209. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)1

SUBJECT

  • U.S.-Soviet Relations: Disarray in Moscow?

Recent Soviet behavior can be interpreted broadly in two ways. Assertive Soviet behavior in regional conflicts, the heavy ideological tone of Gorbachev’s Party Congress report, the clearly propagandistic nature of Soviet arms control proposals and the apparent attempt to extract substantive concessions in exchange for agreeing to a summit date are read by some as a sign that Gorbachev is not serious in reaching any accommodation with the United States, but rather is determined to test our resolve and to play to the “peace” galleries in the West in order to strain our alliances and bring pressure to bear for unilateral concessions.

The alternate interpretation is that Gorbachev in fact sees it in his interest to lower tensions with the United States, but is constrained by internal divisions and major opposition to changes of policy and furthermore misled by faulty political advice regarding the most effective tactics in dealing with the United States. The current Soviet stance, according to this interpretation, does not signify that Gorbachev has set out to challenge the United States, but rather that he must maintain the image of standing up to U.S. pressure to change long-standing Soviet policies. Those inclined to this interpretation see signs that he may be subject to criticism for returning from Geneva empty-handed, and simply cannot risk another summit without some concrete results. This interpretation, of course, does not deny the obvious fact that Soviet [Page 889] actions have been heavily influenced by propagandistic considerations, but would hold that these are not inconsistent in Soviet eyes with a genuine effort to reduce tensions.

After careful reflection on the events since the Geneva Summit, I am convinced that the second interpretation is closer to reality than the first. It would take an extended essay to describe all the reasons which led me to this conviction, but the key factors are the following:

1. Evidence of disarray at the Party Congress: no consistent line, directly contradictory elements—even in the “Central Committee report” read by Gorbachev—and striking differences in approach by some of the speakers.

2. Retention of persons Gorbachev clearly wished to remove.

3. Contradictions in the Five-Year Plan.

4. A slowdown (and in some cases a total stalling) of some of the “campaigns” and “reforms” proposed by Gorbachev.

5. Accumulating evidence that the military is not enthusiastic about accommodation with the U.S.: lukewarm treatment of Geneva summit in the military press; behavior of military representatives in the various negotiations (introducing elements which political representatives had agreed to change).

In sum, Gorbachev seems not to have his act together yet. Furthermore, he has made some mistakes which open him to criticism. For example, in espousing the nuclear testing moratorium, he can be accused of failure to achieve anything. Not only has the U.S. not gone along, but it has not had the propaganda effect anticipated. (It is probably not accidental that he made his speech last Saturday on Soviet TV.2 It was in part aimed at peace movements in the West, but more importantly it was aimed at a Soviet audience, and was meant to explain his failure and to cast the U.S. as the guilty party. There was an unmistakable note of defensiveness in the Russian text.)

He also is possibly accused of agreeing too readily to a pattern of future summit meetings. The argument likely used is that the President uses the meetings to obtain backing for his policies at home, and that Gorbachev—inexperienced in national security affairs—fell into a trap. Both elements of the military and the old guard political leadership—the latter now fighting for its life—probably resorts to such arguments.

Even if this second interpretation is correct, it does not mean that we should change any policies. In my opinion, we are exactly on the right track. We must demonstrate firmness and continuity. However, if we are to put Gorbachev’s intentions and political clout to a valid test, we [Page 890] should do two things: (1) convey clearly to him what sort of substantive outcome we consider possible at the next summit (and perhaps the one after that); and (2) avoid gratuitous public slaps.

Regarding the second point, I would observe that such moves as supplying stingers to the mujahedin can be most useful. Talking about it, however, can be counterproductive. The same goes for drawing public attention to programs like stealth. The leverage is in the action itself. Public threats (even in the form of leaked stories) simply pushes the Soviet leadership into a corner. The thing they are unable to tolerate is public humiliation. Under such circumstances, their habit is to stand pat and become demonstrably truculent.

It is of course a tall order to attempt to bring pressure to bear quietly, given our inability to control leaks and the need to go public on a number of issues in order to garner support. However, we need to do better on this score if we are to maximize pressure and the prospects for successful negotiation.

One final note regarding Soviet (and Russian) psychology: As I have pointed out in previous papers, Russians tend to proceed deductively in their reasoning and approach to negotiations. This is in contrast to the normal American inductive approach. Concretely, what this means is that they have a psychological need to be assured in advance where we are headed, before they will address the concrete steps necessary to get there. They are quite capable of proceeding step by step—but only if they are convinced that there is a real prospect of agreement at the end of the process.

Although we cannot and should not interpret recent Soviet actions as benign, it seems clear to me that there is some measure of a genuine element in the repeated Soviet requests to define what we wish to achieve at future summit meetings. In effect, they are asking: “Is the President willing to conclude major agreements at all, or is he simply diddling us with negotiations to hold domestic forces at bay?”

In sum, my judgment is that the greatest tactical risk at present is not that our actions can be interpreted by the Soviets as showing insufficient resolve (I think they are fully convinced on this score), but that they may draw the conclusion that concrete negotiation is futile. Therefore, I believe that some steps to provide reassurance that the President has a real desire to enter into major arms reduction agreements could be helpful. I believe this can be done without in any way damaging our substantive positions.

Recommendations:

1. That the President stress to Dobrynin his desire to conclude concrete agreements on key issues, and sketch out a plan of what he would like to achieve. He should make clear that optimally, he would like [Page 891] to see a resolution of the key issues of the NST talks and appropriate treaties signed and ratified during his administration. (Note: he can make reference to some of the suggestions in his private correspondence.)

2. That we make another effort to establish more private means of communication. Dobrynin’s new appointment may facilitate this, since he may now be a key player in Moscow and not just a messenger here. His appointment could provide the Soviets with an appropriate counterpart in Moscow for dealing with (for example) Paul Nitze in a very quiet way.3

3. That we take concrete steps to compartmentalize very restrictively any confidential consultations, so as to preclude any risk of leaks. (This may require cutting the staffs of some Departments out altogether.)

  1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron April 1986 (1/6). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action.
  2. March 29; see Document 207.
  3. See footnote 9, Document 206.