Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

112. Letter from Secretary of Defense Weinberger to Secretary of Commerce Baldrige¹

Washington, July 7, 1983

Dear Mac:

(S/NF) I want to express to you my strong concerns over the proposed export to Romania of the high-density recorder and airborne multispectral scanner system (MSS). These systems would make a significant contribution to Soviet military intelligence, including spaceborne multispectral scanner systems, should the items be diverted. I believe the available evidence, [less than 2 lines not declassified] indicates that there is a substantial probability that this could occur if we go through with the sale.

(S) I have just received information which reveals that immediately, prior to the Romanian request for MSS from the United States, Romania signed a Protocol with the USSR for Outerspace Remote Sensing of Earth Resources. The agreement was concluded on 5 October 1979 at the 21st Session of Intergovernmental Commission on Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation. The Protocol extends cooperation between the two countries from 1981 to 1985. The airborne MSS system is an essential technology for the Soviets to achieve effective outerspace remote sensing, in addition to its use for military and intelligence application.

(S/NF) The Soviets are now five to 10 years behind the United States in the development of multispectral scanners. As you may know, the airborne MSS functions as a versatile field measurement system, providing visual and infrared spectral data needed for future spaceborne and operational military equipment. While the Soviets have some units, they are far from a near real-time capability which this export would assist. They now use a camera system which results in considerable delay from the time the information is gathered until an image is constructed. With an airborne electro-optical, or near real-time capability, the Soviets could develop their own systems to monitor camouflaged troop and logistical developments. [less than 3 lines not declassified] is a breakdown of how the exports would enhance Soviet capability in high-speed recorders and multispectral scanners.

(S/NF) While the airborne MSS technology is almost 10 years old, the Soviets, if they acquired it, would be handed the basis on which to build a spaceborne MSS capability. Daedalus has built various types of MSS systems used for research, development and design of the spaceborne Thematic Mapper system. In addition, the airborne MSS is to be used by the French for the development of the spaceborne SPOT system. Because of its improved spatial resolution, SPOT’s systems’ progress is being monitored by the Defense Intelligence Agency as part of its search for improved spaceborne techniques.

[2 paragraphs (11 lines) not declassified]

(S/NF) In addition, the U.S. Navy has recently requested the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) to employ an airborne version of an MSS subsystem to obtain spectral data during an amphibious operation at Camp Pendleton in California. The objective is to obtain information for future tactical reconnaissance system designs. The instrument to be used is of the same technology as the MSS in question. The measurements are to begin within the next few months. Therefore, Soviet acquisition of this system would have a direct adverse effect on our own military operational capabilities, for which Soviet countermeasures could be devised.

(S) Safeguards against the diversion of the airborne MSS strike me as unreliable, since the Soviets do not need a hands-on application to make use of the system, either for reverse engineering or exploitation. For example, the Soviets could ask the Romanians to fly the airborne MSS system over their own territory, evaluate the data and determine whether its military facilities are detectable. If they are, countermeasures could be instituted.

(S) We believe that Romanian acquisition for civilian purposes of the airborne MSS, along with the high-speed recorder for U.S. signal intelligence is only marginally justified, given that the land resource data they need is already available to them. With Romania’s economic problems in mind, I find it difficult to believe this effort is not inspired by other considerations. Despite the modest sum for these proposed exports, we see the risk as out-weighing any marginal benefits and believe they should be denied.²

Sincerely,

Cap

1. Source: Reagan Library, Donald Fortier Files, Subject File, Technology Transfer: Romania Landsat Case 07/09/1983–07/14/1983. Top Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].
2. Underneath his signature, Weinberger wrote, “Mac—There is new information in this letter that wasn’t provided before. I’ll be glad to discuss further if you wish. Cap.”