265. Note From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff1
SUBJECT
- Gorbachev Speech
The Gorbachev speech is an attempt to bring increased pressure on us in the nuclear testing area by tying the moratorium extension to a claimed policy of turning the world toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.2 It is probably based on an assessment that the Soviet moratorium is beginning to bring some dividends in Congress and with the Allies, and therefore should continue as a centerpiece of the Soviet propaganda offensive.
He has worked this in to the relatively new Soviet “principle” of interdependence—which for many in the world, places Soviet rhetoric on the side of the angels.
The fact that Gorbachev made an agreement on a testing moratorium an explicit goal for the Washington Summit is clever, but may be too clever by half. If it is clear that he cannot achieve it, it makes it more difficult for him to come. However, it also means that if there is any progress on the testing issues, he can claim that this was only because of Soviet pressure on the U.S.
His comments toward the end that agreement on a moratorium “would be a kind of prologue to further progress on nuclear arms” tends to imply that a moratorium is a prerequisite to arms reduction, but does not actually say so.
Most other issues are mentioned almost in passing, but all in the context of the claim that the Soviets have put forward a comprehensive program to ensure peace and move toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It is striking to me that he had so little to say about SDI (his comments are nothing new, and seem to be largely a reassurance to the Soviet public that he will protect Soviet interests). This suggests that the speech may herald a lessening of emphasis on SDI as a stumbling block, along with increased emphasis on the testing issue. In [Page 1088] propaganda terms, this has some advantages for the Soviets, since they cannot deny that they have an SDI program of their own, but can point to their self-imposed moratorium as evidence of Soviet restraint and good faith.
There is nothing new on verification: the same general statements made before, along with the reference to the instrumentation installed by the private group. In sum, I believe we face an increased push from the Soviets on the testing issue. It could conceivably be designed to provide a pretext to delay the summit if our position does not change, but I doubt that this is the main motivation. What is most likely, in my view, is that Gorbachev went out on the limb a bit when he proposed it in the first place, and seeing that it is making inroads in world opinion, has decided to step up the pressure on us rather than climbing back off the limb at this time.
At this time, I believe our comments should be relatively brief and should concentrate on the following elements:3
1. The best way to move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons is to start reducing them. It is unfortunate that G did not have more to say about how we can do this.
2. If he means what he says about verification, then the way to show it is by accepting U.S. proposals to improve verification, ratify the TTBT and PNET, and negotiate further limits on testing on this basis.
3. Soviet claims to support movement to a more peaceful world ring hollow so long as they continue to pursue a brutal, unjust war of conquest in Afghanistan.
4. In sum, if the USSR is genuinely interested in peace, it will stop waging war; if it is interested in eliminating nuclear weapons, it will start reducing them, and if it is interested in ending nuclear testing, it will work with us to improve verification procedures.4
- Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron August 1986. No classification marking.↩
- In telegram 14311 from Moscow, August 20, the Embassy reported on Gorbachev’s speech on Soviet television the evening of August 18, which “announced Soviet decision to extend unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing until January 1, 1987.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860637–0492) For the full text of the speech, see Documents on Disarmament, 1986, pp. 494–500.↩
- Poindexter initialed above this sentence.↩
- Poindexter handwrote an additional point: “5. Moratorium on unrealistic proposals.”↩