The Arms Control Support Group prepared a lengthy paper on optional
approaches which served as the agenda for a Senior Arms Control Group
meeting on the subject last Thursday.3 Since that meeting three general
approaches have emerged. OSD favors not
altering our current positions while discrediting the Soviet plan. The
State Department would be far more forthcoming in adapting to parts of
the Soviet plan and putting forth new US
positions in Geneva this round. Others are between these two approaches.
Since this subject will be addressed at an NSC meeting next week, I am forwarding for your background
an Executive Summary of the longer paper at Tab
A.
Tab A
Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support
Group4
Washington, January 25, 1986
OWL 21: Responding to Gorbachev’s January
Proposals (S)
Purpose: This executive summary has been
generated from the Arms Control Support Group OWL 20 paper on the
subject in order to familiarize the reader with the decisions
involved with choosing a US response
to the January 14, Soviet initiative. At the heart of the Soviet
proposal (summarized at Annex A) is the
proposed “plan” for achieving the total elimination of nuclear
weapons by the end of the century.5 The overriding decision
will involve our basic reaction to the concept and details
associated with this “plan” within which the Soviet proposals are
embedded. In this regard, the most charged internal USG discussion will focus on the
extent to which we can join in a call for the elimination of nuclear
weapons by the relatively near-term date of
[Page 797]
1999 or accept that goal without caveat. Three
alternative approaches are under consideration: (S/O)
Approach 1. Express reservations about the
Soviet “plan”. Explore new elements of the Soviet proposal in the
appropriate negotiating fora. (S)
Approach 2. Protect our option to advance, at
the appropriate time, a US proposal
which reframes the core of the Soviet plan accepting some basic
elements, (e.g., a commitment to the goal of eliminating nuclear
weapons but with no specific timeline and agreement that the initial
step should be US/USSR reductions), but rejecting any
discussion of subsequent phases or the details associated with such
out-year phases. (S)
Approach 3. Go beyond approach 2 and propose
substantive changes to all three US
NST positions (START, INF and DST) during
the current round. (S)
Each approach would immediately criticize elements of the Soviet
proposal that have previously been offered and rejected by the
US and the unrealistic details
and linkages proposed in Soviet phases 2 and 3. Each would also
attempt to maintain the focus on keeping priority on executing the
mandate given at the last summit to pursue areas of common
ground—50% reduction in nuclear arms appropriately applied, and an
interim INF agreement. (S/O)
Discussion: Certain elements of the Soviet
“plan” reflect positions offered by the US to the Soviets over the past 5 years. For example,
the US is on record as calling
ultimately for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Further, in
response to questions about how the US would propose handling the issue of British and
French forces, we suggested to the Soviets that we should take the
first important steps bilaterally in moving to 50% reductions (as we
define them) and then involve not only the British and French but
the PRC as well. We have also
repeatedly stressed the need to go beyond National Technical Means
(NTM) as required for effective verification. (S/O)
On the other hand, the US has always
made it clear that the elimination of nuclear weapons must be
accompanied by certain criteria that allow us to move safely to a
world where we can maintain our security and commitments without
nuclear weapons. For example, either the causes of conflict must be
reduced (e.g., regional and ideological differences resolved), or
alternative means of protecting US
and allied vital interest must be found (e.g., SDI, improved conventional forces, or
a reduction in Soviet conventional force advantages). (S/O)
The Soviet “plan” narrows the focus on the total elimination of all
nuclear weapons by 1999, making that a goal in itself. It does not
address the corresponding deterrence and stability rationale for
weap
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ons or the
associated mechanisms including equitable reductions, compliance and
SDI, that will be needed either
to eliminate these underlying security requirements or replace the
contribution now made by the nuclear weapons. It offers no schedule
for the resolution of existing regional conflicts and differences
and, in the process, sets up a situation in which, if the
elimination of nuclear weapons by that date were taken as a serious
possibility, it undercuts US and
allied nuclear modernization. (S/O)
In short, as the Soviets have often tried to do, this attempts to set
an unfair public focus and agenda. It’s a heads-they-win,
tails-we-lose situation. If we simply eliminate all nuclear weapons
by 1999, without taking actions by the same date, the Soviets gain a
real advantage. If we reject their offer as framed, we look bad.
Without a balanced and more comprehensive focus (which includes both
a plan/schedule for the elimination of nuclear weapons and a plan/schedule for either eliminating or
handling in some other way the security requirements for these
weapons), it is questionable whether the US and NATO could go
much beyond agreeing to the general overall goal. In evaluating the
concept that the Soviet Union has proposed, we must keep in mind
certain key national security considerations, which are summarized
at Annex B. (TS/O)
The Soviet “plan” also calls for us to accept many unacceptable
elements of the Soviet approach to reductions during the first
phase, front-loading the deal in order to get certain alleged
benefits in subsequent phases. Even then, however, many of the
“benefits” (e.g., the early total elimination of tactical weapons)
promised in subsequent Soviet phases play largely to public opinion.
(S)
We face a serious problem in reconciling planned national security
and defense spending (in the DoD,
DoE and State budgets) with the
realities of deficit reduction and Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.6 We must consider how our response to the Soviet
“plan” will affect the debate in this area. (TS/O)
We must also consider the potential relationship to the upcoming
summit. Some believe that we could use this Soviet proposal to reach
some limited general agreement about the elimination of nuclear
weapons, and if this agreement were framed in a manner so that it
could be finally decided at the summit and protect our positions and
interest in focusing on offensive reductions, that this could be
useful to the United States. Others believe that if we pursue this
approach, it will cause the summit to become, in effect, a deadline
for reaching some
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agreement with the Soviets, and, therefore, it will be much more
difficult to deal with the Soviet proposal, protect our interests,
and pursue our agenda. (TS/O)
If Approaches 2 or 3 were chosen, the
substantive steps in implementation are as outlined in Annex C.7 Beyond the central issue of framework,
there are specific elements of the Soviet proposal which some
believe may represent opportunities for the US; these are summarized below and contained in the
matrix of options at Annex D.8
SPECIFIC ISSUES
A.
START
(U)
In Geneva, the Soviet delegation has said that the Gorbachev proposal does not
involve any changes in their previous START position. We should challenge the Soviets to show
their good faith and demonstrate we can get on schedule for a 1999
date by dropping their onesided preconditions and getting down to
serious negotiations on reducing ballistic missiles and heavy
bombers. (S)
Others believe (Approach 3) that we should go
further to adjust the period of dismantlement to coincide with the 8
year period cited in the Soviet proposal and revisit the issue of
whether to ban single RV mobile
ICBMs. (S/O)
B.
INF
(U)
The Gorbachev package
combines an important shift in INF
that is both potentially encouraging and potentially troublesome
with some familiar and unacceptable elements. (Their “interim”
proposal—allowing 100–120 US
GLCMs to remain in Europe—is
apparently still on the table, according to the Soviet NST Delegation). Some believe
(Approaches 2 and 3) a prompt US
response should be considered. Its key elements as part of a first step package could be as follows:
(S)
—Elimination of US and Soviet LRINF in Europe west of Novosibirsk
(and therefore, Barnaul); (S)
—“Significant” reduction in SS–20s in central and eastern Asia; at
least 50 percent cuts (though the US
would restate its “zero-zero” preference for their total
elimination); (S)
—A global LRINF missile warhead
ceiling. The US would have a legal
right to global equality, i.e., to match any Soviet SS–20 warheads
remaining outside Europe with US
systems in CONUS or elsewhere outside of Europe; (S)
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—Soviet LRINF systems which are
reduced would be destroyed. US
systems based in Europe could be withdrawn to the US unless, or until, they were in
excess of the equal global ceiling, in which case they would be
destroyed (while protecting a right to convert the PIIs to PIBs). (S)
—Equal SRINF ceiling at current
Soviet level or freeze SRINF at
both sides December 31, 1982, levels. (S)
—The reductions and limits would involve US and Soviet systems only; there would be no agreed
constraints on UK and French
systems. (S)
—Introduce key elements of verification regime as an integral part of
this proposal. (S)
—Reaffirm November (summit) joint statement to move ahead on INF agreement without linkage to
Defense and Space issues. (S)
In the second step of an overall program we
could envision the completion of LRINF reductions to zero-zero. (S)
C.
DST
(U)
The parts of the new Soviet proposal that address matters in Defense
and Space neither advance the negotiations nor offer anything
positive to which we could respond. The Defense and Space
Negotiating Group should continue to follow the agenda defined in
the DST instructions for Round
IV,9 and should indicate to the Soviets that,
if anything, their new proposal is a demonstration of lack of
seriousness on their part to pursue a businesslike dialogue.
(S/O)
Some believe (Approach 3) that the U.S.
delegation should propose that neither side seek amendment of the
ABM Treaty during the first
phase and that we seek to resolve compliance issues associated with
that Treaty and agree to do nothing further to erode confidence in
it. (S/O)
D. Other Areas
With regard to verification, risk reduction centers, chemical
weapons, CDE, nuclear testing and
MBFR, the Soviet proposals
are, on balance, not sufficiently forthcoming, and do not require a
change in the current US
position.
Annex B
Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support
Group10
Annex B—National Security
Implications
of Eliminating Nuclear Weapons by 1999
Our current national strategy depends, to a great extent, on the
contribution of offensive nuclear weapons (both strategic and
non-strategic). While we are committed to the ultimate goal of the
total elimination of nuclear weapons, we have always noted that
translating this into reality will take a long time since we will
either have to change the international situation to the point that
the contribution of nuclear weapons is no longer needed (e.g.,
ideological and regional tensions resolved) or alternative means of
maintaining security are in place. Any commitment we make to a
detailed plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons must be viewed
as an extremely serious step which we must be sure we can execute
and safely live with because, once made, it may generate pressures
(budgetary, arms control, political) which could force the US unilaterally toward such a course.
(TS/O)
We are equally committed to NATO
strategy (14/3) which also depends heavily on the contribution of
both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons.11
NATO 14/3 is, in many respects, a
somewhat fragile, political strategy—but absolutely essential to
maintaining alliance cohesion. In the context of the SDI debate, for example, the FRG offered the principle (which we
endorsed) that unless and until an alternative to current strategy
is found and agreed upon, it is essential that full support be
provided to 14/3. Any commitment to a schedule such as that proposed
by the Soviets would immediately call into question the future of
14/3. Once again, this would be a most serious step, and one that
would require extensive Allied consultation. (TS/O)
If the current regional imbalances in conventional forces are not
resolved, there would be little to deter hostile powers from
pursuing their interests to the potential detriment of US interests. Significant political,
economic, and military commitment would be required to equal the
deterrent potential of relatively inexpensive nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, elimination of nuclear weapons by the current nuclear
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powers could place
them at risk from those that have not acknowledged possession, but
may in fact possess, or gain access to, such weapons. (S/O)
The direct impact of the Soviet plan would be to derail Western
modernization. Some of the provisions, by simply being given the
status of real “possibilities”, could achieve the same result. For
example, if the elimination of British and French systems is roughly
8 years away, why should the UK
invest its limited resources on the Trident D–5 missile? Similarly,
if tactical systems are also going to be gone in the same time
frame, why should NATO pay the
fiscal and political costs of modernizing these systems? Why should
the US (or the US and its allies) waste precious funds
and take the political heat of continuing with SDI? And why pay for systems like MX,
MIDGETMAN and the TRIDENT D–5? (TS/O)
The President has committed the US
ultimately to eliminating nuclear weapons. These observations are
not intended to undercut this goal. But, to point out the dangers we
face if this goal is pursued in isolation as proposed by the Soviet
“plan”. Total elimination of nuclear weapons must be accompanied by
actions which obviate the requirements for those weapons, including
resolution of regional differences, the correction of military
asymmetries, and a fundamental change in orientation and ambitions
of the Soviet leadership. (S/O)
