202. Memorandum From the Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks (Kampelman) to Secretary of State Shultz 1
SUBJECT
- Personal NST End of Round Assessment
1. The Soviet refusal to follow the November 21 joint statement by not moving forward on the START 50% reduction negotiations is a disappointment which we should highlight to the Soviets and in public diplomacy; but it should not discourage us. I believe it is a signal that even though they have dropped INF linkage to SDI, we must not be misled into believing they are dropping START’s linkage to SDI. The Soviets also have to keep testing us. They will renew the negotiations.
2. Insofar as INF is concerned, it strikes me as being just what it now appears to be on its face. The Soviets will continue to work very hard to keep modernization away from the French or British; and they will try to avoid making Asian reductions without getting something [Page 860] in return from the Chinese. Here again, we should not be too surprised if the negotiations here turn cold again at the beginning of the Fifth Round.
3. Moving to Defense and Space, Karpov explicitly stated the delay in START was due to the fact that we had resisted any forward movement in the Defense and Space negotiations. My position with both Karpov and Kvitsinskiy (no longer with us) was that we had very little, if any, “wiggle room” in Defense and Space and that I could not begin addressing it internally until I knew for certain that satisfactory radical reductions in strategic offensive weapons were in hand. I, therefore, urged them to reconsider their negotiating tactics. We will see what happens.
4. I have been continuing to receive signals that the Soviets may be prepared to settle for less than a demand for a full ban on “space-strike weapons” as part of resolving the negotiating impasse. Most recently, recognizing our opposition to a comprehensive ASAT ban, they have called for “partial” or “first” steps in the form of something less than a comprehensive ASAT ban. They may feel that growing Congressional pressure will require us to follow down that road with them. (Defense is very nervous about our exploring this area with the Soviets, but I believe I should draw them out. You may hear about this.)
5. The rest of the package they appear to be suggesting to us would include an agreement as to what the ABM Treaty means, designed to limit our SDI activities by keeping them as close as possible to research alone and to as little research as possible. They have also indicated to us that they might be prepared to limit and possibly remove their ABM system around Moscow; and that they would be willing to search for a formula on Krasnoyarsk which does not label them as treaty violators. Their package will also include a requirement, I believe, that we agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for as long a period as they can get us to accept. The suggestion has also been made that certain ground-based SDI systems could be sanctioned. (Defense is also most uneasy about these subjects coming up in informal exchanges.)
6. It is my view that the interagency process should not address itself to these Defense and Space questions at this time, but I will continue my probing and my informal discussions, just as Paul has done, with friends in the other agencies. The issue is now highly sensitive and controversial in Washington. It has been said that when a seller offers two prices, he expects the buyer to choose the lower, but before we address the question of price, we need to demonstrate we are receiving something of value. That is not yet in hand.
7. It is my view that Soviet seriousness in all areas will increase as the Summit nears. Our Fifth Round will begin on May 8 and probably last until the end of June. In the event there is no Summit until December, we will, of course, have a sixth round in the autumn and the busy action will take place then.
- Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1986. Confidential.↩