The handwritten letter was obviously the more personal one, particularly
since Gorbachev immediately
announced the content of his letter of January 12 and wrote in the same
vein to several other Chiefs of State. Therefore, it would be
appropriate to answer the two letters separately, keeping the
handwritten exchange more personal, private and direct. I think it is
important to give a specific reply to the handwritten letter both to
sustain this private exchange and to reply to some of the unacceptable
allegations in it. This can be done without getting into the details of
his letter of January 12.
—By separating the reply to his handwritten letter from that to his
“public” letter of January 12, the draft indicates clearly, without
saying so, that the use of “proposals” for propaganda is not helpful to
the negotiating process, and that such “proposals” will not be given the
status of private messages.
—By devoting special attention to regional conflicts and Afghanistan in
particular, it lays the ground for a linkage of restraint in these areas
to the reduction of nuclear weapons beyond the initial 50 percent. It
also includes a strong statement regarding Soviet involvement with
Qaddhafi, based on the danger posed to the Soviet Union by his
unpredictability. (This is a factor the Soviets probably worry about,
and it will not hurt to play on it a bit.)
You will note that the draft contains no mention of the Washington
summit. Given the Soviet delay in suggesting a firm date—or reacting in
any way officially to our proposal made in early December—I think it is
desirable to avoid showing any exceptional eagerness. Also, in his
letter, Gorbachev made no
mention of the meeting other than to say that he considered the
correspondence “a very important channel” for preparing for it.
Although the draft reply is longer than I would like it to be, it is only
slightly longer than Gorbachev’s
letter (a translation of which is at Tab B for your reference).3
Nevertheless, I consider it important to provide answers to Gorbachev’s allegations in some
detail, and this cannot be done much more briefly. Providing him with a
detailed reply does indicate that you take his arguments seriously and
have given them careful thought.
If you decide to write out a letter along the lines of the draft, I would
recommend that we do a courtesy translation (on very close hold) and
send it through Hartman in a
sealed envelope, as we did with your previous handwritten letter.
Regarding the letter of January 12, we will be consulting the Allies over
the next few days and should have a formal reply ready for you to
consider at the end of next week.
Tab A
Draft Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General
Secretary Gorbachev5
Washington, February 12, 1986
DRAFT REPLY TO HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM GORBACHEV
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
Your letter of December 24, 1985, was most thought-provoking and I
would like to share my reactions with you. I have of course also
received your letter of January 14, 1986, and will be responding to
it shortly. However, since the substance of the latter is already in
the public domain, I believe it is well to keep our private
communications separate. Although the issues overlap, I would hope
that our informal exchange can be used to clarify our attitudes on
some of the fundamental questions.
I agree with you that we need to set a specific agenda for action to
bring about a steady and—I would hope—radical improvement in
U.S.-Soviet relations. I suggested two such topics in my previous
letter, and I would hope that we can identify others as ripe for
immediate progress. For example, some of the obstacles to an
agreement on intermediate-range missiles seem to be falling away. I
would also hope that rapid progress can be made toward agreement on
a verification regime that will permit a global ban on chemical
weapons.
Regarding arms reduction in general, I agree with you that we must
make decisions not on the basis of assurances or intentions but with
regard to the capabilities on both sides. Nevertheless, I do not
understand the reasoning behind your conclusion that only a country
preparing a disarming first strike would be interested in defenses
against ballistic missiles. If such defenses prove feasible in the
future, they could facilitate further reductions of nuclear weapons
by creating
[Page 835]
a feeling of
confidence that national security could be preserved without
them.
Of course, as I have said before, I recognize that adding defensive
systems to an arsenal replete with weapons with a disarming
first-strike capability could under some conditions be
destabilizing. That is why we are proposing that both sides
concentrate first on reducing those weapons which can be used to
deliver a disarming first strike. Certainly, if neither of our
countries has forces suitable for a first strike, neither need fear
that defenses against ballistic missiles would make a first strike
strategy possible.
I also do not understand your statement that what you call “space
strike weapons” are “all purpose” weapons. As I understand it, the
sort of directed-energy and kinetic devices both our countries are
investigating in the context of ballistic missile defense are
potentially most effective against point targets moving at high
velocity in space. They would be ill-suited for mass destruction on
earth, and if one were planning to strike earth targets from space,
it does not seem rational to resort to such expensive and exotic
techniques. Their destructiveness can never approach that of the
nuclear weapons in our hands today. Nuclear weapons are the real
problem.
Mr. General Secretary, in the spirit of candor which is essential to
effective communication, I would add another point. You speak often
of “space strike weapons,” and your representatives have defined
these as weapons which can strike targets in space from earth and
its atmosphere, and weapons in space which can strike targets in
space or on earth. I must ask, “What country has such weapons?” The
answer is, only one: the Soviet Union. Your ABM system deployed around Moscow can strike targets
beyond the atmosphere and has been tested in that mode. Your
co-orbital anti-satellite weapon is designed to destroy satellites.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union began research in defenses utilizing
directed energy before the United States did and seems well along in
research (and—incidentally—some testing outside laboratories) of
lasers and other forms of directed energy.
I do not point this out in reproach or suggest that these activities
are in violation of agreements. But if we were to follow your logic
to the effect that what you call “space strike weapons” would only
be developed by a country planning a first strike, what would we
think? We see the Soviet Union devoting enormous resources to
defensive systems, in an effort which antedates by many years our
own effort, and we see a Soviet Union which has built up its
counterforce weapons in numbers far greater than our own. If the
only reason to develop defensive weapons is to make a disarming
first strike possible, then clearly we should be even more concerned
than we have been.
We are concerned, and deeply so. But not
because you are developing—and unlike us deploying—defensive
weaponry. We are concerned
[Page 836]
over the fact that the Soviet Union for some reason has chosen to
deploy a much larger number of weapons suitable for a disarming
first strike than has the United States. There may be reasons for
this other than actually seeking a first-strike advantage, but we
too must look at capabilities rather than intentions. And the fact
is that we are certain you have an advantage in this area.
Frankly, you have been misinformed if your specialists say that the
missiles on our Trident submarines have a capability to destroy
hardened missile silos—a capability your SS–18 definitely has.
Current Trident missiles lack the capability for such a role. They
could be used only to retaliate. Nor is the Pershing II, which
cannot even reach most Soviet strategic weapons, a potential
first-strike weapon. Its short flight time is not substantially
different from that of the more capable—and much more
numerous—Soviet SS–20’s aimed at our European Allies whom we are
pledged to defend and most of whom have no nuclear capability of
their own. Our forces currently have a very limited capability to
strike Soviet silos, and we are improving this capability only
because we cannot accept a situation in which the Soviet Union holds
such a clear advantage in counterforce weaponry. Even if we are
required to complete all planned deployments in the absence of an
accord which limits them, they will not match the number of Soviet
weapons with a first-strike capability.
If our defense and military specialists disagree regarding the
capability of the weapons on the other side, then by all means let
us arrange for them to meet and discuss their concerns. A frank
discussion of their respective assessments and the reasons for them
could perhaps clear up those misunderstandings which are not based
on fact.
In any event, we have both agreed to the principle of a 50% reduction
of nuclear arms. Implementing that agreement is surely the first
task of our negotiators at Geneva. Let me stress once again that we
remain willing to reduce those weapons systems which the Soviet
Union finds threatening so long as the Soviet Union will reduce
those which pose a special threat to the United States and its
Allies. Our proposals in November included significant movement on
our part in this direction and were a major step to accommodate your
concerns. I hope that your negotiators will be empowered to respond
to these proposals during the current round and to engage us in
identifying which strategic systems are to be included in the 50%
reduction.
So far as defensive systems are concerned, I would reiterate what I
wrote before: if your concern is that such systems may be used to
permit a first-strike strategy, or as a cover for basing weapons of
mass destruction in space, then there must be practical ways to
prevent such possibilities. Of course, I have in mind not general
assurances but concrete, verifiable means which both sides can rely
on to avoid these
[Page 837]
contingencies, neither of which is a part of United States strategy
or planning. I honestly believe that we can find a solution to this
problem if we approach it in practical fashion rather than debating
generalities.
I would like nothing more than to find, by our next meeting, an
approach acceptable to both of us to solve this problem. But I
believe that will require two things: accelerating negotiations to
reach agreement on the way to reduce offensive weapons by 50%, and
discussion of concrete ways to insure that any future development of
defensive systems cannot be used as a cover for a first-strike
strategy or for basing weapons of mass destruction in space. Aside
from these broader issues, I believe that your recent proposal
brings settlement of the problem of intermediate-range missiles
closer and that there are improved prospects for agreeing on
effective verification measures in several areas.
Regarding regional conflicts, I can see that our respective analyses
of the causes are incompatible. There seems little point in
continuing to debate those matters on which we are bound to
disagree. Instead, I would suggest that we simply look at the
current situation in pragmatic terms. Such a look would show two
very important facts: that the Soviet Union is engaged in a war in
another country and the United States is not. And furthermore, this
war is one which is unlikely to bring any benefit to the Soviet
Union. So why is it continued?
Certainly not because of the United States. Even if we wished we do
not have the power to induce hundreds of thousands of people to take
up arms against a well trained foreign army equipped with the most
modern weapons. And neither we nor any country other than the Soviet
Union has the power to stop that war. For who can tell the people of
another country they should not fight for their motherland, for
their independence and their national dignity?
I hope, as you say, that there is an open door to a just political
settlement. Of course, we support the U.N. process and hope that it
will take a practical and realistic turn. However, 1985 was marked
by an intensification of conflict. I can only hope that this is not
what the future holds.
As I have said before, if you really want to withdraw from
Afghanistan, you will have my cooperation in every reasonable way.
We have no desire or intent to exploit a Soviet military withdrawal
from Afghanistan to the detriment of Soviet interests. But it is
clear that the fighting can be ended only by the withdrawal of
Soviet troops, the return of Afghan refugees to their country, and
the restoration of a genuinely sovereign, non-aligned state. Such a
result would have an immediate positive effect on U.S.-Soviet
relations and would help clear the way to progress in many other
areas.
The problem of superpower military involvement in local disputes is
of course not limited to the tragic conflict in Afghanistan. And I
[Page 838]
must say candidly that
some recent actions by your government are most discouraging. What
are we to make of your sharply increased military support of a local
dictator who has declared a war of terrorism against much of the
rest of the world, and against the United States in particular? How
can one take Soviet declarations of opposition to terrorism
seriously when confronted with such actions? And, more importantly,
are we to conclude that the Soviet Union is so reckless in seeking
to extend its influence in the world that it will place its prestige
(and even the lives of some of its citizens) at the mercy of a
mentally unbalanced local despot?
You have made accusations about U.S. policy which I cannot accept. My
purpose here, however, is not to debate, but to search for a way out
of the pattern by which one of us becomes militarily involved,
directly or indirectly, in local disputes, and thus stimulates the
reaction of the other. This transforms what should be of local
concern into a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. As I have said, we believe
it is the Soviet Union which has acted without restraint in this
respect. You say it is the United States.
But agreement as to who is to blame is not necessary to find a
solution. The point I would make is that we must find a way to
terminate the military involvement, direct and indirect, of both our
countries in these disputes, and avoid spreading such involvement to
new areas. This was the goal of the proposal I made last October.
Let us encourage the parties to these conflicts to begin
negotiations to find political solutions, while our countries
support the process by agreeing to terminate the flow of weapons and
war materiel into the area of conflict.
Mr. General Secretary, there remain many points on which we still
disagree, and we will probably never reach agreement on some of
them. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the critical problems can be
solved if we approach them in the proper manner. I have the feeling
that we gradually are finding some additional points on which we can
agree, and would hope that, by concentrating on practical solutions,
we can give greater momentum to this process.
But we do need to speed up the negotiation process if this is to
occur. Therefore, I hope you will instruct your delegations in
Geneva, as I have instructed ours, to roll up their sleeves and get
seriously to work.
When you announced to the public the ideas contained in your letter
of January 14, I made a statement welcoming them.6 Our study
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of that message will shortly be completed and
when it is I will be responding specifically to the points you made
in it.
Nancy joins me in sending our best regards to you and your wife.
Sincerely,
