Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

117. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, August 4, 1983

SUBJECT

• Export to Romania of the Daedalus Multispectral Scanner (MSS) and Associated Tape Recorders

We have undertaken an exhaustive review of the factors underlying the dispute over the licensing of an MSS system for Romania. [less than 2 lines not declassified] the estimates of the intelligence community have fluctuated throughout the period of this review in a way that I find troubling.

Bureaucratically, of course, the divisions run deep. Cap Weinberger is unambiguously in opposition to the sale. A Presidential override of the Secretary of Defense would need to be reported publicly to the Congress. This has never happened before, and—given the attention now being focused on the China Technology Transfer Review—we would need to think very carefully about the substantive and political implications. Moreover, precisely because technical uncertainties do exist, I think it would be very awkward to make this the first case in which a President overrides his Secretary of Defense on the military implications of a proposed technology transfer.

State strongly supports the transfer, although our Ambassador to Romania, David Funderburk, himself believes it would be dangerous to export Landsat, the system to which the MSS is a precursor. Mac Baldrige reserves judgment. On the NSC staff itself, Ron Lehman, Gus Weiss and I favor denial; Jack Matlock, Paula Dobriansky and Norm Bailey favor approval. All agree it is worth bringing up at your next breakfast meeting with Shultz and Weinberger² in order to determine if there is any leeway for compromise on either side and also to see if the participants want an NSC meeting on the subject.

To simplify somewhat your review of this complex case, Jack Matlock, Paula Dobriansky and I have cast the principal arguments in the form of pros and cons.

Arguments in Favor of the Transfer

— Our foreign policy interests would be well served by approval of the license. Romania will of course not reorient its foreign policy because of a denial, but the U.S. ability to influence Romania to maintain elements of its more autonomous course would be impaired.

— The Vice President’s visit to Romania (September) would be clouded by this case and we would not be able to reap its full potential benefits.

— NSDD–54, which has placed transfers of technology to Romania on a different basis than those to other East European countries (“there is a high probability that technology legally sold to any Eastern European country other than Romania will be passed to the Soviet Union . . .”), would be reaffirmed and, thus, would underscore the consistency of our foreign policy.

— The final report of the Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee (TTIC) notes that the Soviets have as good or better capability in the infrared area as that found on Daedalus.³

— TTIC also affirms that potential gains to the Soviets can be minimized by safeguards that insure that Daedalus is not made available for detailed engineering study or reverse engineering. It concluded that in order to reap any tangible benefits, the Soviets would have to gain extended access to the system—a contingency which can be minimized through appropriate safeguards.

— There is no immediately apparent offsetting move that we could take to soften the blow a denial would cause to our relations with Romania, since it will be difficult to explain why we would deny 15-year-old widely available technology supplied to China five years ago.

Arguments in Favor of Denial

— The denial of a single technology transfer is unlikely in any fundamental way to alter either U.S.-Romanian relations or the character of Romanian foreign policy. Romanian policies are predicated on a number of considerations on which our leverage is minimal.

— Even if denial does worsen the atmosphere during the Vice President’s trip, no lasting damage can be expected; in fact, the visit itself could potentially offset any repercussions of transfer denial.

— It is true that NSDD–54 places transfer of technology to Romania on a different basis from other bloc countries, but NSDD–54 does not abandon the need for case by case review. Moreover, NSDD–54 may itself need to be reevaluated in light of recent information regarding technology cooperation between Romania and the Soviets, as well as [less than 1 line not declassified] that the Soviets “increasingly are in a position to pressure the Government of Romania to share technology acquired from the West.”

— [1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

— As noted above, TTIC believes the system can be safeguarded against reverse engineering and outright diversion. DOD is concerned however about contingencies in which the Soviets would ask the Romanians to share data developed by the system—data which would be helpful, among other things, in determining the extent to which SS-20 sites were adequately camouflaged.

— [less than 6 lines not declassified] TTIC itself acknowledges that if the Soviets get extended access to the system it will probably enable them to improve their military airborne multispectral scanning capability.

— We know that the Soviets have clear interest in this technology by virtue of the fact that U.S. Customs caught them trying to covertly acquire an MSS system as late as 1982. This system was more sophisticated than the Daedalus in infrared capability, but comparable in the visual range, where the Soviets lag.

Procedural

We believe you should broach the subject with Secretaries Weinberger and Shultz at your next meeting or sooner if the occasion arises (talking points attached).⁴ The Commerce Department is under court order to report by the end of next week either that the case has been resolved or that a clear timetable exists for resolution. We believe you should ask Cap if he has reviewed all the work of the intelligence community and if he still persists in his opposition to the transfer. We believe you should ask Secretary Shultz if he believes U.S.-Romanian relations will turn decisively on this particular transfer and if we could not explore alternative arrangements—such as data leasing or an agricultural exchange agreement—that would give the Romanians at least part of the capability they seek.

Recommendation

That you discuss the matter privately with Shultz and Weinberger to determine if their positions remain unchanged.⁵

1. Source: Reagan Library, Paula J. Dobriansky Files, Romania—Landsat (4). Top Secret. Sent for action. Fortier did not initial the memorandum.
2. No memorandum of conversation for this meeting was found.
3. The report is in the Reagan Library, Kenneth DeGraffenreid Files, Subject File, Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee—Romanian LANDSAT Paper 1983.
4. Attached but not printed at Tab I are the undated talking points.
5. The “Approve” option was checked.