Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

95. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 21, 1985

SUBJECT

• Your September 27 Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

This memorandum provides some thoughts on how we can best exploit your meeting with Shevardnadze, along with my separate sessions September 25 and 27, with a view toward your Geneva meeting.

The Soviet Approach

The Soviet game plan is becoming increasingly clear. They are seeking to create the impression that they have left no stone unturned to achieve an arms control breakthrough in Geneva. Dobrynin confirmed to me September 16 that Shevardnadze will present concrete proposals to you next week on the nuclear and space talks.² Our guess is that they will be an elaboration of Gorbachev’s recent expressions of willingness to accept deep cuts in exchange for constraints on strategic defense beyond the “fundamental research” stage. Shevardnadze will presumably also be pushing previous Soviet initiatives (Gorbachev’s July nuclear testing moratorium, the non-militarization of space proposal Shevardnadze will present to the UNGA, perhaps a new twist on the Soviet chemical weapon-free zone in Central Europe concept), while seeking to capitalize on our ASAT test.

Our Objectives

Our task will be three-fold. We will want to:

—Probe to determine the seriousness of any new Soviet proposals;

—Give Shevardnadze as much information as possible and appropriate to set the stage for a productive November meeting and progress at the Geneva talks;

—Lay the basis for further steps in our regional dialogue and on the range of bilateral and human rights issues.

Your Meeting, Friday, September 27

Given the constraints on your time, you might most usefully concentrate on laying the groundwork for an in-depth exchange with Gorbachev on the most pressing issues in the relationship. I recommend that you:

—Respond to Shevardnadze’s proposals with a strong statement of your own commitment to meaningful arms control, explaining to Shevardnadze your views on the need for deep reductions and the potential promise of SDI research. (As Shevardnadze will not be accompanied by his own arms control specialists, he will not expect a detailed reply to his message, which I hope he will preview with me in New York).

—Outline your plans for a wide-ranging discussion of perceived intentions and motivations. (You might suggest to Shevardnadze that you and Gorbachev be prepared to describe your respective domestic agendas as a means of getting beyond stereotypes to the roots of policy).

—Express your concerns about Soviet regional policies, focusing on Afghanistan, where we have recently seen some hints of a greater Soviet willingness to consider a negotiated withdrawal.

—Reemphasize to Shevardnadze the importance you attach to movement on human rights and emigration (perhaps in your tete-a-tete at the conclusion of the meeting).

As with Gromyko last year, lunch could be given over to an elaboration of views on regional issues,³ providing an opportunity to rehearse points you will later make to Gorbachev on the impact of Soviet international behavior on our perceptions. You could also use the occasion to get some sense from Shevardnadze of current political dynamics in the Kremlin.

My Meetings: Wednesday and Friday afternoon, September 25 and 27

Dobrynin has indicated I may get a first look at Shevardnadze’s arms control message during our initial session Wednesday. While I will press him to be as specific as possible, we may not have a complete picture of what Moscow has to offer until your meeting. I will also put some ideas of our own on the table.

—On the Geneva talks, I will try to engage Shevardnadze in a comprehensive discussion of the offense/defense relationship. This will serve the purpose of smoking out details of his private message and giving him some direct exposure to our thinking on the subject.

—On nuclear testing, I will stress the importance we attach to verification, reaffirming our willingness to ratify the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties if the Soviets will cooperate in satisfying our concerns. I will propose that special representatives from both sides explore this possibility this fall.

—On ASAT, we are not in a position to take the initiative, but I will need to address any proposals Shevardnadze may make.

—On chemical weapons, we are working interagency a proposal that we exchange lists of CW precursors as a first step toward collaboration in preventing the spread of CW possession and use; and

—On nuclear nonproliferation, I will confirm our willingness to make a joint statement on cooperation at your Geneva meeting.

As arms control issues will dominate the New York session, regional and bilateral matters will probably slip to my Friday afternoon meeting. I will follow up in greater detail on regional points you make and formally propose that we regularize the expert-level talks we have had over the past year on the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southern Africa and Asia. (We are proposing Central American/Caribbean talks be held in October.)

I will raise human rights and emigration initially in a brief tete-a-tete on the margins of our New York meeting, broaching an idea discussed with Mac Baldrige: that concrete steps by the Soviets to meet our concerns might be met with some liberalization of our non-strategic trade controls. I will return to human rights and emigration in my final session, reinforcing the points you would make in your meeting, and presenting an up-dated list of cases in which we are interested.

There is a good chance that at some point in our meetings Shevardnadze will raise two additional issues: whether there should be a formal communique in Geneva and whether there should be follow-up meetings between you and Gorbachev. I will inform him that we remain open as to how the meeting should be documented, and that our final decision will depend on what substantive results can be expected. On follow-up meetings, I will indicate that we are willing in principle, but feel that future meetings should be in capitals. I will reiterate our view that it is the Soviets’ turn to come to Washington.

Media Arrangements

As with Gromyko last year, I will plan to make two statements in connection with Shevardnadze’s visit: the first, a short, informal comment following our New York meeting; the second, a longer review of where we stand following your meeting and lunch. We plan backgrounders by Roz Ridgway, Jack Matlock and Art Hartman after both my exchanges with Shevardnadze to shape public perceptions of the visit and of its implications for the Geneva meeting. You might want to consider a radio address focusing on US–Soviet relations, perhaps the following Saturday.⁴ We will also plan to do the usual talk shows after the meetings are over.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Reagan-Shevardnadze Meeting 09/27/85 (5 of 7). Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum is stamped “Eyes Only” in the top right-hand margin. Another copy of the memorandum indicates it was drafted by Parris on September 16 and cleared by Ridgway, Hawes, and Stafford. Ridgway sent this copy of the memorandum to Shultz under a September 17 action memorandum, recommending that he sign the memorandum to the President. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Soviet Union September)
2. See Document 90.
3. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 287.
4. On September 28, Reagan gave a radio address on his meeting with Shevardnadze. See Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book II, pp. 1149–1150.