Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

144. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, November 13, 1985, 1–1:46 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Regional and Bilateral Issues for Geneva

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President

• The Vice President’s Office

  • Donald Gregg

• State

  • Secretary Shultz
  • Assistant Secretary Ridgway

• Treasury

  • Secretary Baker

• Defense

  • Secretary Weinberger

• Justice

  • Attorney General Meese

• CIA

  • Director William Casey

• CJCS

  • Admiral William J. Crowe

• DOE

  • Danny J. Boggs

• OMB

  • James C. Miller III
  • Dr. Alton Keel

• White House

  • Donald Regan
  • Robert C. McFarlane

• NSC

  • Jack F. Matlock
  • Tyrus W. Cobb

Minutes

In opening the meeting, Mr. McFarlane pointed out that the President goes to Geneva able to deal from a position of strength. While the Soviets, and many of the President’s critics, have attempted to turn this into an SDI summit, the President has been able to successfully broaden the agenda. The Soviets now concede that the Summit should address issues that are of fundamental importance to the Soviet-American relationship—including regional, human rights and bilateral matters. While arms control remains a critical part of the agenda, it will not dominate the Geneva sessions. (C)

The President’s firm stance, Mr. McFarlane added, has made it clear that the root of our bilateral problems lies not in the arms race. In doing so, the President has secured the support of the American people and the Congress, and persuaded the Soviets to treat these issues seriously. George Shultz raised these points in Moscow and while the Soviets have not agreed with our point of view, they are prepared to discuss them.² (C)

Secretary Shultz noted that the discussions he had in Moscow were not particularly productive. However, the sessions were conducted in a very cordial and businesslike manner. They have agreed to the President’s proposal to discuss various regional problems, which we have moved forward at the Assistant Secretary level. Your UNGA speech provided the impetus for forward progress by suggesting a process whereby these concerns could be addressed.³ It appears, the Secretary said, that the Soviets haven’t yet figured out what their response will be to the President’s regional initiative. We expect Gorbachev to be evasive on the question of regional problems, and achieving progress on this will be one of the most difficult challenges facing you in Geneva. The Secretary said that Gorbachev told Bud and him that both superpowers needed to exercise restraint, and both have obligations. Specifically, the General Secretary said the USSR would support “national liberation movements.” Still, the Secretary concluded, the Soviets have not offered us anything specific. Our task is to ensure that Gorbachev understands that these regional crises represent potential “flash points.” (C)

On human rights, Shultz continued, the Soviets have said they are prepared to discuss, to varying degrees, these issues. In the Soviet view, there are basically three categories of human rights concerns. First, there are those cases which the Soviets believe have some legitimacy; i.e., the Soviets concede our arguments have some merit. For example, divided spouses may be reunited as long as the individual had no exposure to national security information. We presented a list to them, but no action has been taken, although they have promised some movement here.⁴ Secondly, there are those cases the Soviets regard as internal matters and the broader question of emigration. The Secretary recommended that the President also remind the Soviets not only of their commitments in Helsinki, but specific pledges with respect to Seaman Medvid and the soldier, Sukhanov, who entered our Embassy in Kabul.⁵ The Secretary concluded that this will be a rough session, and we should expect that Gorbachev will counter by citing alleged abuses in this country. Specifically, the Soviets may cite a study by the Hoover Institute that called for increased arms expenditures at the expense of social entitlements. In response, we should cite the number of jobs we have created. The President responded that he knew it would be difficult, but thought that he might stress to the Soviets that the key difference is that we do not have fences to keep our people in. The Secretary agreed and noted that the key would be to note that we wanted to handle these issues privately. (C)

The Secretary noted that there are many bilateral issues on the agenda, some of which were moving to solution:

—Cultural Exchanges: It appears that we will have this agreement ready for signature. However, we have a remaining disagreement regarding reciprocal access to television and on exhibits.

—Environment: EPA Director Lee Thomas is now in Moscow, but it is doubtful that we will have anything ready on environmental matters.

—Air Safety: We continue to bang away on this issue, emphasizing that the Soviets have a responsibility regarding air safety in the North Pacific. There is a good chance that we can bring this agreement to fruition.

—Civilian Aviation: We have an agreement in principle, but several specific problems remain. Pan American is still unhappy about financial arrangements. While it may be difficult, we believe we will have this agreement ready for signature.

—Consular Agreement: The Soviets are holding this agreement hostage to the CivAir accord. We have a survey team in Kiev, searching for alternate sites. If we find a suitable site, we will consider moving forward, but we will not sign an agreement unless we have located suitable property and can insure simultaneous occupancy.

—INC/SEA: There is a possibility for cooperation in this area, but it is doubtful that anything will be ready for Geneva.

—Berlin: We need to continue hammering at the Soviets regarding problems in this vital city. First, we must stress how important it is to guarantee safety in the Berlin Air Corridors. Secondly, in the wake of the Nicholson murder, we need to come down hard on the necessity of ensuring the safety and operational capabilities of our military liaison missions.

—Trade: We have no great expectations in this area, but Mac Baldrige will lead a mission to Moscow in December.

—Fusion: The Soviets have proposed a multi-lateral cooperative venture designed to investigate the potentials of nuclear fusion for energy production. This would involve the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and other countries. We have stressed that participation would be restricted to those countries actually contributing. We have cooperated with the Soviets in this area in the past and have profited from this cooperation. The President asked where this prototype would be built. The Secretary responded that this was a critical point. The Soviets are pushing for Vienna, but we prefer Geneva. He added that this would be an unclassified project, but we have serious concerns, particularly about sharing computer technology. Whatever technology transfer occurs will have to be within COCOM guidelines. Secretary Weinberger pointed out that if adequate controls are not in place, we may just want to agree only to discuss funding, costs and mechanisms for implementation. He noted that DOD was very concerned with the problem of computer technology, as well as the possibility of diverting DOE funding away from SDI. (S)

Director Casey pointed out that he felt Gorbachev would stress the importance of Moscow playing a role in the Mid-East peace negotiations, and he would criticize President Zia’s involvement with the Afghan resistance. President Reagan said that he might point out to Gorbachev that while we recognize his obligation to support so-called national liberation movements, we cannot agree that this should be done by the provision of arms. We, too, support legitimate revolutions—the problem is distinguishing a genuine insurgency from one supported by outside powers. The difference is that we are not subverting legitimate governments, but we are supporting democratic forces. The President added that much of the Soviet claim to legitimacy depended on fulfilling the Marxist-Leninist dictum that communism cannot succeed until the world revolution occurs. Secretary Shultz added that the President was quite correct, and, interestingly, it won’t be necessary to quote Marx or Lenin on this—the Soviets would agree with him. The President mused that perhaps what was required was some sort of supervision of elections. On the human rights issue, the President indicated that he planned to handle this issue primarily in the one-on-one sessions. He added that he would point out that it would be necessary to see progress here in order to gain public and Congressional support for movement in other areas. (C)

Deputy Secretary Boggs noted that we have a fairly successful ongoing program with the Soviets on fusion cooperation. He pointed out that the two big problems with an expanded fusion program were funding and protection of technology. Although fusion will involve primarily civilian utilizations, we need to stay alert to technology transfer problems, particularly with respect to computers. We anticipate a budget requirement of about $150 million per year. This is a very attractive venture in that if it were successful, it would bring enormous benefits to mankind—virtually cost-free energy. We need to subject this proposal to more interagency scrutiny. (S)

Admiral Crowe noted that INC/SEA could yield some attractive cooperation. Some modest military to military contacts have been established. In the past, we have also had reciprocal port visits. Secretary Shultz added that we have some proposals on the table for expanding this cooperation, but the Soviets have not yet picked up on them. (C)

On the point of denial of religious freedom in the USSR, the President said he has been struck by the rise in anti-semitism there. He speculated that the restriction on Jewish emigration was largely based on their fear of allowing such talent to leave the country. The President speculated that if the Soviet leaders would allow the Jews to attend services in their Temples, then much of the desire to emigrate would be eased. Secretary Shultz noted that despite the official atheism, many of the funerals there have distinctly religious overtones. (C)

The meeting concluded at 1:46 p.m.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Geneva Meeting: NSC (National Security Council) Meetings. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. On November 13, Reagan wrote in his personal diary that three meetings related to the upcoming summit took place. He wrote: “A full cabinet meeting to brief them on plans for Geneva—then some talk about the ‘87 bud. (even though they haven’t come up with one for ‘86). Then an N.S.C. meeting—again on practical details for Geneva. Cap came in with full report on Soviet treaty violations (more reading).” This report, along with a November 13 covering letter to the President from Weinberger, are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988. Another copy is in the Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Memoranda of Conversations, Moscow (09/11/1985)–(11/13/1985). Reagan continued, noting that later that day “Bill Casey brought in 3 of his experts on the Soviet U. Their presentations on the people of Russia were great & confirmed things I had heard from unconfirmed sources. The Soviet U. is an ec. basket case & among other things there is a rapidly spreading turn by the people to religion.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, pp. 539–540) This meeting with CIA analysts presumably covered the NIE on Soviet Domestic Economic Stresses, sent to the White House on November 6; see Document 141.
2. See Documents 134–140.
3. See footnote 3, Document 85.
4. See footnote 3, Document 136.
5. Seaman Miroslav Medvid and Soviet soldier Aleksandr Sukhanov were both potential Soviet defectors who chose to return to the Soviet Union. Reagan addressed both cases in several entries in his personal diary. On November 1, he wrote of Sukhanov: “Well the Goblins didn’t get us but we have another Soviet defector case. In Kabul—our embassy—there is a deserter from the Soviet mil. asking asylum.” Then on November 2: “Our defector in Kabul cant make up his mind. He’s 19 yrs. old. The Soviet Ambas. visited him in our embassy and gave him a fatherly pitch as to how he could go back to Russia—no punishment etc.” Of the Medvid case, Reagan wrote on November 7: “Ed Meese came in to brief us on the Medved [Medvid] affair—he is the sailor who jumped ship (a Russian ship) in New Orleans to be a defector. Then he recanted and is back on ship board.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, pp. 535–539) More information on Medvid is in telegram 332820 to Moscow, Leningrad, and Athens, October 30. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850773–0359) More information on Sukhanov is in telegram 335592 sent for information to Moscow, November 1. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850781–0401)