145. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz 1


  • Insights into Gorbachev’s Policies and the Role of the Soviet Military

The [less than 1 line not declassified] sensitive CIA report purports to describe Gorbachev’s goals and motivations regarding arms controls issues at Geneva and the role the Soviet military plays in his plans and economic policies.2 [less than 1 line not declassified]

Gorbachev is not prepared to make major concessions to the US prior to 26th Soviet Party Congress in February since it could harm his image as a tough leader, but he realizes concessions will be necessary to achieve arms control agreement.

Gorbachev must convey the impression that he is an effective leader on foreign policy matters in order to be able to remove the “old guard” at the 26th Party Congress, and thereafter the “old guard” in the bloc.

Gorbachev’s immediate interest would be served by a series of declarations on arms control, trade and international security at the summit. If he fails to get that much, Soviet propaganda is ready to blame the US.

—The Soviet military has already been promised a percentage increase in its budget totally independent of what is to be decided for the civilian economy in the normal five-year plan and Gorbachev has committed himself to extensive modernization of military production facilities. In return the military supports his arms control approach.

  1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (11/15/1985); NLR–775–14–76–5–8. Secret; Sensitive; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by A. Friedt (INR/SEE).
  2. The CIA report was not found attached.