Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

82. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 29, 1983

SUBJECT

• Andropov’s Proposal to Destroy Missiles

In an August 27 Pravda “interview,” Andropov offered to destroy all missiles to be reduced under the Soviet proposal to limit SS–20s “in Europe” (probably referring to those missiles deployed west of their proposed 80-degree line) to the level they attribute to British and French missiles.² He has now sent you a letter (Tab 1),³ formally conveying that offer.

In the letter, Andropov portrays this move as “a serious step” toward a mutually acceptable agreement and states that the USSR expects a comparable reciprocal step from the US that would make such an agreement possible. He states that Moscow believes that agreement is still “possible and achievable,” and that the Soviet Delegation will have instructions to “exert additional efforts” toward agreement in the next round.

Under their previous position, the Soviets maintained that the primary method of reduction would be destruction, although a certain percentage of systems could be withdrawn from Europe. We have pressed the Soviets in Geneva for some time as to whether or not any SS–20s to be reduced under their proposal would be destroyed, or merely relocated to the eastern USSR. Thus, the Soviet move is, at a minimum, a welcome clarification of their position. It is, however, also significant in that the Soviets have offered, for the first time, to destroy a number of new systems (i.e., 80–100 SS–20s). Of course, the basic problems in the Soviet position—inclusion of British and French forces, a ban on any US INF missile deployments, and no limits on new SS–20 deployments in the Far East—remain.

The Soviet move is of course primarily directed toward European public opinion. It would not directly affect the options now before you with regard to possible new elements in our own INF position (i.e., inclusion of aircraft, regional subceilings, a proportional reduction of Pershing II). However, we can expect the Soviet move to find some resonance here and in Europe; it will likely generate additional pressures—both from publics and from some of the Allies—for movement on our part when the INF negotiations resume on September 6.

We will be in a better position to develop your response to Andropov’s letter as a result of decisions to be taken on our INF position. In your letter we would then be able to outline the substance of any new elements of our position. My meeting with Gromyko in Madrid on September 8 would provide an opportunity to convey your response. These steps, properly presented to the Western public, will allow us to maintain the initiative and sustain Allied support for our deployments.

The NATO Special Consultative Group meeting scheduled for September 2 offers an opportunity to inform the Allies of Andropov’s letter. Andropov may be sending similar letters to Allied leaders; if so, we can use this SCG to coordinate our replies.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Brezhnev (8290913, 8391028, 8391032). Secret; Sensitive. A notation on the routing slip for Shultz’s memorandum reads: “Sep 02 83 Pres Noted.”
2. In telegram 10897 from Moscow, August 27, the Embassy reported: “In a pre-vacation interview, leader Yuri Andropov has made his most significant statements in months on INF and China. Responding to questions by Pravda August 27, Andropov clarified that the Soviet Union would be prepared to destroy all missiles—including SS–20s—reduced in Europe under an INF agreement. His remarks revealed no change in the Soviets’ insistence on taking into account UK/French systems or in their opposition to any U.S. deployments.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830494–0455)
3. See Document 81.