Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

44. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, June 18, 1985

SUBJECT

• Gorbachev’s Reference to Remarks Attributed to You

You will recall that I mentioned to you the report from the Italians that Gorbachev had told Craxi that he had just received a cable from Dobrynin which reported that you had “confirmed nonchalantly” that the negotiations in Geneva had no prospect of success and had “insisted on the importance of a summit meeting.”² Hartman reported this from Moscow and was instructed to inform those allied missions briefed by the Italians that the purported quotations were a total fabrication.³

State subsequently raised the matter with Sokolov, pointing out that such misquotations damage Dobrynin’s reputation as a reliable reporter. Sokolov said that he would discuss the matter with Dobrynin and attempt to obtain an explanation.

The next day, Sokolov telephoned Simons to say that Dobrynin had sent two cables to Moscow, one reporting conversations at Ken Dam’s farewell reception, which included conversations with you and Secretary Shultz, the latter touching on the summit question, and one reporting on his luncheon conversation with Kampelman, which dealt primarily with the Geneva negotiations. Dobrynin speculated that Gorbachev had read both cables and had mixed up the identity of the interlocutors.

Comment: Even if it is true that Gorbachev mixed up a cable reporting a conversation with Kampelman with one reporting on a conversation with you and/or Shultz, it does not explain why Gorbachev received such a distorted view of what was said. Certainly Max was not as negative on the prospects for Geneva as was reported, nor could Shultz’s comments on the possibility of a summit be considered “insisting on its importance.”⁴

I believe that we should consider this incident as clear warning of the danger of depending largely on Dobrynin to convey our messages to Moscow. It is obvious either that his reporting is inaccurate, or that his commentary puts a twist on the conversation so that his report leaves a distorted impression on his readers. The lesson for us should be clear: if we want to be understood accurately in Moscow, we better make sure that the message is conveyed directly by our own people.⁵

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron June 1985 (2/4). Confidential. Sent for information.
2. Gorbachev met with Bettino Craxi, the Italian Prime Minister, in Moscow on May 27. Telegram 7272 from Moscow, May 31, reported: “Dobrynin-McFarlane conversation? The Italians dropped a bomb on us during their debrief on the Craxi visit. According to them, Gorbachev during his treatment of space arms referred to a telegram he had ‘just received from Dobrynin’ on a conversation Dobrynin had had with Bud McFarlane. Gorbachev said Bud had indicated the USG ‘did not expect results’ in the second round in Geneva—a statement Gorbachev portrayed as evidence we felt under no pressure to negotiate seriously. Gorbachev also reportedly indicated that Bud had ‘insisted’ to Dobrynin on the importance of a summit. This is, of course, fourth hand, and may have lost or gained something in the telling. But the Italians have passed it on to six NATO Embassies in Moscow as fact, and we’d like to be in a position to comment. Anything to it?” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850383–0176)
3. In telegram 171439 to Rome, June 15, Van Heuven informed Holmes: “Moscow had earlier reported by O–I that Gorbachev had brandished before Craxi a message from Dobrynin reporting a conversation with McFarlane, alleging that Bud had seen no expectations of progress in Geneva II and ‘insisted’ on the importance of a summit. Queried informally through Jack Matlock, Bud responded that this was a total fabrication, that everyone whom the Italians had told about it should be told this, and that the Italians should be asked for as much detail and precision as possible. Curt Kamman is spreading the word in Moscow, and I am asking you in this message to go back to Bottai and Badini to see what further ‘precision and detail’ can be elicited. Clearly the issue has something to do with Dobrynin’s credibility here. The only time Bud and Dobrynin have exchanged words recently was at Ken Dam’s farewell reception, and Bud denies saying anything like that quoted.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850396–0558)
4. In telegram 171439 to Rome, Van Heuven also noted that Kampelman reported meeting Dobrynin privately on May 27: “the report registers extensive discussion expectations for Geneva II, but nothing bleak from Max, and a few mentions of the summit, none of them ‘insisting’ on either side on its importance. I am getting Warren Zimmermann to plumb Max’s memory further, but Warren is confident the answer will be, if not ‘total fabrication,’ then total distortion.” (Ibid.)
5. McFarlane drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin and wrote: “agree.”