Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

80. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

SOV M 85–10159X

Washington, September 6, 1985

Current Soviet Posture Toward the November Meeting

Summary

In the period leading up to the Geneva meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in November, the Soviets will continue their vigorous effort to portray the Reagan administration as opposed to progress in arms control and improved US-Soviet relations. This campaign is likely to include broad propagandistic appeals—such as the Soviet draft UN treaty on the “non-militarization” of space—as well as more subtle overtures to US and West European audiences hinting at substantive Soviet concessions at the November meeting if Washington indicates a willingness to forgo or drastically limit its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Gorbachev’s recent interview with Time magazine is consistent with this strategy, claiming that Moscow is preparing “serious” proposals for the meeting while charging that administration officials are portraying it as a “get-acquainted” session.² The Soviets also will continue pressing the idea in diplomatic and other private channels, as Gorbachev did in his 3 September meeting with a delegation of US Senators, that the USSR is interested in reaching agreements with the United States and in exploring possible areas of compromise on arms control issues.³ [portion marking not declassified]

The objective of such public and private diplomacy will be to portray the meeting as a key branch point in US-Soviet relations for the balance of the administration. Tactically, the Soviets thus hope to leave US policymakers with little latitude between engaging in a pre-meeting dialogue that fosters public expectations of substantial progress on arms control—thus implicitly suggesting US flexibility on space weapons limitations—or running the risk of adverse political fallout within NATO and with domestic constituencies by seeming not to respond to Soviet initiatives that Moscow will claim address US concerns. [portion marking not declassified]

The Soviets no doubt intend to keep their own options open for exploring US receptivity to their private hints about possible areas of convergence and for responding to any alternative arms control possibilities floated by Washington for discussion at the November meeting or in the Geneva talks. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze’s visit to Washington in late September probably will be viewed by Moscow as a fact-finding mission to gauge US intentions on arms control issues and the Reagan-Gorbachev discussions. At the same time, however, the Soviets probably hope to be well positioned by their diplomatic and propaganda efforts to place the onus on Washington if the November meeting should go badly from Moscow’s perspective. Soviet actions during the period leading up to the November meeting will also be aimed at influencing the forthcoming US decision on mutual restraint within past SALT understandings and Congressional debate on funding for the administration’s defense programs. [portion marking not declassified]

Moscow’s diplomacy prior to the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting will also be aimed at courting West European opinion, both as a means of influencing US policy and as a way of exploiting any West European dissatisfaction with US policy should US-Soviet relations fail to improve. Continued lobbying against SDI and possibly efforts to influence the Dutch decision on INF basing in November will figure in Moscow’s maneuvering. In particular, the Soviets may be in a position to reduce the number of their SS–20 launchers deployed at bases to fall at or below the overall level of 378 that the Dutch have said would constitute a basis for reconsidering their commitment to GLCM deployment. Gorbachev’s visit to France in early October will provide an opportune occasion to try to capitalize on French reluctance to endorse SDI—perhaps by airing the possibility of some sort of Soviet association with EUREKA—or to highlight a new Soviet initiative on INF aimed at influencing the Dutch basing decision. In any event, Gorbachev will no doubt seek to manipulate the charismatic image that has been painted of him in Western media in hopes of appearing as a pragmatic, flexible proponent of arms control and improved East-West relations. [portion marking not declassified]

The Soviets also may view the third round of the Geneva NST negotiations, which opens on 19 September, as an opportunity to influence the substance and tone of the Reagan-Gorbachev discussions on arms control issues. They thus might offer specific new initiatives during the round in the hope that these could form the basis for discussion during the November meeting. [portion marking not declassified]

1. Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—SACG—September 20, 1985. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A typed note at the bottom of the first page reads in part: “This paper was prepared by [names not declassified] the Office of Soviet Analysis.”
2. Gorbachev’s interview in Time magazine appeared in the September 9 issue. Excerpts of the August 28 interview are printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 558–569.
3. Senators Byrd and Thurmond visited the Soviet Union and had a 3-hour meeting with Gorbachev on September 3. In telegram 12225 from Moscow, September 4, the Embassy transmitted a record of this meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850627–0606) Reagan wrote in his personal diary for September 10: “Then Sen. Byrd & the Sen’s. in his Moscow junket came by to report on their meeting with Gorbachev. Really not much new—he’s clever, articulate etc. They think he may be willing to make some changes.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I: January 1981–October 1985, p. 494)