev phenomenon had been discussed at great length by her colleagues. Because of the nature of their work, all members of the institute are party members, but indications are that, because of academic interest and previous frequent contact with Western sociologists, they are a fairly Western-oriented group. Their conclusion: Gorbachev is not to be trusted, and “glasnost” probably won’t amount to much.

Journalist II

47. A foreign policy specialist at “Scinteia” summed up his reaction to “glasnost” by repeating the reply he gave in Yugoslavia when asked the question: “How deep is Romania’s interest in ‘perestroika’?” His reply: “How deep is ‘perestroika’?” This individual is a careful purveyor of government policy. His characterization of the Gorbachev visit: “We were happy to see him come and happy to see him go.”

Journalist III

48. Another foreign policy specialist, this one from “Romania Libera”, said Gorbachev’s “words were nice” but noted there has been precious little activity. He suggested that Romanians, who have seen previous Soviets talk about reform come to nothing, were less gullible than Americans on Soviet pronouncements on “glasnost”. He added that the economic changes suggested by Gorbachev are not necessarily the path to a stronger economy, noting that the Yugoslavs and Hungarians both have taken different roads, and both are now experiencing great difficulties.

49. Comment: Post feels that, if Gorbachev is serious about major reforms and can put them into effect, “glasnost” will have an important influence in Romania but one that we can live with very nicely. For our programming purposes, true “glasnost” would be a plus. The Romanians historically have felt they belong in the Western world rather than the East, and a more open Romanian society would greatly increase opportunities for us regardless of who initiates the openness.

50. However, we are not so sanguine about prospects if “glasnost” turns out to be a sham or if, as stated by Journalist I, “it can not continue”. Should either of these be true, we fear that relatively minor changes in the Soviet Union accompanied by much fanfare could substantially enhance the image of the U.S.S.R. as a model for Romania without there being a corresponding relaxation in controls that would permit more Western contact.

51. One can not ignore traditional Romanian suspicions of Russia nor their desire for independence. However, the two countries already are growing increasingly closer economically. If Gorbachev can claim reasonable progress toward a better organized economy and a more open society in the Soviet Union, there will be less opposition to closer political ties with the Soviet Union after Ceausescu has left the scene.

Strovas

1. Source: Reagan Library, Rudolf Perina Files, Subject File, Romania—Substance 1987 (3). Confidential. Sent for information to the Department of State, Eastern European posts, and Moscow (by pouch).
2. Telegram 4531 from Bucharest, sent June 5, described the general opinion of Gorbachev held by Romanians in the wake of his visit to Bucharest. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870440–0046)
3. Not found.
4. May 25–27.