Nevertheless, at the November meeting, the Soviets might see principles
common to both sides—a 50% reduction and an interim INF freeze—as grist for a joint
declaration. Later, at NST, the Soviets
will be tempted to modify their counter-proposal in light of the new
US offer. While their position on
SDI is unlikely to change, in
START they would eventually begin
to bargain. While they will would probably view higher limits as
acceptable, they would not want to be seen as proposing them. In INF, they will likely add to the US offer of 140 launchers in Europe a
number of Soviet systems equal to those of
[Page 539]
the UK and France;
in Asia, they might reduce SS–20s by about 30% (codifying a
dismantlement apparently already planned). But they would do all this
only in the context of continuing pressure on the US
SDI position.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research3
SOVIET VIEWS OF THE NEW US
NST PROPOSAL
The Soviets will see the new US
proposal as having major defects, and fundamental ones on SDI, and as an effort to recapture
some of the public relations high ground going into the November
meeting.
A Soviet Military Perspective
The following evaluation from a Soviet viewpoint of the new US
NST proposal is based on our
understanding of Soviet strategy, military programs, and past arms
control proposals.
Defense and Space: A Disappointment. The new
US proposal will be seen by the
Soviets as confirming their view that a deal on SDI is not possible—at least for now.
They will no doubt reject any idea of “open laboratories” as an
attempt to legalize the SDI program
rather than circumscribe it.
Gorbachev will find himself
in a dilemma. His prior personal statements on SDI make it embarrassing for him to
respond positively. He will no doubt press his points in November.
If he cannot gain any concessions on SDI the possibility cannot be excluded that he would
denounce the summit as a failure. However, the Soviets probably did
not realistically expect a deal on SDI at the meeting, and they would probably see
continuation of an arms control dialogue as their only means to try
to circumscribe SDI.
The Soviets will continue to assert that there can be no deal on
START unless some limits are
put on SDI. Past Soviet statements
and proposals clearly indicate they want a ban on development,
testing, and deployment of SDI;
they also would like to define more explicitly what is permitted
research. The Soviets are likely to go on resisting being drawn into
a dialogue on facilitating a transition to a “defense-
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dominant” world. They also
will continue to deplore US efforts
to reinterpret the ABM Treaty,
which they view as symptomatic of US
rigidity on SDI.
INF: Perhaps a
Silver Lining. Given Soviet demands for the inclusion of
FBS and for equality with total
NATO
INF, they would still see the
US and Soviet positions as being
far apart. They would, however, see opportunities for further
discussion. The proposed limit of 420–450 warheads on LRINF missiles in Europe (which
appears to envisage a limit of 36 Pershing–IIs) and the proposal to
allow conversion of Pershing–IIs (P–IIs) to shorter-range Pershing–Ibs both signal a
willingness for significant reductions in US
P–IIs. This is important because
the Soviets regard the P–II’s
accuracy and short flight-time as a threat to their
command-and-control. The US formula
for reducing SS–20s in Asia is vague, and could leave the Soviets
with 54–81 of their 162 Asian SS–20s depending upon how it is
calculated.
START: Not Good
Enough. The new proposals contain some elements the Soviets
would regard as improvements over previous US positions: more ICBM
RVs are allowed, and limits on heavy
bombers and ALCMs are made
explicit. The Soviets would see these factors, however, as being
outweighed by what they would regard as the negative aspects of the
proposal. (See attached examples of US and Soviet forces under the US proposal.)4
—Too few ballistic missile RVs are allowed. The 4500 limit (500 less than
under the last US proposal) is too
low to meet Soviet targeting requirements as we understand them,
even with the reductions the US is
likely to make. The Intelligence Community estimates that 4300–4900
weapons would be needed in a comprehensive Soviet strike against the
US. Factoring in withheld
reserves, unreliability, and unavailability pushes this up to
6400–7600. The Soviets also may have requirements for additional
weapons to compensate for expected wartime attrition and to cover
targets in other areas. A reduced number of US targets due to the proposal would only lower Soviet
requirements by 200–300 weapons, as the US could retain over 80% of its ICBM force. Not only are the Soviets
reluctant to substitute bomber weapons for missile RVs in the initial strikes, but the
US proposal does not allow then
enough bomber weapons to take up the slack if they so chose.
—US bomber
advantages remain. While the two sides are allowed 350
heavy bombers and 1500 ALCMs, the
Soviets probably would interpret the US proposal as counting the Backfire intermediate-range
bomber as a “heavy bomber.” The USSR thus would be forced to reduce
[Page 541]
its theater and martime strike force
(420 Backfire are projected to be deployed by 1990), and to trade
off between their remaining Backfire (which do not carry ALCMs) and the intercontinental-range
Bear H and Blackjack. Furthermore, gravity bombs and short-range
attack missiles (SRAMs) are not
limited—the US could deploy at least
1800 of these under its proposal.
—The ban on mobile ICBMs. This will abort an expensive 30-year
push by the Soviets to improve the survivability of their ICBM force, and will disrupt
long-made deployment plans. The SS–25 road-mobile ICBM is already deployed, with 27
operational and bases for up to 108 more under construction. While
it could be deployed in silos, we do not believe the Soviets
currently plan to do so. A very expensive infrastructure to support
rail-mobile deployments of over 100 SS–X–24s (which could begin in
1987) also is under way. Strategically, the Soviets could argue that
mobiles meet US concerns over
stability and therefore should be permitted.
—Soviet modernization is disproportionately
affected. Not only does the US proposal preclude planned mobile deployments of the
SS–X–24 and SS–25, but would specifically cancel the SS–18 Follow-on
heavy ICBM program we know to be
in train. The RV limits would also
force the Soviets to limit deployments of the SS–N–20 SLBM/Typhoon SSBN, and would be
unable to retrofit the new SS–NX–23 SLBM into existing Delta–III–class SLBMs. Fewer bombers could be
deployed, and large numbers of single-RV
ICBMs and SLBMs would have to be
dismantled.
In contrast, the US could deploy all
currently programmed MX ICBMs and
B–1 bombers. Trident SSBN deployment would have to terminate with
the twelfth boat in 1990, but Trident–II SLBM deployment could go ahead. (With MX and Trident–II
unconstrained, the US’s prompt
hard-target capability would be growing at the same time the
mobility ban would leave the USSR’s ICBMs vulnerable.)
Only about half as many US
ALCMs could be deployed as
planned, but the US could simply
refrain from converting some B–52s for ALCMs and would have to dismantle only a few. US and Soviet SLCMs would remain unconstrained.
How Might the Soviets Parry?
At the summit Gorbachev will
no doubt be sharply critical of the US proposal, and in particular will renew his demands
on SDI. At the same time they may
examine the US proposal for possible
language that could be included in a joint declaration at the end of
the meeting.
—While objecting to a number of provisions in the US proposal, they probably see the
basis for agreed language centering on both sides’ willingness to
work toward a 50% reduction of offensive forces, the details to be
worked out at the NST talks.
[Page 542]
—Given that the proposed INF freeze
would occur before the next NST
round, they might hope that an agreement can be announced at the
meeting itself on a cessation of further INF deployments, coupled with a commitment for further
negotiations on reductions.
At subsequent NST Rounds the Soviets
may begin to bargain on START and
INF in the hope that progress
in these areas may give them renewed leverage on SDI. If so, they might attempt to meld
their present position with what they would regard as the
encouraging elements of the new US
proposal. Such a response might embody the elements described in the
following paragraphs.
START. The
Soviets are likely to continue to propose overall limits on weapons (i.e., gravity
bombs and SRAMs as well as RVs and ALCMs). While the Soviets would be reluctant to be
publicly identified as the proposer of higher
limits, they might hint that such higher levels are acceptable. To
the extent that Soviet public rhetoric commits them to a 50%
reduction, it will be difficult for them to advocate smaller
cuts.
One option would be to take the US’s
6000 figure for RVs and ALCMs, and add to it the 2000 or so
other bomber weapons the US
apparently is reserving the right to deploy. This limit of 8000
weapons might then include a sublimit of 6000 ballistic missile
RVs (this would be closer to
actual Soviet requirements, while not too far above the old US position of 5000). To address US concern about the number of ICBM
RVs, the Soviets might offer to
deploy no more than 45% of the 8000 weapons on any one leg of the
triad; this would result in 3600 ICBM
RVs, as does their present
counterproposal. They might also propose 1250 SNDVs (the magic 50% from their
current position), probably would retain SALT–II-type modernization constraints, and certainly
allow mobile ICBMs.
Until the SS–X–24 Follow-on ICBM
was deployed in the early 1990s, the Soviets probably would not have
enough hard-target-capable RVs to
cover all US
ICBMs. However, all US hard-target-capable ICBMs (MX and Minuteman III) probably
could be covered from the outset of an agreement. The Soviets are
unlikely to accept direct limits on ballistic missile throw-weight
(these might even be unnecessary, as the 3000 RV
ICBM limit effectly constrains
them). They may subsequently propose trading the throw-weight
reductions for something the US
finds equally unacceptable, such as FBS inclusion in START.
INF. The
Soviets might try to pocket the US
offer of 140 LRINF missile
launchers in Europe, and add to it a number of launchers or warheads
equal to those of the UK and France.
In Asia, they might offer to reduce their SS–20s about 30%—in
effect, proposing to “concede” what they already appear to be
preparing to do (i.e., dismantling the five
SS–20 bases at Novosibirsk). They are unlikely to accede to the
equal global limits concept. In sum, while there can be movement on
INF, the two sides would remain
far apart.
[Page 543]
Defense and Space. The Soviets are unlikely to
change their position. At some point they might offer to delineate
permitted research. To induce the US
to negotiate over SDI limits, the
Soviets might be prepared to signal willingness to accept wider
SDI activities than they have
to date.
