Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

83. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 30, 1983

SUBJECT

• My Meeting with Gromyko in Madrid

I. Our Strategic Approach

My meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Madrid will be the first of a number of sessions with him in September.² I see this series of meetings as an opportunity to pursue our testing strategy with the Soviets in a way that maximizes pressure on them to be forthcoming on issues we can identify as ripe for doing business, and, possibly, to attenuate their response to the prospect of U.S. INF deployments in Europe later this fall. Substantively, the Soviets have been responding in small ways to our testing (on the Pentecostalists, the grains agreement, CSCE, and even in START and MBFR). Having back-to-back meetings in September gives us a chance to create bureaucratic incentives for positive decisions in Moscow by putting issues before Gromyko in Madrid to which he should respond three weeks later.

Realistically, we cannot expect major movement from the Soviets in the weeks and months ahead: they are in a sour mood, and are facing a serious political defeat on INF deployment. Hence, we will not want my meetings with Gromyko to be seen as harbingers of a major breakthrough, or even a significant improvement in relations. If European pressures grow for a delay in INF deployment we may have to put less emphasis on the progress we have made and more emphasis on continuing Soviet intransigence. We want to maintain hope that obstacles to progress can be overcome; but suggesting that the Soviets are being less obstructionist than they really are could jeopardize INF deployments and our strategic programs.

The risk we currently face, however, especially with the allies, is not one of excessive expectations. Rather, they are worried about no progress at all, and as the INF deployment date approaches they will see a danger of all-out confrontation. These mounting concerns are being used to bring pressure on us to make concessions to the Soviets in arms control. For the present, I believe one antidote may be public perception that some modest movement in other areas of U.S.-Soviet relations is possible. At the same time, we must counter any new over-optimism which could eat into support for our rearmament program by continuing to point to Soviet obstructionism on the essential issues.

The setting seems more favorable than for my meeting with Gromyko a year ago. We are regaining the initiative in international affairs from the Soviets. Our economic recovery and improved ties with our allies and friends give us reason for confidence in dealing with the USSR; we have a lead in the INF debate in Europe; and the prospect of your and Cap Weinberger’s visits to Asia will demonstrate that we are on the move there as well.³ Of course, we will need alert U.S. diplomacy if we are to manage the strategic/MX debate here and the INF “hot autumn” in Europe successfully. We also face problems in the Middle East which give the Soviets satisfaction. But overall they will be on the defensive, trying to walk the line between demonstrating their unhappiness with the INF deployments and threatening counter-actions, and keeping the door open to dealing with the U.S.

We understand Gromyko’s people have recommended to him that he engage me in a broad review of the relationship in the shorter Madrid meeting, and reserve discussion of specifics for New York. At Madrid, I will certainly want to convey to him that we are sticking to our broad agenda, and that there can be no basic improvement in relations before they show us in deeds that they are willing to act on our concerns about human rights and regional issues as well as arms control and bilateral matters. I will underscore our willingness and ability to sustain and win a long-term competition and undercut any illusion that they can simply wait us out.

But it would be a mistake, as I see it, to play Gromyko’s game by putting off discussion of specifics to New York. On our side, we have, as you know, serious problems about treaty compliance in the arms control field and about fulfillment of their earlier commitment to liberate Anatoliy Shcharanskiy by early 1984 (assuming he appealed for early release, which he has been unwilling to do so far). We have major concerns over Soviet activities in Central America, Libyan forces in Chad, and Soviet-encouraged Syrian intransigence in the Middle East. I will want to press all these issues: they cannot wait.

At the same time, in order to get the most from the multiple-meeting scenario I should be in a position to demonstrate that we are ready to move toward settlements that are consistent with the interests of both countries. I do not expect Gromyko to be a willing partner: diplomats on the defensive rarely are. But rather than debate him on philosophy or on INF, I would like to put forward some new ideas in the arms control field. My hope would be that some of the modifications we are making in our negotiating positions in key negotiations—START, INF and MBFR—will combine with our continuing military buildup and our revived activism in the Third World to make the case for restraint and compromise more credible within the Kremlin.

The decisions we will be considering on arms control issues over the coming weeks will therefore be critical to success in my September meetings with Gromyko. If we wish to give the Soviet bureaucracy a push, in other words, we also need to give a push to ours.

Following the Madrid session, we may wish to consider whether we should invite Gromyko to Washington after the New York meeting. In that case he could meet with you as well as me. If properly managed such a visit could drive home both the seriousness of your message and contribute to the perception that we are doing our utmost to probe for Soviet flexibility. It would also position us well to make use of what may have to be our second theme of the fall—that despite our efforts we are prevented from moving forward on the issues by Soviet intransigence.

II. The Madrid Agenda

At Madrid, I plan to take up all four areas of our long-standing agenda with Gromyko, but I will want to lead with human rights and arms control.

Human rights will head my list both because of its importance and the CSCE context of our meeting. Unless we have some word on Shcharanskiy before we meet, I will give his case—and the promise Max Kampelman was given for his release—top priority. In addition to Shcharanskiy, I will mention Sakharov, the Pentecostalists, Soviet Jewry and the recently established “Anti-Zionist Committee,” and the Soviet spouses of Americans that the Soviets are not allowing to emigrate. To put these cases in a broader framework I will also elaborate the themes of my CSCE speech, on the connection between human rights and security.

Gromyko will, as always, attach highest priority to arms control, arguing that for Moscow this is the litmus test of U.S. seriousness in pursuing more constructive relations. I will need to be able to deal with arms control in this meeting in a way that denies him the claim that we are intransigent in this important area. Accordingly, I propose to emphasize two basic themes:

—that we are serious about reaching agreements in START, INF and MBFR, and are prepared to be flexible as long as the end results meet our criteria of reductions, equality, stability, and verifiability;

—but that Soviet failure adequately to address our concerns about compliance with existing agreements will undercut any prospects for reaching agreements.

On specific negotiations, I propose to proceed as follows:

—On INF, I would like to give a substantive reply to Andropov’s weekend message to you⁴ by previewing with Gromyko the new elements of flexibility that Paul Nitze will be outlining in the first days of the new round in Geneva. One thought would be to hand him your answer to Andropov. At the same time, I will want to reiterate that any increase in tensions from Soviet counter-deployments will be the Soviets’ fault.

—On START, I will point to the important changes tabled by Ed Rowny in the last Geneva round, and emphasize our flexibility in finding a mutually acceptable way to reduce the throw-weight disparity. Given Moscow’s complaints that our proposal seeks radical restructuring of Soviet strategic forces, I would like to inform Gromyko in Madrid that at our UNGA meetings later in the month, I will be prepared to address possible changes to the framework of the U.S. proposal, if the Soviets are prepared to take similar steps to meet our basic concerns.

—On MBFR, I plan to pick up on Dobrynin’s reference to the possibility of additional verification measures, and urge that the Soviet negotiator present more specific ideas when he and Ambassador Abramowitz resume their private exchanges in Vienna.

As for compliance, the Soviets have to understand that much is at stake. I intend to voice in strong terms our concerns about the new large phased-array radar’s compatibility with the ABM Treaty. I will state bluntly that the Soviet claim that the radar is for space-track rather than ABM purposes is implausible, and that failure to resolve the situation will undermine our arms control efforts. I will also reiterate our dissatisfaction with Soviet explanations about the PL–5’s consistency with SALT II, and point to the corrosive effect on mutual confidence of Moscow’s telemetry encryption practices.

I also plan to press Gromyko on regional issues of importance to us. On Central America, I will reiterate our warnings against the introduction of Cuban combat troops or jet aircraft into Nicaragua and emphasize the danger that current Soviet policies—particularly the large supply of arms—could lead to a confrontation. Larry Eagleburger has just warned the Soviets about Syrian foot-dragging on a pullout from Lebanon, but I would plan to press the point again with Gromyko. Afghanistan will, of course, be touched on, but New York on the eve of the UNGA Afghanistan debate is probably a better place to press the Soviets. We want to keep up the pressure on the Soviets over Afghanistan, and if we are careful should be able to assure that they take the blame for any failure of the UN-sponsored negotiating effort currently underway. Similarly, in order to keep the Soviets from claiming that lack of consultation on southern Africa excuses their foot-dragging there, I plan to offer Gromyko another side meeting at senior working level—with Chet Crocker on our side as before—at the UNGA.

I plan to use bilateral issues essentially as means to suggest to the Soviets that further progress may be possible in our bilateral relationship if they are willing to meet our concerns on other, more vital issues. If we can develop negotiating positions on the consulates and exchanges agreement in time, these could serve as examples. But I will underscore to Gromyko that small steps forward in such areas cannot substitute for agreement on more substantive questions.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 8/16–31/83. Secret. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Burt and Azrael forwarded the memorandum to Shultz through Eagleburger under cover of an action memorandum on August 30. Simons drafted the August 30 action memorandum on August 26, which was cleared by Palmer, Kelly, and Sestanovich.
2. Shultz and Gromyko were scheduled to meet in Madrid during the CSCE on September 8.
3. Reagan went to South Korea from November 12 to 14 and visited China in late April 1984. Weinberger was on a trip to Asia from September 23 to October 3, visiting China, Japan, and Pakistan. A joint State-Defense message noted that Weinberger would be “prepared to discuss with the Chinese the full range of Asia-related security issues, including the Soviet threat, Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, and Afghanistan, as well as other issues of mutual concern.” (Telegram 206535 to multiple Asian capitals, July 23; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830419–0910)
4. See Document 81.