81. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)1
SUBJECT
- Gorbachev’s Summit Preview
Gorbachev’s TIME interview and statements to visiting U.S. senators provide additional proof, if any were needed, that his primary Summit objective is to kill SDI, and he has given us a remarkably candid description of how he hopes to do it.2
Clearly the most interesting of Gorbachev’s recent statements was his professed willingness to tolerate SDI “fundamental science” research which he agreed could not be verified. By agreeing with us on this point, he hopes to see us hoist with our petard. The key to this tactic was provided in the following sentence in the TIME interview:
“But the main thing is that if all this work on space weaponry were to stop at this [research] stage, then no one would have any more interest in going over to the next stage in the process of designing and developing, because nobody would think of appropriating any more money for these purposes if it were known that money could not subsequently be used.”
This statement reflects a disturbingly sophisticated understanding of what Congress could and probably would do to SDI should we agree even to seriously discuss not going beyond the research stage. [Page 318] The fact that none other than Senator Nunn said Gorbachev’s new tack was “good news” is a clear harbinger of things to come. Nunn did object to Gorbachev’s excessively narrow interpretation of “fundamental research,” but I daresay, Gorbachev will, in due course, indicate a willingness to broaden his definition if this leads to stopping all further SDI development. Of course, Gorbachev further sweetened the pot by offering “radical” strategic arms and INF proposals after we agreed to “prohibit the militarization of space.”
Interesting additional evidence of Soviet single-mindedness in seeking SDI’s demise was Gorbachev’s indirect, but still surprisingly candid (interview) explanation of why he wants a bilateral nuclear test moratorium: “The U.S. needs nuclear testing to provide the nuclear element for space lasers.”
Bearing all the above in mind, it is obvious that Gorbachev wants to force the President to get down to brass tacks on SDI in Geneva. He, indeed, hopes to make “progress” on this issue the principal criterion for the success or failure of the Summit. While, as you know better than I, the Soviets have agreed to discuss regional, bilateral and other arms control issues, SDI will be front and center. Even reaching agreement on a secondary bilateral issue will be touted as evidence that the Soviets are ready and willing to reach agreements on larger issues, especially SDI.
Gorbachev clearly wants to avoid an exchange of charges, a bout between “supergladiators,” not just to avoid our slings and arrows, but primarily to save time for hard negotiating. In this connection, he is obviously disturbed by reports that we want “an introductory meeting, only an agenda for the future things to that effect.”
He will also hope to get the President to repeat and reinforce the statements which, Gorbachev claims, are bringing the Soviets to Geneva: “War was inadmissible . . . nuclear war was not winnable . . . the U.S. was not seeking superiority over the Soviet Union.” In the propaganda battle which is bound to follow the Summit, the Soviets will try to use such truisims to demonstrate either our inconsistency and hypocrisy or the advent of a new period of detente—depending on how things go.
We can, in any case, be thankful that Gorbachev has recently provided us with such detailed insights into Soviet Summit and pre-Summit tactics. Now all we have to do is counter them.
- Source: Reagan Library, Crisis Management Center, NSC Records, 1981–1985, NSC Information Summary Memorandum to Poindexter. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Matlock, Linhard, Lenczowski, Kraemer, Steiner, and Christopher Lehman. A stamped notation reads: “RCM has seen.” McFarlane wrote in the margin: “Thanks Bill.” Brackets are in the original.↩
- See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 80.↩