Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

45. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, June 18, 1985

SUBJECT

• Summitry

Mark Palmer mentioned to me last night that he understood that you and Secretary Shultz would be meeting with Dobrynin to deliver a reply on Gorbachev’s meeting suggestion, and that he understood that we would be proposing Geneva.²

I hope Mark’s information is garbled, and that this is not the case. On the possibility that he misunderstood the current state of play, I would like to submit the following thoughts for your consideration:

1. It is undesirable to respond too quickly to Gorbachev’s proposal for a meeting in Europe, since that will reinforce the impression that the President wants a meeting more than he does. This is particularly true given the conflicting signals we have received regarding Gorbachev’s own desires.

2. The fact of the matter is that a meeting in a third country in Europe is, in most respects, the least attractive of the three alternatives. I say this because it is the variant which puts the least pressure on the Soviets to change some of their policies in order to insure a successful meeting. These pressures are greater if they receive an American President there, and also if they send their leader here. And our historical experience has been that meetings in third countries tend to be either failures or sterile (Kennedy-Khrushchev in Vienna and Carter-Brezhnev, also in Vienna—the latter sterile in the sense that SALT-II had already been negotiated, and even if that is considered an achievement, it was not an achievement of the meeting). I believe these factors should be carefully considered by the President before he is encouraged to move in the direction of a meeting in a third country.

3. If there is some difference between Gromyko’s desires regarding a meeting and Gorbachev’s, then a quick acceptance of the proposal in the letter (which bears all the earmarks of having been written in the Foreign Ministry) simply hands Gromyko an easy victory. We should be cautious about doing this until we get a better feel for Gorbachev’s real desires.

4. For this reason, I would strongly recommend that we delay a reply for a couple of weeks, and use the time to have the Agency contact try to find out from Ryzhkov what Gorbachev really wants. I still suspect that he would prefer to come to the U.S., and if this is the only way he can get a meeting, he might well agree.

5. Rather than agreeing precipitously to a third country, we should give careful thought to the advantages and disadvantages of the President going to Moscow. I don’t like the idea of his making the trip first any more than the others, but I believe that if we cannot have a meeting here, one there would almost certainly be more productive than one in a third country. Given the Soviet approach to these things, it would put them under pressure, at a minimum, to moderate their propaganda attacks and start making some gestures in the human rights field. It would make it most difficult for them to continue to portray the President as a threat, since the symbolism of his visit would undermine this claim—certainly among the Russian people and probably also in Western Europe. None of these advantages are gained from a meeting in a third country, which in fact maximizes the liabilities (high public expectations) and minimizes the leverage for Soviet performance.

In sum, unless an irrevocable decision has already been made, I would strongly recommend that we slow down, give some careful thought to these nuances, and play our cards deliberately.

I would appreciate an opportunity to see you briefly as soon as you can make time, in order to obtain your guidance on several ongoing issues.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron June 1985 (2/4). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. McFarlane wrote in the top margin: “Set up a mtg w/ Jack.”
2. It seems likely Matlock’s memorandum arrived too late, as McFarlane and Shultz met with Dobrynin the previous evening, June 17, to discuss the summit and venues. See Document 43.