Office of the Historian

126. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan1

Washington, July 16, 1984

SUBJECT

  • Technology Sales to Romania

Secretary George Shultz has sent over the attached letter2 asking us to go ahead with the sale of a Landsat ground station and of computers to Romania. These issues were considered at a meeting of the Export Administration Review Board last month.3 Many reservations about the Landsat sale were expressed, but no final decision was reached. In addition to George’s views, you may wish to consider the following technical and political issues.

An interagency report concluded that the potential technology gain to the Soviet Union from the Landsat sale to Romania would be minimal if the ground station equipment were changed to make it less capable and if the Romanians provided security against unauthorized Soviet access.4 [4 lines not declassified] The Soviets have satellites that can take much sharper pictures on film than the LANDSAT can. They do not have a fully operational satellite system that uses electro-optical equipment to produce multi-spectral images that can be processed by computers for a variety of military uses. We do not know how much access to the Landsat station would speed up the Soviet development of a comparable system. DIA has identified development of such a system as a high priority Soviet goal. If Romania acquires Landsat technology, it is likely that the Soviets would put great pressure on Romania to transfer that technology to them.

In terms of the political factors, as NSDD 54 emphasized, our differentiation strategy gives us only marginal influence in Eastern Europe. In the long run, what keeps Romania—the most repressive state of Europe—on its present course is a commitment to national independence. And in the short run, although he may hope to be rewarded for it, Ceausescu’s Olympic decision was aimed less at us than at his athletes and at his own popular standing (now lower than ever). He may even [Page 350] balance the decision, as we are now seeing, by closer economic and other ties with the USSR. Nothing we can do will prevent overtures to Moscow, for Romania’s acute economic problems lead Ceausescu to seek help from both East and West. Yet because our economic ties are strong—MFN, growing trade (now at the $1 billion mark), IMF relief, etc.—we can, where security concerns require it, say no on isolated issues without lasting damage to our relationship.

We will be providing you with a complete package reviewing this issue for your decision before you leave for California.5

  1. Source: Reagan Library, Donald Fortier Files, Subject File, Technology Transfer—Romania 06/26/1984–08/16/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted by Rosen and Sestanovich. A stamped notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.↩
  2. Dated July 5; not found attached.↩
  3. The minutes of this meeting were not found.↩
  4. The interagency report, April 27, is in the Reagan Library, Kenneth DeGraffenreid Files, Subject File, Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee—Romanian LANDSAT Paper 4/24/1984–4/27/1984 (I).↩
  5. Reagan was scheduled to fly to Los Angeles on July 28 in order to attend the opening ceremony of the Olympics.↩