Office of the Historian

141. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State1

2332.
Bucharest, April 2, 1986, 1144Z

SUBJECT

  • MFN Renewal for Romania.
1.
(S—Entire text. )
2.
Summary: Romania has been unresponsive to our demarches on emigration and human rights. The regime is not becoming any less repressive. There are some signs—and more rumors—of slightly closer Romanian cooperation with the bloc. It gets more and more difficult to prevent Congress from vetoing MFN extension. In each of the fields of interest to the U.S., however—diversity within the bloc, emigration, human rights, economics—it seems to us the U.S. will be worse off without MFN than it is with it. We should continue to use the pre-MFN period to push very hard on emigration and human rights but, even if there is little progress by the time of our MFN determination, we feel MFN is in the U.S. interest and should be recommended. End summary.
3.
Diversity:
—
The Ceausescu-Gorbachev meeting at the Soviet Party Congress was “frank” and “friendly,” not “comradely” or “warm.”
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Ceausescu’s statement at the Congress stressed the importance of independent paths for each nation and even said a U.S.-Soviet arms agreement should be reached “on the basis of the proposals of both sides.”
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The Romanians voted against the U.S. on only three of what the U.S. has determined to be the ten most important votes in the 1985 UNGA. The Soviets voted against us on eight.
—
The Romanians continue to differ from other Warsaw Pact countries on, for example, Afghanistan, Vietnam, recognition of Israel, conventional force reduction, defense budgets.
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Romanian combat units do not participate in Warsaw Pact ground force maneuvers, nor do the Romanians allow such maneuvers on their soil.
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Over 48 percent of Romania’s trade is still outside CEMA.
4.
The Romanians pursue this relatively independent policy largely for their own reasons. Its effect on overall Soviet strength is not large. However, it does handicap Soviet consolidation of an East [Page 388] European bloc. As such, it is in our interest. MFN is a dramatic symbol of our recognition of Romania’s relative independence. It encourages such independence for Romania and for other East European states. Withdrawal of MFN for Romania—following withdrawal of MFN for Poland—would suggest that our differentiation policy is limited to Hungary alone.
5.
Emigration: MFN helps.
—
Some 7, 000 persons left Romania for the FRG, Israel and the U.S. in the first half of FY 1986.
—
This contrasts with some 8,800 in the first half of FY 1985. The number of Romanians leaving for the U.S. in particular has declined drastically this year, in part due to the fact the U.S. has terminated the TCP refugee program.
—
Even the 865 departures for the U.S. in the first half of FY 1986 are twice as many as 407 departures for the entire calendar year of 1974, the last year before MFN.
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Within the past year we have concluded an agreement on emigration processing which significantly reduces hardship for emigrants.
6.
Human rights: The Romanian record on human rights is bad, and we should not be put in the position of trying to defend it. MFN has had only little effect on human rights in any country; in Romania it has brought better treatment of the Jewish community and of some Protestants, and has each year gotten a few human rights prisoners amnestied. Denial of MFN, while a satisfyingly dramatic indication of our displeasure with Ceausescu’s internal policy, would worsen human rights in Romania, not improve them.
7.
Economics: The idea of MFN for communist countries, predating Jackson-Vanik, was to add to the long-term attraction of economic links to the West. MFN was not designed for short-term political leverage. It is the long-term attraction which remains strong.
8.
Conclusion: From all the above we conclude that despite our current, serious problems with the Romanian Government, MFN is in our interest and the President should recommend extending it.
9.
We hope these arguments will dissuade Congress from cancelling MFN. Even if Congress does cancel MFN, a record of administration support would be a basis for continued dialogue with the Ceausescu regime and its successors.
Kirk
  1. Source: Reagan Library, Paula J. Dobriansky Files, Romania—EE Memoranda (10). Secret; Exdis.↩