266. Memorandum From the Chief of the Arms Control Intelligence Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (George) to Director of Central Intelligence Casey1
SUBJECT
- Background Information (U)
1. This “fast-track” memorandum is for your information and such subsequent action at the Cabinet level as you see fit. (U)
2. Attached is a set of the draft Memoranda of Conversation resulting from the meeting of US and Soviet NST experts in Moscow on 11/12 August.2 These papers show that the NODIS messages from Moscow were incomplete. I know NIO/USSR wrote to you on this general subject already. I think he and I agree that the US did not do a very good job in Moscow. [portion marking not declassified]
3. [1 paragraph (2½ lines) not declassified]
4. I read this material Saturday and gave up in disgust. I know the Administration did not want to be in the position of working any text in Moscow (for security reasons), but I think it is clear that the US Delegation:
—Did not use the correct (and may have used the “wrong”) terminology to describe the US position about SDI and the ABM Treaty (e.g., as cited in the President’s letter).
—Had essentially nothing to say of substantive content, in response to Soviet questions (e.g., when Karpov asked what the US had in mind, beyond ballistic missile warheads, in a regime of mutual restraint).
I think it is obvious that the US Delegation, in effect:
—Gave minimal, if any, thought to what it wanted to do in Moscow.
—Did minimal, if any, preparatory work for responding to the obvious, upcoming Soviet questions. [portion marking not declassified]
5. I think the root causes of this situation are: insufficient policy direction, little policy discipline, and personality conflicts. Colonel Linhard of the NSC Staff cannot enforce these points; he is outstanding in substance and procedure, but he does not have the necessary political muscle. [portion marking not declassified]
[Page 1090]6. Of relatively greatest annoyance to me is that US intelligence went far out of its way to ensure the delegation had our papers on the Air Force plane from London to Moscow about what to expect from the Soviets.3 Both Ambassadors Kampelman and Rowny told me privately upon their return that they thought our background papers had been extremely helpful. Clearly, good intelligence is not a substitute for preparations or policy. [portion marking not declassified]
7. Whatever one may think about the wisdom or value in the Administration’s arms control positions, it is sad to see a senior US delegation “fumble the ball” as was done in Moscow. In my view, certain arms control experts in Washington—upon hearing about the substance of what happened in Moscow—would be seeking to remove delegation members from office; Richard Perle’s treatment of SDI and the ABM Treaty is a prime example. [portion marking not declassified]
8. It may be that the Administration wanted to appear confused and shallow to the Soviets, but I suspect not. The Soviets no doubt noticed the US performance. One of the “secrets” of Gorbachev’s arms control effort is that he knows US positions are relatively shallow and their presentation relatively weak. Generally (and Ambassador Nitze usually is a key exception), once US personnel exhaust their inventory of policy statements and questions, there is essentially nothing left and little capacity to invent anything else. One reason is that almost every issue has to go to the NSC Staff; generally this is on purpose, because one or more “players” thinks the President will agree with him—if only he knew the true story. In my view, the President ought to be “mad as hops” about the chaos in and around the Moscow meeting. This nation’s arms control policies are hard enough to implement, and to explain, without such mindless foolishness. I think the US is losing the battle on arms control and the summit. [portion marking not declassified]
9. If I were king, I would do my best to get Secretary Shultz’s attention (as well as that of Admiral Poindexter) to ensure that when these NST experts get together again in early-September in Washington, the US is prepared (especially on substance), and the senior White [Page 1091] House Staff know we are—from its own reviews with the key people. [portion marking not declassified]
10. If ACIS may do more to assist you here, please call. (U)
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Arms Control Intelligence Staff (DCI/ACIS), Job 91B00805R, Policy Files (1972–1986), Box 2, Folder 15: Douglas George: NSC/START Policies. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. [text not declassified].↩
- Not found attached. For information concerning the talks, see Document 263.↩
- Under an August 6 memorandum to Linhard and Kampelman, DCI Representative to the Arms Control Support Group [name not declassified] forwarded a paper “intended to complement the memorandum being prepared by CIA in support of your trip to Moscow, which focuses on the substantive issues involved. My paper presents some personal views on possible Soviet objectives and expectations that might help you in preparing for certain contingencies.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Ambassadors Henry F. Cooper and Max Kampelman, Program Files for the Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms (S/DEL), Lot 93D592, Experts Group)↩
- George signed “Doug” above his typed signature.↩